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ABSTRACT
DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL FOR A MULTIPLICITY OF PUBLIC SPACES:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MEDIA-HOSTED DISCUSSION BOARDS
FEBRUARY 2015
BRYAN MATHEW BALDWIN, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
M.A., EMERSON COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jarice Hanson
Since their inception, online discussion boards have intrinsically appealed to
proponents of deliberative democracy, and those appended to Web-based news sources
have been recognized as possessing the potential – whether realized yet or not – to
engender meaningful discussions by engaged citizens on a range of public issues. In
contrast, ardent critics of such forums contend they are merely raucous and unstructured
repositories of expressions reflecting the darker side of human nature (e.g. incivility,
vulgarity, ad hominem attacks, racism, homophobia, etc.).
This study assessed the deliberative quality of online postings made over a twomonth period and affiliated with four popular news sites. The researcher administered an
a priori content analysis scheme designed to gauge four key component measurements of
a comment’s deliberative quality (civility, politeness, justification and complexity) while
also coding categorical information pertaining to the modality and constitution of
precipitating news content. The findings revealed statistically significant differences in
the overall deliberative quality of comments, as well as a wide range of differences
within each of the component measures, across the four platforms. A broader matrix of
comparisons (utilizing each of the categorical variables to group data accordingly) are
vii

	
  
presented in alignment with five overarching research questions.
From the study emerges the need to embrace a different premise altogether when
considering the efficacy of online discussion boards: to better understand whether or not
this contemporary communicative construct is thriving or withering, it is first necessary
to recognize that a multiplicity of online spaces exist, each theoretically serving different
typologies of publics. Only after doing so does the researcher endeavor to offer an array
of tailored reforms to better calibrate the expectations for participant engagement and
information dissemination and synthesis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview: A New Invitation to Construct Meaning
The coupling of Web-based news outlets and online discussion boards has grown
increasingly commonplace. Among the traditional media outlets, including those as
seemingly mainstream as The New York Times, National Public Radio and CBS News,
technologies allowing readers, listeners and viewers to comment easily on what they have
read, heard or seen have been integrated just as readily as within the domains of upstart
blogosphere journalists, podcasters and YouTube mavens. Though there may be
uncertainty as to whether demand for this technology has driven its deployment or its
deployment has driven demand (for discussions of technological determinism see, for
example, Postman, 1993), its increasingly ubiquitous presence and popularity are clear.
According to the Pew Internet and American Life Project, consumers of online news are
highly participatory and 37% of adults (and 51% of adults between the ages of 18 and 29)
surveyed cited the “ability to comment” as one of the most popular features of Webbased news outlets (Purcell, 2010). At the same time, and even on some of the most
traditional online news sites (such as WSJ.com, the online presence of The Wall Street
Journal), articles written by bona fide journalists occupy the same level of prominence as
user comments within much of the hypertextual frame.
Though much has been written about the Internet’s broader implications on
subjects ranging from the intrinsic opportunities for greater democratization of news
reporting (see, for example, Papacharissi, 2002) to the inherent dangers for healthy
citizenship affiliated with users’ newfound abilities to tailor news content and curtail a
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diversity of perspectives (see, for example, Sunstein, 2001; Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson,
1997), such questions all begin with a shared – and enduring – assumption: the journalist
is still the primary distiller of facts, information and analyses into news content that is
then transmitted to and digested by an audience. Though the nearly universal
accessibility of the Internet (at least in an American context) and the growing availability
of news broadcasting tools have certainly widened the field of entry considerably for new
journalists, their introduction and rise did not immediately transform the role of the
journalist itself. Whether a foreign correspondent for The Washington Post, a blogger for
The Drudge Report, or the host of an RSS-fed podcast, journalists as recently as a decade
ago still operated clearly as elites (or insiders) and the public was still very much, to use
Lippman’s (1927) term, a “phantom” in that “the citizen gives little of his time to public
affairs, has only a casual interest in facts and a poor understanding of theory” (Lippman,
1927, p. 25).
Commenting features and easy-to-use discussion interfaces are important
technological developments to be sure, but far more important is what their marriage to
traditional news outlets symbolizes: an implied invitation to the public to not only join a
discussion but to participate in the synthesis of information and contribute in an open
forum in which meaning may be considered, deconstructed and reconstituted over and
over again. Within such a construct, the determination of the meaning of news content
no longer resides exclusively, or concludes with, the journalist. Rather, the journalist can
be seen as now playing a very different role: he/she germinates or furthers a conversation
by offering an initial news report; the conversation is catalyzed by the explicit or implicit
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invitation for members of the audience to discuss; and the journalist is then nearly always
absent from the direct proceedings of said discussion.
As its central premise, this dissertation recognizes this change to be radically
upsetting to the traditional norms of interaction and engagement (or lack thereof) that
have long existed between the purveyors of news and audiences. A shift so seismic is
worthy of deeper investigation in its own right, but it is the staggering speed with which
this change occurred within the culture that makes such an exploration particularly
intriguing. With so little time for adjustment, both progressive news outlets and forwardthinking participants alike struggle with how to best engender an appreciation for these
forums as virtual agoras and not the cyberspace equivalent of the bathroom stall (see, for
example, Goldberg, 2010; Perez-Pena, 2010; and Messmer, 2009).
As a secondary premise, this study readily acknowledges the enduring agendasetting capabilities of news organizations (Iyengar & McGuire, 1993; McCombs & Shaw,
1972). Beginning with Lippman’s (1922) initial conclusion that the public responds not
to actual events but to the “pictures in our heads” (p. 4) created largely by the reporting of
the press, and steadily advancing through sophisticated explorations in contemporary
political psychology illustrating the inherent powers of the elite to shape public opinion
(see, for example, Zaller, 1992), the agenda-setting function is highly relevant to the
current inquiry. Even during a time of considerable evolution and upheaval in how a
burgeoning media connects with a diversity of audiences, Cohen’s (1963) words still ring
true: the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think,
but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (p. 13).
Ultimately, this work seeks not only to better understand the various forces at play
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within this expansive and often cacophonous discursive space, but also to apply the
analytical findings to a program of practical reforms and an articulation of reasonable
best practices. And while vibrant public spaces may take any number of forms –
Habermas’ (1989) rational-critical model, Hauser and Grim’s (2004) rhetorical
democracies, Mouffe’s (2000) agonistic confrontations, and Schudson’s (2011)
monitorial citizenries are but a few – all stem from the shared tradition of civic virtue
perhaps best captured by Arendt’s (1958) notion of vita activa, in that the self is
secondary to the public realm and one’s merit is established by public conduct (Hauser,
1999). Absent a deeper and more pragmatic understanding of how new technologies do
or do not possess the inherent capacity to energize such domains and excite healthy civic
discourse, any proposed strategies to leverage or redefine the ways in which journalists
serve the public – and of how the public serves journalists – would be premature. These
spaces may hold the democratic potential to emerge and potentially flourish as bona fide
publics, but before making any assessment it is first necessary to gauge how much of the
exertion of discursive energy is merely about (at best) talking in circles or (at worst) what
one former online ombudsman labeled “the digital equivalent of the loudest drunk in the
bar” (Shepard, 2011).

Political News: A Key Ingredient of Democratic Vitality
While there is an ongoing and highly-charged debate over the efficacy (see, for
example, Capella & Jamieson, 1997; Jamieson, 1993; Page & Shapiro, 1992) and
political-economy (Bagdikian, 2004; McChesney, 1999) of contemporary news
organizations, a well-functioning press is generally understood to be a necessary
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ingredient to any political environment in which democratic values and robust debate
flourish. Few critics would be given pause, for example, with a reminder of Winston
Churchill’s famous wartime pronouncement:
A free press is the unsleeping guardian of every other right that free men prize; it
is the most dangerous foe of tyranny… Under dictatorship the press is bound to
languish, and the loudspeaker and the film to become more important. But where
free institutions are indigenous to the soil and men have the habit of liberty, the
press will continue to be the Fourth Estate, the vigilant guardian of the rights of
the ordinary citizen (Ingelhart, 1998, p. 188).
Political information concerning the affairs of state and the nerves of government is
synthesized and channeled through the media, thus introducing a powerful check-andbalance against the excesses of power. For James Madison, this dynamic was so essential
that it functioned as, in effect, the cornerstone of the (then) radical new experiment in
popular sovereignty:
Nothing could be more irrational than to give the people power, and to withhold
from them information without which power is abused. A people who mean to be
their own governors must arm themselves with power which knowledge gives. A
popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is
but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both (Madison, 1900, p. 143).
Though the value of political information vis-à-vis democratic institutions may be
accepted as a truism, there are sharp divisions in the understanding of the means by
which such information is transformed into political knowledge, let alone the extent to
which that knowledge sparks critical discussions, excites civic activity or informs
political decision-making. For purposes of this study, two particular scholarly traditions
are of interest: the mastery of political facts as a measure of political sophistication; and
political cognition through the use of schema and heuristic cues. Though no single
explanation comes close to explaining fully the discursive dynamics at work within

	
  

	
   5

	
  
online discussion spaces, an understanding of each provides an effective orientation for
beginning to conceptualize the analysis.
Political Literacy
Research placing an emphasis on the importance of the public’s familiarity with
political facts (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Luskin, 1987; Neuman, 1986) begins with
the assessment that the American political system is constituted by an amalgamation of
disparate and even inconsistent normative values. As such, the ability of citizens to
participate within such a system requires a relatively mature sense of political literacy.
For those with a high degree of political literacy, the system functions quite well; for
those without, the system can quickly become practically impenetrable and conceptually
less democratic. Ultimately, varying levels of political knowledge contribute to a
stratified and, potentially, reinforcing power structure. In their seminal work, What
Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1997)
concluded that Americans know comparatively far less about how their political system
functions than do the citizens of nearly all other industrialized nations, and citizens who
are most informed about one topic tend to be most informed about all topics. They go on
to argue that the distribution of political knowledge is an issue of power and not one of
choice: better informed citizens are more likely to participate, discern their own selfinterest, have stable opinions, and connect their opinions to political developments.
Citizens need to be more engaged in politics, but the reasons for paying attention need to
be clearer to them, the benefits of stronger citizenship must be more evident, and the
opportunities to learn about politics should become more frequent, timely and equitable.
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While numerous studies over an extended period of time offer evidence
supporting the broader claim that Americans’ political literacy is dangerously low (see,
for example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954; Converse, 1964; Entman, 1989;
Converse, 2000), Delli Carpini and Keeter further conclude that levels have remained
ostensibly constant over the past five decades. An explosion of new communications
channels shrinking the chasm between those who govern and the governed (see, for
example, Grossman, 1995; Abramson, Arterton & Orren, 1988) has done remarkably
little to improve political literacy. At the same time and equally surprising, the waning of
print-based news, with its natural bias for prioritizing the objective, rational use of the
mind (Ong, 1982), and the rise of more televisual forms, which catalyze emotional
responses (Hart, 1994) and reinforce entertainment as a supra-ideology (Postman, 2005),
has hardly been to its detriment. Not only have levels of political literacy remained
virtually unchanged but, as Page and Shapiro (1992) detail in their study of a nearly
identical time period, Americans’ collective policy preferences have been shown to be
generally stable and, when they do change, they typically change in understandable and
predictable ways.
Political Cognition
An emphasis on political facts necessarily privileges the idea that citizens are
rational beings for whom the quality of their political decisions is based upon the clarity
and the completeness of information. For Lippman (1922) and others, it is a false ideal to
conceive of a public that is capable of managing its own affairs in this way, and it is folly
to suggest the average citizen is “omnicompetent” (p. 21) in the manner necessary to
flourish. The public, according to Lippman, does not express its opinion so much as
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align itself against a set of choices that are proffered by governing or controlling elites.
This “bewildered public” (p. 21) consists merely of spectators of political action who can,
at best, confine their interests in the public to those things of great interest in a moment of
crisis. This dim – or at minimum, sobering – view of citizenship was echoed by Downs
(1957) in An Economic Theory of Democracy. Writing more than 30 years after
Lippman, Downs (1957) concluded that rationally behaving citizens have little incentive
to gather information before making political choices (or even choosing to make political
choices at all) and struggled with the fact that citizens would ever turn out in large
numbers to vote – and yet, to varying degrees, they generally do.
Concurrent advances in cognitive psychology (see, for example, Bartlett, 1932;
Piaget, 1952) may partially explain how it is that citizens with deficient levels of political
literacy and few incentives to pay closer attention can continue to be both grounded in a
stable set of political values and adaptive to an increasingly complex universe of
information. Building on Kant’s (2003/1781) original notion of schema as an
imaginative construct for linking non-empirical concepts to mental images of objects that
had been experienced empirically, the cognitive literature brings to light the possibility of
shortcuts employed by humans as they wade through a bevvy of observations. Within
such a framework, the importance of political news is not so much connected to fueling
one’s supply of political information as it is to expanding the depth and range of political
cognition and civic learning.
Understood from this perspective, and as noted by Graber (2001), the core
features of political knowledge are not the facts they contain but the implications they
hold for decision-making and action. She insists that citizens marshal an array of
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inherent heuristic devices to pay attention to what they need and concludes, “When it
comes to functionally useful knowledge, average citizens are moderately well informed”
(p. 45). In his discussion of presidential campaigns, Popkin (1994) details the ways in
which citizens employ low-information rationality to make reasonable, from-the-gut
choices. Like Graber, he concludes that evaluating the health of the citizenry based
solely on factual knowledge is both misleading and failing to address the deeper concerns
of citizenship. Citizens are quite capable of relying upon and subconsciously tapping into
any number of “cognitive holding spaces” to simplify assumptions, evaluate information,
and make reasonable decisions. Key (1966) offers perhaps the most blunt description of
reasons for optimism vis-à-vis the ability of citizens to process political information:
[My] perverse and unorthodox argument… is that voters are not fools. To be
sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed, yet by and large the
electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given
the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information
available to it. In American presidential campaigns of recent decades the portrait
of the American electorate that develops from the data is not one of an electorate
straitjacketed by social determinists or moved by subconscious urges triggered by
devilishly skillful propagandists. It is rather one of an electorate moved by
concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental
performance, and of executive personality (p. 7).
Beyond the domain of individualized decision-making, the use of cognitive
shortcuts also helps to explain many of the dynamics of group political behavior and
begin to reveal how it is that ordinarily disinterested citizens can suddenly find
themselves interested in collective activities. As Gamson (1992) argues, most citizens
condition political knowledge through their own experiences, memories and reflections.
As such, they possess a “latent political consciousness” (p. 20) that can be elicited by any
number of collective action frames. Integral to the definition of collective action frames
are the components of injustice (moral indignation expressed in the form of political
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awakening), agency (awareness that is possible to alter conditions or policies through
collective action), and identity (the process of defining a sense of belonging, typically in
contrast to a sense of other). As this study is fundamentally concerned with the
discussions existing within online forums – as opposed to one-off pronouncements or
discursive hit-and-runs – an understanding of such dynamics is highly relevant.

Purpose and Nature of the Study
According to national trend data collected by the Pew Internet and American Life
Project, a significant number of American adult Internet-users report they have posted
comments on online news sites and the participation rate has risen significantly – 18% in
February 2006, 22% in December 2007, 27% in September 2009, and 32% in September
2010 (the last time such data were collected) (Pew Internet and American Life Project,
2012). This growth may be interpreted as somewhat understated given that the size of the
American adult population of Internet-users has also risen steadily over the same period.
Across the broader landscape of similarly functioning communicative technologies, the
upward trajectory is as clear as it is consistent: Nielsen/McKinsey reports that the
worldwide number of blogs has risen from 36 million to 173 million from October 2006
to October 2011 (NielsenWire, 2012); 51% of Americans had a Facebook account in
2011 versus 8% in 2008 (Webster, 2011); and the number of Americans using Twitter on
a typical day quadrupled between November 2010 and February 2012 (Pew Internet and
American Life Project, 2012a). The inescapable conclusion is that, more than ever and at
an expanding rate, users are publicly recording their thoughts and opinions, creating
content, and contributing effort to enlarge the universe of discourse. It remains to be seen
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if such users are behaving as a simple amalgamation of an increasingly noisy and
disconnected audience or whether they might possibly be crossing a different threshold –
that of conscious and participating citizens who, perhaps each in their own way, readily
or accidentally embrace a mode of vita activa.
While dozens of recent studies within the field of political communications have
assessed the implications this explosion of traffic has had on any number of important
civic dynamics (see, for example, Himelboim, 2011; Bennett, Wells & Freelon, 2011;
and Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), very few have attempted the additional fete of gauging
levels of discursive quality within such spaces. Too much attention in the past has been
paid to the volume of content created, be it measured by force of strength or sheer
numbers. The result has been an overemphasis on the two extremes of the cyberoptimism/cyber-pessimism continuum: either the surge in voluntary expression on
matters of public interest is seen as a boon for the democratic spirit (see, for example,
Anderson & Cornfield, 2003), or the rapid expansion in noise lessens the ability for
citizens to resolve political differences through such a mode of discussion (see, for
example, Sparks, 2000).
It must be noted that the choice to focus on the quality of discourse is made
primarily to gauge a flavor of the overall civic-mindedness of discussants and to reveal, if
possible, some of the more generalizable characteristics of groups populating each online
discussion board. Doing so allows for a consistent and fair exploration of differences
between the various groups, anchors the research trajectory to a rich literature pertaining
to civic discourse and deliberation (see Chapter 2), and allows for the construction and
administration of a comprehensive content analysis coding scheme (in this case, centered
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around four unique measures of discursive quality – civility, politeness, complexity and
justification; see Chapter 3). This approach also carries with it, however, an inherent
challenge and limitation that must be identified at the outset: the methodology employed
corresponds to but a single understanding of quality, one influenced significantly by the
underlying theories and virtues of deliberative democracy. The narrowness of this
approach notwithstanding, examining a large sample of public discourse through a
common lens is useful for determining if, at least based upon one set of grounded
measures, there are significant differences present across the broader population.
What may make this study unique is that, as it assesses the quality of public
discourse with an eye towards civic-mindedness, it is also attempting to determine
whether or not different kinds of online news content – understood in this investigation as
the unique starting material for each of the online discussions considered – may have an
impact on the quality of discourse that follows. Here, too, the methodology employed is
attempting to unweave the densely woven tapestry of online discussions into some of its
component threads. The chosen grouping categories are intended to be neither
exhaustive nor arbitrary, but simply reflective of some commonsensical distinctions
between one packet of news content and another. There are any number of
differentiating choices that could have been made to explore differences and, given the
exploratory nature of the study, the researcher deliberately focused on but two of the
more obvious ones: categories describing the news channel; and categories describing the
overarching focus of the news content itself.
The news channel dimension is of inherent interest because it describes, in
essence, the technological mode (in this case, either print or audiovisual) through which
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news content traverses to reach audiences. In addition, as this study focuses on the
relatively new deliberative space of online discussion boards (one made possible by the
advent of the Internet), it is compelling to distinguish between news channels that are
native to the Internet Age and those that arrived in the pre-Internet era. It is conceivable
that the very agency of a news organization may be understood quite differently by those
born in cyberspace and in a time of ubiquitous social media than those that were not (see,
for example, Braun & Gillespie, 2011).
With respect to the dimension of news content, numerous critics have tended to
categorize political news as being about either the workings of democratic processes or
tactics and gamesmanship (see, for example, Patterson, 1993). This study embraces the
spirit of the existing lineage of scholarship while also, perhaps, streamlining and tailoring
its underlying distinction for purpose of easier measurement; political news content is
characterized as being either primarily focused on a mode of governing or a mode of
campaigning. Additionally, each segment of news content considered by this study is
labeled as being principally concentrated around domestic political topics (meaning
germane to the United States) or those predominantly relevant to international affairs.
Much has been made of the influence of the Internet in engendering a truly global
perspective and mindset: cyber-optimists point to signs of political borders being made
more permeable and the formation of a global village as a result of new technologies;
cyber-pessimists see a strengthening of the innate human tendency towards balkanization
(see, for example, Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 1997). Again, this study is not so much
concerned with validating or refuting such arguments but about marshaling them within
the given methodology to consider an array of potential differences.
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Once the vibrancy of the discursive space is examined deeply, the opportunity to
reconsider and, if need be, reform the rules, procedures and guiding principles
undergirding such forums arises. Emerging best practices and time-tested exemplars will
be examined in brief, and a new menu of practical strategies – to boost discursive quality,
improve efficacy of the forum, and further engender an appreciation for democratic
dialogue – will be presented. First, however, the study must shine a light on the larger
question of whether or not the historic relationship between journalists and audiences has
fundamentally changed given the introduction of new technologies that readily encourage
deliberation. Moreover, it is necessary to consider to what extent the fine line between
audiences and citizens is being further blurred (or, perhaps, is coming into greater focus)
as a result of users' engagement with new deliberative tools. To do so, the study begins
by scrutinizing the quality of the given discourse and establishing where important
differences may exist given the analytical approach. Only then can it envision the
emergence of a difference set of dynamics altogether, one which may hold the potential
for, first, understanding that a multiplicity of unique typologies of publics can reasonably
exist, and second, supporting each of those typologies with a more sophisticated
calibration of the space itself. As such, the more intrinsic value of this research is to
demonstrate the idea that new technologies are important to the human condition not so
much in that they alter it but because they may allow humanity to understand itself in a
more deep and meaningful way.
Research Questions
Employing the methodology of content analysis prescribed in Chapter 3, the
dissertation poses five overarching research questions:
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(RQ1) As measured by the four characteristics of quality public discourse, what
is the overall quality of the discussions taking place in the four online
discussion forums and are there significant differences?
(RQ2) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant
differences in the measures of quality public discourse between those
news sites that offered printed materials versus those that offered
multimedia segments?
(RQ3) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant
differences in the measures of quality public discourse between Internetnative and traditional news sites?
(RQ4) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant
differences in the measures of quality public discourse in discussions
linked to stories/segments principally covering domestic politics and those
principally covering international politics?
(RQ5) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant
differences in the measures of quality public discourse in discussions
linked to stories/segments principally covering governing/policymaking
and those principally covering campaigning?

Organization of the Study
The dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 2 follows this
introduction with a thorough review of the existing literature. As the study positions
itself at the intersection of numerous scholarly vectors, the chapter is understandably
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bricolage in flavor. And while a wide variety of existing trajectories could factor in to
the analysis, several emerge as being highly relevant. These include, but are not limited
to: contemporary identifiers and dynamics of public spaces; enduring and emerging
considerations for the interplay between journalistic integrity and the democratic
imperative; the changing landscape for reporting, interpreting and digesting political
news; and key elements of theory and practice as they pertain to deliberation (and
particularly online debate) and public discourse. Lastly, the chapter will catalog the
small number of existing studies that have sought to measure discursive quality in online
spaces and begin to articulate the theoretical foundations behind how this study measures
discursive quality as an indicator of an online community’s civic health.
Chapter 3 describes in detail the specifics of the content analysis methodology
employed in the study. Particular attention is given to the operationalization of the four
variables of quality and, given the large number of content units, the process of training
the coding team to achieve adequate levels of inter-coder reliability. Chapter 4 presents
the findings achieved as a result of undertaking the given methodology and responds to
each of the five research questions. Observations from a secondary analysis, which
qualitatively (and holistically) reviews the most voluminous online discussion in each of
the four forums, is also presented in this chapter.
As described previously, Chapter 5 considers the broader implications pertaining
to the vibrancy and quality of this discursive space, reviews current and possible best
practices, and develops a slate of recommendations with an eye towards improving
democratic vitality. Before concluding, the overarching strengths and weaknesses of the
study are assessed and opportunities for further research are offered.
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Conclusion
Rapid – and accelerating – advances in technology have made it increasingly
commonplace for users to create and marshal the content of their choice. Never before
has the act of expression been easier to constitute, register and broadcast.
Communication technologies are now as ubiquitous as they are instantaneous, and even
the most novice of users can marshal an array of inexpensive – or even free – tools and
transmission systems that not very long ago were limited to those who possessed
sufficient means and/or sufficient focus and determination to convey their beliefs,
conclusions or consternations. The ability of a U.S. Senate candidate tapping into her
Twitter feed, for example, certainly raises new questions about the need for public
relations or journalistic intermediaries. No less important, the anonymous poster of a
hastily articulated online comment attached to a published story about said campaign
causes one to wonder about the long-term health, plausibility and efficacy of more timetested (let alone validating) techniques of writing letters to the editor or crafting op/ed
pieces.
For many scholars, technology is already understood to be an extension of the self
(see, for example, Turkle, 2005; Kurzweil, 2000): mobile devices and a cloud-based
infrastructure are becoming as essential to users as opposable thumbs and rapid eye
movements, while social media feeds and a plethora of information channels are as
seamless to a user’s experience as senses of smell, taste or touch. Critical to remember,
however, is that what defines a user is not necessarily the same as what embodies a
citizen. Simply interfacing with technology does not, in and of itself, meet or surpass the
various thresholds of engaged citizenship. Similarly, activity per se does not necessarily
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equate to the virtues of Arendt’s vita activa. To be a citizen is to think and behave as a
contributing member of a broader public; one’s public deliberation should be forged of
judicious argument, critical listening and earnest decision-making (Gastil, 2000) and
strive (even if not always successfully) to advance the democratic ideals of empathy,
egalitarianism and open-mindedness (Barber, 1984).
Through a professional acumen built on integrity and objectivity, and by
functioning as the quintessential stewards of publicly relevant information and analyses,
journalists have long served not only an invaluable scrutinizing function but also as
catalysts for the transformation of content and activity into public deliberation and
discourse worthy of democratic institutions and life. Profound changes in technology,
and specifically the growing ease with which users can readily broadcast their opinions
anonymously and without the need for validation or evidence, certainly holds the
potential to disrupt the bearings of this invaluable balance wheel. The news industry
certainly finds itself in the midst of similarly epochal change – and facing historic choices
– as detailed by the most recent annual report of the Pew Research Center’s Project for
Excellence in Journalism:
So far, news organizations are mainly using the popular networking platform,
Twitter, to push out their own content rather than to engage with audiences, solicit
information or share information they themselves did not produce… The
problems of newspapers also became more acute in 2011. Even as online
audiences grew, print circulation continued to decline. Even more critically, so
did ad revenues. In 2011, losses in print advertising dollars outpaced gains in
digital revenue by a factor of roughly 10 to 1, a ratio even worse than in 2010.
When circulation and advertising revenue are combined, the newspaper industry
has shrunk 43% since 2000. The civic implications of the decline in newspapers
are also becoming clearer. More evidence emerged that newspapers (whether
accessed in print or digitally) are the primary source people turn to for news about
government and civic affairs. If these operations continue to shrivel or disappear,
it is unclear where, or whether, that information would be reported… In sum, the
news industry is not much closer to a new revenue model than a year earlier and
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has lost more ground to rivals in the technology industry. But growing evidence
also suggests that news is becoming a more important and pervasive part of
people’s lives. That, in the end, could prove a saving factor for the future of
journalism (Mitchell & Rosenstiel, 2012).
For this hope to become reality, and for the news media to reassert its invaluable role as a
guardian of the public interest, the function of the journalist needs to be reimagined in the
context of burgeoning, user-created content and heightened expectations for engagement.
Absent a thorough assessment of the quality of such content, even given the presumed
rawness of its current form, one could understandably infer that signal had
overwhelmingly been squelched by noise. And yet, even if they are distracted by this
cacophony, audiences continue to demand and consume significant quantities of news. It
may very well be that audiences continue to assign high intrinsic value to the role
journalists have historically played in helping to transform passive audiences into active
citizenries, but the emergence of new tools may have altered the conditions by which that
can both occur and be recognized. Perhaps even more important, the simple notion of a
dichotomous partnership between the news media and its audiences may no longer be a
sufficient construct to sort out the bigger questions of who is responsible for integrity and
objectivity. In its place, revealed at least in part by the widespread utilization of new
technological tools to support dialogue, arises the possibility of identifying a much richer
and diverse multiplicity of public spaces in which both the purveyors and consumers of
news may come together in a variety of ways to catalyze discussion, promote exchange,
and create the conditions for a flourishing and invested citizenry. The roles,
responsibilities and expectations of all involved could vary significantly from one public
space to the next, as could the conditions for maximizing each domain's democratic
potential.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
A Bricolage of Research Traditions
The scholarly trajectory of this investigation requires passage through a
tremendously active, but also rather raucous, intersection of numerous research traditions.
Occasionally, the boundaries between these fields of study are blurred beyond
identifiability, while at other times the connective tissue that lies between them is not so
readily apparent. Key influencing components drawn from the existing literature include:
the virtues, complexities and realities of public spaces; an understanding of the various
theories of public discourse as they pertain to the digestion of political news and potential
activation of civic responsibility; the possible effects (positive, negative and neutral) new
communication technologies may hold for the democratic imperative; and measures of
quality for online public discourse.
Though this study may draw from a range of research perspectives, it is
fundamentally grounded in Page’s (1996) underlying premise that “[p]ublic deliberation
is essential to democracy” (p. 1). As described in their comprehensive review of the
empirical literature, Delli Carpini, Lomax Cook, and Jacobs (2004) note that the
celebration of public deliberation has its origins in the city-states of ancient Greece and
further flourished in the town hall meetings of colonial New England and bourgeoisie
salons and cafes of Eighteenth Century Paris. Within at least one tradition of democratic
theory (see, for example, Barber, 1984; Connolly, 1983; Dahl, 1989; Dewey, 1954/1927;
Fishkin, 1992; Habermas, 1996; Mansbridge, 1983), public deliberation is understood to
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be a cornerstone of participatory democracy and representative government. According
to Chambers (2003), public deliberation:
begins with a turning away from the liberal individualist or economic
understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in conceptions of
accountability and discussion. Talk-centric democratic theory replaces votingcentric democratic theory. Voting-centric views see democracy as the arena in
which fixed preferences and interests compete via fair mechanisms of
aggregation. In contrast, deliberative democracy focuses on the communicative
processes of opinion and will formation that precede voting… Although theorists
of deliberative democracy vary as to how critical they are of existing
representative institutions, deliberative democracy is not usually thought of as an
alternative to representative democracy. It is rather an expansion of
representative democracy (p. 308).
This connection of theory with purpose continues to be highly relevant in an era
defined by rapidly evolving new media forms that are increasingly participatory and
accessible, and a time in which rapid technological innovation has precipitated the
expectation for a heightened mode of invention and the possibility for a greater variety of
communication channels. Be that as it may, newer forms of media (not unlike all those
that preceded them) continue to hold a highly contingent level of utility in empowering
the public domain as each new innovation is shaped and conditioned by both the citizens
who use them and the discourse that serves as their lifeblood.
Publics and Public Spaces: Competing Definitions and Dynamics in a New Age
As noted by Dahlberg (2007), many Internet-democracy commentators,
researchers and practitioners embrace the notion and advocate for the further
development of a deliberative “public sphere” as the ideal framework for citizen
participation in politics. Within such spheres, rational-critical debate between citizens
over shared problems and interests leads to better informed public opinion that can both
guide and balance the work of officials and the systems of government (see, for example,
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Benson, 1996; Bohman, 2004; Clift, 2003; Davis, 1999; Fung & Kedl, 2000; Gimmler,
2001; Noveck, 2000; Sunstein, 2001; Tanner, 2001; Wilhelm, 2000). Though the
literature surrounding public spheres and their emergence, maintenance and expansion –
or, more pessimistically, their dissipation, atrophy and decay – is as varied as it is vast,
the primacy of discourse is central to nearly every relevant theoretical construct.
Though each theorist defines and positions the notion of public in a slightly (or in
some cases, radically) different manner, each argument has a strong conceptual tether to
discourse. As a foundational conception, an understanding of public has a multitude of
connotations and innumerable philosophical origins. For purposes of this study,
however, the seminal works of two theorists are particularly noteworthy in setting the
stage for a consideration of public realms: Hannah Arendt’s (1958) The Human
Condition and John Dewey’s (1954/1927) The Public and Its Problems.
Arendt (1958) noted that an underlying problem facing western philosophy was
the subordination of action and appearance (what she labeled vita activa) to purer forms
of thought and eternal essences (vita contemplativa). In calling for a reversal of this
hierarchy, Arendt outlined the three forms of human activity: labor, work and action.
Labor, she argued, consists of the things humans need to do to keep themselves alive.
The results of labor are fleeting and the only record of labor’s presence is human
survival. In contrast, work is the process by which man creates a world of artificial
things that endure over time. Critical to this understanding is the belief that a mode of
work also sets the stage and establishes the conditions by which actions can occur.
Action, in turn, is a uniquely human quality, speaks to mankind’s ability to be novel and
inventive, and is accomplished chiefly through speech and communication. Arendt
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insists that action requires a sense of public, a term she defines as a place of commonality
(i.e. occupied by shared structures and institutions generated from work) and political
agency in that actions carry with them a degree of agency. For Arendt, who rejected neoromantic notions of intimacy and emotional frameworks within the broader construct of
public, the public sphere is a largely artificial place defined by civility and, when
appropriate, solidarity. This was not a shortcoming, she claimed, but served as one of its
greatest achievements in that it created the appropriate environment for contributing
members of the public to determine their own affairs. One could argue that online
discussion and comment boards, the discursive space examined by this dissertation,
epitomize the very artificiality of which Arendt described.
Though his perspective and underlying philosophy were very different than
Arendt’s, Dewey’s faith in the public’s ability to determine its own affairs was quite
similar. Writing after the first World War but before the onset of the Great Depression,
Dewey (1954/1927) argued that political meaning is created through conjoined action and
a public consists of all those things that are directly or indirectly connected to the broader
array of such actions. The challenge for the public, he posited, was one fueled by the
context of modern industrial life. Homogenous communities of shared interests (e.g.
Jefferson’s agrarian democrats) had been replaced by loose, heterogeneous clusters of
mass audiences. Until the “Great Society is converted into a Great Community,” he
argued, “the Public will remain in eclipse” (p. 142). Dewey described the Great
Community as:
a society in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of
associated activities shall be known the fill sense of that word, so that an
organized, articulate Public comes into being. The highest and most difficult kind
of inquiry and a subtle, delicate, vivid and responsive art of communication must
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take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and
breathe new life into it. When the machine age has thus perfected its machinery it
will be a means of life and not its despotic master. Democracy will come into its
own, for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion… It
will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the
art of full and moving communication (p. 184).
Few scholars describe a more obvious and essential role for discourse with respect
to energizing public spheres than Jurgen Habermas (1989). This clarity, however, comes
only with the privileging of the very particular kind of discourse Habermas identifies as
the “ideal speech” type. Against the broader context of rational-critical debate, the ideal
speech type is one in which all participants have an equal ability to engage in discourse,
there is mutual respect by all involved for each individual’s contribution to the
discussion, and the speech itself is devoid of ideological connotations. In such a mode,
which Habermas claims existed for only for a brief period of time in certain parts of
Europe (Witschge, 2004), citizens come with private agendas to engage in strategic
communications within the public sphere. What emerges as the victorious argument is
the one that trumps all others based upon its own discursive strength. While ideal speech
types and modes of rational-critical debate seem applicable only to very particular kinds
of homogenous communities, Froomkin (2004) notes that individuals are only capable of
practical discourse, which produces only provisionally legitimate laws or rules that apply
only to the group or polity that produced them. Practical discourse cannot be achieved
directly within society as a whole but only through the creation of smaller communities
focused on discrete matters of import. Significant improvements in information
technology, however, may hold the promise to bolster levels of communicative capacity.
Discourse-enabling tools are being developed at a rapid pace and hold the potential to
radically empower individuals operating in cyberspace. Froomkin is hopeful that some
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combination of these tools will help to overcome the daunting problems of scale and
draw discursive power back into the public sphere.
While many democratic theorists conceive of public as a type of space (real,
virtual or otherwise), Hauser (1999) suggests something else entirely: the public as a
rhetorical activity. By conceptualizing publics in this way, Hauser is able to explain why
what appear to be outwardly inchoate political movements have a sense of integrity that
would otherwise arise only from many years of maturation and the refinement of a
common vocabulary. Describing the notion of public not so much as an environment but
a mode of engagement, Hauser and Grim (2004) argue that there need not be the
acceptance of a particular point of view but rather respect for the underlying belief that a
given contribution occupies a central place in the constitution of public itself.
Conceptualized in this way, there is less of an inherent need to form a single
comprehensive sense of public. Instead, multiple publics form principally around issues
and ultimately contribute to a broader sense of civic dialogue. While some theorists (see,
for example, Gitlin, 1998), point to these public “sphericules” as either too chaotic or too
assimilated, Hauser suggests that what is most important is that they are eventful, in that
citizens become members of a public only by directly contributing to a broader activity.
Considered in this context, a lack of consensus or the absence of sophisticated discourse
within online discussion spaces need not necessarily be equated with the deficiency of a
sense of public. What matters instead is a shared propensity by participants to openly
contribute to the process of engagement, even if what is being contributed varies
considerably from one participant to the next.
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For Mouffe (2000), the very idea of consensus is antithetical to the broader
project of democracy and is more likely to precipitate the onset of hegemony.
Democratic conditions, Mouffe contends, originate from two seemingly incompatible sets
of normative values – one based on the rule of law (e.g. rights, property, etc.) and the
other based on popular sovereignty. Too often, in Mouffe’s judgment, consensus is akin
to the colonization of one of these sets of normative values over the other. Rather than
strive to reach consensus, Mouffe advocates for a mode of agonism. The ongoing
presence of adversarial conditions, along with the continuous reshaping of the public
landscape based upon changing dynamics between adversaries, activates the democratic
spirit.
Whether highly stylized or purposefully bereft of norms for interaction, publics
and public spheres emerge from the supposition that an exchange of ideas ultimately
empowers modes of deliberative democracy, be they narrowly or broadly constituted
(Fishkin & Laslett, 2003). For a mode of communication to be deliberative, however, it
must exist for far deeper purposes than simple transmission and reception of messages to
and from citizens. Indeed, it is a communicative form that is both interactive and
purposeful, defined as “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, wellinformed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of
discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers, 2003,
p. 309). Only when the participants understand their participation to be essential, and
thus recognize that their exchange may have some concrete impact (no matter how large
or small) on political outcomes, can the role of the public – and thus, the imperative of
public deliberation – be both clear and strong.
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Public Deliberation: Norms and Critiques
An extensive body of literature points to a surprisingly small number of norms
vis-à-vis the ability of public deliberation to engender positive democratic outcomes
(Delli Carpini, Lomax Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). If deliberation is sufficiently empathetic,
egalitarian, open-minded and reason-centered, it is expected to result in the consequences
of: heightened appreciation for the perspective of others; a broadened sense of one’s own
interests; the belief that citizens can work collaboratively to solve problems; enhanced
legitimacy for the overarching political system; and the generation of social capital (see,
for example, Barber, 1984; Gutman & Thompson, 1996; Mansbridge, 1983; Warren,
1992; Sunstein, 1993; Putnam; 2000). At the same time and no less important, there
remains significant and reasonable doubt as to the practicality, appropriateness, efficacy
and political significance of such a communicative form (Delli Carpini et al., 2004).
Critics argue that forums for public deliberation are too infrequent, lack connectivity with
the machinery of government, privilege the affluent and well-educated, and require a
skillset not possessed by the typical citizen (see, for example, Brown, 2000; Hibbing &
Thiess-Morse, 2002; Mansbridge, 1983; Mutz, 2002; Sanders, 1987; Schudson, 1997;
Sunstein, 2001).
Fishkin (1992) places some of these concerns in context by arguing the quality of
deliberation exists on a continuum between less deliberative and more deliberative.
When, for example, arguments by some participants go unanswered by others, or when
information that would be required to understand the force of a claim are absent, or when
some citizens are unwilling to weigh in on some elements of the debate, the process is
regarded as less deliberative. From a practical standpoint, and given the diversity of
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perspectives, styles and aptitudes participants bring to any forum, a certain amount of
incompleteness is expected and thus tolerable. The act of improving deliberation (i.e.
moving it from a mode of less deliberative to more deliberative) has much to do with
expanding levels of completeness.
As an activity, Lewinski (2010) suggests that forms of deliberation must be
further differentiated as either horizontal or vertical criticism. In the former, a group of
participants jointly objects to distinct elements of a complex argument put forward by an
opponent. In the latter, participants act in sequence by deepening the previously voiced
criticisms against one element of their opponent’s argumentation. Such a definition is
particularly relevant to this study and brings into sharper focus the methodological
framework for scrutinizing the data in question. It is essential to understand that, within
the discursive space of online discussion boards attached to media outlets, participants
are responding both to the content of the linked story (written or produced by a journalist)
and to the comments of one another (almost always non-journalists).
Much of the existing literature on public deliberation reinforces the blurring of the
critical difference between notions of politeness and civility, a tendency that can unduly
lessen the democratic merit of robust, animated and even heated forms of discussion
(Papacharissi, 2004). Habermas (1989, 1991), for example, placed significant value on
well-behaved interaction and emphasized the need for courteous turn-taking and wellmannered demeanor. In contrast, Lyotard (1984) thought quite differently of the logic of
restraint and argued that anarchy, individuality and disagreement were the pathways to
democratic emancipation. Equally noteworthy, Fraser (1992) suggested that adherence to
a condition of politeness necessarily privileged those in power – specifically, wealthy,
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white men – and reinforced existing power structures functioning to drown out
individuality and uniqueness.
A number of scholars have found a way through this blurriness by utilizing a less
idealistic framework and opting, instead, for a pragmatic approach. As one example, in
her work on civility within the United State Congress Jamieson (1997) considers the need
for a norm of reciprocity in that
[T]he differences between members and parties are philosophical and not
personal, that parties to a debate are entitled to the presumption that their views
are legitimate even if not correct, and those on all sides are persons of goodwill
and integrity motivated by conviction (p. 1).
Similarly, Papacharissi (2004) notes that before a behavior is termed uncivil, its
implications for democratic society should be considered. As such, it is only when
people demonstrate offensive behavior toward social groups that their behavior becomes
undemocratic; anything less does not have lasting repercussions for the health of
democracy.
Beyond norms (and subsequent critiques of those norms) of behavior, however,
public deliberation is also very much about the content of an argument. While Habermas
(1984) suggests that participants subscribe to an “orientation for reaching understanding”
(p. 285), and Schudson (1997) insists that a commitment to try to reach consensus is the
line of demarcation between deliberation and simple conversation, other scholars
emphasize the overarching value of justification (see, for example, Ferree, Gamson,
Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Entman, 2004; Wessler & Schultz, 2007). Essential to the
power of public deliberation is the giving of justification for one’s own claims, the
demand of justification for others’ claims, and the willingness to rebut and refine based
upon the content of the ensuing interactions. Doing so shifts attention away from
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participants and onto the substance of their contributions. Wessler (2008) proposes four
different levels of analysis for such contributions (the idea, the utterance, the article and
the page) while further noting that the justification and rebuttal/refinement criteria
do not require that speakers in public deliberation actually aim at reaching
understanding with their opponents. To have an enlightening effect on audiences,
it is sufficient that justifications and counter-justifications be presented in
public… debates conducted in front of an audience are as normatively valuable as
dialogues between speakers, provided they adhere to their own set of normative
standards (p. 4).
Taken as a whole, the expansive literature surrounding public deliberation is, in
effect, focused on responding to an overarching question: what is it about the discourse
present in certain kinds of public spaces that makes it distinct from ordinary discussion or
even simple conversation? As has been discussed previously, the very act of engaging in
public deliberation, along with varying degrees of a citizenry's commitment to continue
to do so, are at the heart of any and all of the traditions supported by democratic theorists
and proponents of deliberative democracy. The artifact of that deliberation, however, is
the discourse itself; it is that which must be scrutinized to detect the array of forces at
work within such spaces, let alone to begin to identify the significant differences that may
exist among them.
Doing so is analogous to extracting and then analyzing a blood sample from a
corporeal being. Just as a physician cannot determine critical biochemistry or toxicology
levels through simple examination, neither can the researcher effectively gauge through
casual observation the variety of democratic life forces that may be at work within a
given public space. In a similar vein, a physician, after analyzing a blood sample, must
then compare its levels to some established set(s) of norms that will allow them to take on
meaning within the realm of lived experience. These norms, which typically both reflect
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a rich understanding of history and offer a correlated sense of expectations given
particular circumstances, can only serve as a generalizable resource of relatively
unbounded definitions. Thus, just as a doctor's patient possessing excessively high levels
of blood glucose (again, in comparison to a given norm) is not automatically diabetic,
neither may an online discussion space that simply appears to be healthy and engaging –
or perhaps more likely, presents itself as sick and off-putting – be easily characterized as
advancing or retarding the project of deliberative democracy.
Fortunately, the affiliated literature offers insights into at least some of what those
important norms may be and, at the very least, allows for the articulation of at least one
possible compound description of what high quality (or to use the current metaphor,
healthy) public discourse looks like. From there, the theorist can then begin to broach
more complex investigations (as in the case of the concluding chapter of this dissertation)
to assess the relative importance different communities may directly or indirectly place
on a range of pathways to engage political news (e.g. the tools of political cognition,
political literacy or collective action) or to help facilitate its processing and further
dissemination (e.g. the concepts of Dewey's (1927) citizen journalists, Lippman's (1922)
intelligence bureaus, or Sunstein's (2001) general interest intermediaries). Before
describing the components of that compound defintion, however, it is first necessary to
consider some of the unique characteristics of deliberative spaces that exist solely online.
Moreover, it is helpful to summarize critical ways in which the introduction of new
technologies require us to think differently (or in some cases, not so differently) about the
processes of reporting and digesting political news.
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Unique Dimensions of Online Deliberative Spaces?
In contrast to more traditional forms of deliberation (e.g. town hall forums,
dueling op/ed pieces, televised debates, etc.), public deliberation occurring in cyberspace
carries with it a host of new aspects that have been the subject of considerable study.
Some of these new dimensions are structural in nature and the result of how the
underlying technological infrastructure is oriented with respect to users. Other
differences emerge from the variety of new ways with which users do – or do not –
interact with one another. Each requires careful scrutiny and critics are wise not to
become either too ensconced in either blind optimism or shallow cynicism. New
technologies generally lead to new opportunities and a host of new challenges; online
homes for deliberation are no different in this regard.
As noted by Plant (2004) and others, the technology of the Internet creates a
coalescing force that enables the emergence of online groups. Such groups consist of
either individuals or organizations that come together through an electronic medium to
interact with respect to shared opportunities, challenges and interests. Hauben and
Hauben (1997), as part of their comprehensive analysis of Usenet (one of the oldest and
most diverse online communities), suggest that groups controlling their own information
can be quite vibrant and successful, even if they lack formal rules or means of enforcing
such rules. Citizenship, they claim, naturally evolves into a form of “netizenship” and
members of online groups are highly skilled at fending off threats to the health of the
community. While lauding the voluntary nature of online communities, Anderson and
Cornfield (2003) note than an unfortunate consequence of such communities is a
tendency for homogeneity. Despite the attraction of belonging to voluntary communities,
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their rise can often intensify existing social and political dynamics. Group homogeneity,
while often comforting to members, can have negative consequences for the broader
development of society. Public deliberation benefits from a diversity of perspectives,
though Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) argue the potential for deliberation occurs primarily
in online groups where political topics come up only incidentally. More pessimistically,
Gandy (2002) concludes that the majority of the 100 most frequently visited websites in
the world are dedicated to commerce and entertainment as opposed to political discourse.
Barber, Mattson, and Peterson (1997) reinforce this notion in claiming that the Internet,
as whole, has come to resemble the realm of shopping, play, entertainment and little else.
Within the online arena, users do not have to satisfy the same thresholds of selfidentification as do participants in other deliberative spaces. Dutton (1996) argues that
the ability to hide one’s real identity (or at least to be given the choice to do so)
precipitates a disinhibiting effect; participants are freer to express their honest opinions.
In a similar vein, the research of Blader and Tyler (2003) suggests evidence of a
correlation between the absence of nonverbal cues and an invigoration of discussion
likely caused by the removal of barriers. A lowered, generalized sense of social presence
online may encourage expression of dissenting voice and mitigate perceived risks of
deliberative participation (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimmons, 2002). In contrast,
Maldonado (1997), beginning with a premise that that topics of politics are too serious to
engage with a stranger, argues that participants should necessarily identify themselves in
order to act as responsible actors within any online debate. Poster (1997) contends that
rational argument can rarely prevail in an online setting as identities are fluid and the
conditions for encouraging compromise are lacking. Lastly, Davis (1999) offers a
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sobering view of the democratic promise related to the Internet’s interactive features.
The traditional, predominant forces in American politics dominate the Internet, like all of
its technological predecessors; such forces seek to sustain or expand their existing power
relationships. As such, he argues, the Internet is hardly a revolutionary force for
democratic virtues and interactivity is primarily an illusion.
Cyber-optimists maintain the Internet has and will continue to diversify the
marketplace of ideas and provide new forums for public deliberation (see, for example,
Papacharissi, 2002). Some observers, including Connery (1997), see in the Internet the
opportunity to revive a Habermasian, coffeehouse-style (1989) public sphere, arguing
that such spaces generate invaluable (even if contradictory and digressing) discussion that
constitutes the basis of public opinion and informs affairs of state. At the opposite end of
the philosophical spectrum, and building on Mouffe’s (1999, 2000) theoretical
foundation, Witschge (2004) notes the Internet holds tremendous potential to weaken
hegemonic power and energize agonism in that it is rife with contradictory and digressive
viewpoints. Irrespective of whether they possess the requisite ingredients for either a
bona fide public sphere or mode of adversarial agonism, online spaces are heralded by
nearly all cyber-optimists as having the ability to facilitate exposure to opinions beyond
the confines of participants’ immediate associations (see, for example, McKenna &
Bargh, 2000). In stark contrast, cyber-pessimists (or cyber-skeptics) believe that while
the Internet may hold considerable promise for realizing the democratic potential of
society, it also betrays the proclivities of individuals to seek membership in communities
of like-minded thinkers (see, for example, Davis, 1999; Sunstein, 2001), damages
deliberative ideals by facilitating selective exposure to alternative perspectives (see, for
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example, Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 1997), and encourages interest in matters that
have little to do with advancing coherent citizen engagement on matters of public
significant (see, for example, Dahlgren, 2000). Much of the broader debate between
cyber-optimists and cyber-pessimists, however, originates from the mode of inquiry and
the community that is examined. When critics investigate heterogeneous communities,
for example, they generally conclude the Internet engenders deliberative exchanges
among open-minded individuals with dissimilar perspectives (see, for example, Dahlberg,
2002; Stromer-Galley, 2003). If, instead, they focus on homogenous (or even partisan)
groups, they are likely to conclude that discussion spaces are not deliberative but rather
echo chambers for dominant discourse (see, for example, Davis, 1999; Hill & Hughes,
1997, 1998).
In addition to the considerable body of research exploring the efficacy of online
discussions occurring between users, it is important to reference a secondary (and more
modest) literature: that which focuses on discussions occurring largely between users and
themselves. Dumoulin (2003) labels these recursive and reflexive contributions
“interactive monologues,” while Wilhem (1999) argues their utterance reflects a
communicative mode that is largely bereft of listening, responding or engaging in the
type of dialogue that would typify healthy deliberation. Knapp (1997) is far more
hopeful of where such expressions can lead, suggesting that the rigorous rhetoric of socalled “essayistic messages” are the critical starting material for transforming online
groups into vivid public spheres. Others argue that such testimonies allow for the
development of more coherent and comprehensive public opinion and the creation of a
collective memory and archive (see, for example, Tanner, 2001).
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Whether real or perceived, many of the unique features associated with online
deliberative spaces may hold the potential to challenge and ultimately redefine not only
how scholars assess the relative importance of citizens' tools for engaging with
information (e.g. political cognition, political literacy and collective action) but also the
ways in which citizens better calibrate their own utilization of such tools to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of their efforts.
Old and New Challenges of Reporting and Digesting Political News
Though the Digital Age brings with it any number of new dimensions for the
synthesis, sharing and absorption of political news, the writings (and warnings) of a key
critic writing nearly a century ago seem as relevant today as ever. Writing at a time when
radio and television transmission of news was just entering the mainstream, and in
contrast to many democratic theorists, Lippman (1922, 1927) was much less sanguine in
his view of the capacity and capabilities of thinking and deliberating publics. For
Lippman, the formation of public opinion was driven predominantly by issues with which
participants had a high stake. Unlike Dewey (1954/1927) and others, Lippman argued
that citizens should focus on contributing only to politics in which they could make a
legitimate contribution and steer clear of all others. The idea that citizens were somehow
“omnicompetent” and could make rational decisions if provided with sufficient
information was highly dubious for Lippman. Not only was there simply too much
information to process but citizens had no vested interest in digesting such a wide range
of topics. The “pictures in people’s heads” shaped by journalistic accounts – e.g. images
of government, statescraft, policy-making and leadership in action – simply did not
correspond to what the average citizen was living on a day-to-day basis. As such,
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Lippman argued that affairs of state should largely be managed by elites and that
knowledge bureaus staffed by objective professionals were needed to connect legitimate
sources of executive power with a prevailing sense of citizen need and public opinion.
Citizens, according to Lippman, still required a window or passageway to the complex
machinery of government and the management of issues, but that passageway needed to
be managed by professional administrators.
Though their ongoing debate over the roles and responsibilities of the public may
have been among the most important of the early Twentieth Century, Dewey and
Lippman both advocated for the further popularization of the mainstream press and the
need to make the daily news more accessible. While they may have argued vociferously
over the appropriate structures for news generation and vehicles for dissemination, they
shared a deep understanding for the importance of news and its ability to connect
narrowly-focused individuals with a broader sense of society. Despite the proliferation of
media channels, formats and styles, the basic framework of this historic premise – and its
squabbling over many of the finer points – remains quite contemporary. Bimber (2003),
for example, notes that healthy public spheres need professional communicators to
facilitate discussion among ordinary citizens. Similarly, Walsh (2003) argues that in a
mass-mediated society average citizens, after receiving elite-originating communications,
typically process and condition them through casual, often face-to-face conversations
with those most immediately available or in closest communicative proximity.
Journalism forged on the work of elites, however, is the subject of intense and
longstanding criticism. Entman and Herbst (2000), for example, argue that audiences –
and not publics – are what drives journalism; political news is shaped through the media-
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framing process and information is carefully packaged with audiences in mind. Capella
and Jamieson (1997) place the public’s state of apathy at the feet of the media in that it
perpetuates a style-over-substance approach, replete with sound bites and flash in lieu of
depth and objectivity. The rhythm of the news media is also increasingly out of synch
with both deliberative ideals and the gradualness of policy-making. By portraying so
many issues as crises and emergencies, the media triggers waves of attention focusing on
a single problem and crowding out others (Wolfsfeld, 2000). At the same time, Patterson
(1993) notes the dominant schema for the reporter has become the strategic game, thus
leading to a ‘horserace’ style of journalism that is overly dramatistic. Every news story,
he contents, is measured not by the extent to which it elevates the public’s understanding
but by its prescribed structure and conflict, problem and resolution, rising action and
falling action, and clear beginning, middle and end. With respect to campaign discourse
specifically, Jamieson (1993) similarly identifies the highly conventionalized genres of
candidates and press discourse and notes that such forms can minimize argumentation
and ignore the responsibilities of parties to shoulder the claims they make. When
discourse becomes adlike, she maintains, argument, engagement and accountability are
lost. Ultimately, Entman’s (1989) Catch 22-like observation continues to be prophetic: to
become sophisticated citizens, Americans would need high-quality, independent
journalism; but news organizations, to stay in business, would need an audience of
sophisticated citizens.
More recently, critics of the Internet’s effect on journalism note that, as a
medium, cyberspace is highly effective in supporting so-called narrowcasting. As the
solidification of niche forms of communications directed at highly specific audiences
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continues to expand, the participatory divide between the politically active and non-active
will continue to widen (Bimber & Davis, 2003). Equally important, the predominance of
increasingly specialized and personalized information is offset by the steady decline of
what Sunstein (2002) calls ‘general-interest intermediaries,’ or objective journalists or
officials who possess the agency to help the public sort through the cacophony of
information. By and large, the Internet facilitates the distribution of information and
circumvention of gatekeepers and other such intermediaries (Schapiro, 1999). Jamieson
and Waldman (2003) advocate for the restoration of the press as custodians of fact,
arguing that reporters need to help the public make better sense of competing arguments,
defining terms, filling in gaps of information, assessing the accuracy of information
offered, and relating claims and counterclaims to possible, real-world outcomes.
Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) similarly propose a constructionist model of political
communications, one that emphasizes the perspective of an active, interpreting audience;
stresses interaction between such audiences and the media; and privileges common
knowledge over public opinion, in that while news coverage may be dry and specific,
audience reaction is affective and integrative.
The introduction of online commenting platforms may very well be born out of
these same ideals and lofty goals. Though some scholars (see, for example, Schultz,
2000) have concluded there is little real connectivity between commenters and
journalists, and most journalists do not read the comments for lack of time of interest,
others suggest they provide an important window into the minds of readers. As one
journalist from The Guardian recently noted:
I've learned a hell of a lot from reading the Internet, and I'd guess that I've learned
at least as much from the comments and amateur blogs as from professional
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writers. To take just one example, it was the commenters here on Comment is free
who were railing against the injustices of work capability assessments introduced
by this government and conducted by Atos, long before mainstream political
journalists, even the most left-leaning Guardian columnists, picked up on the
story. As a journalist, I am forever picking up nuggets of information on topics of
interest from below the line. Of course, many turn out to be somehow (or entirely)
inaccurate or misunderstood, but a significant minority are immensely useful. I
find it genuinely unfathomable that other writers would cut themselves off from
this goldmine of knowledge (Fogg, 2013).
Part of the lack of connectivity may be the result of a juxtaposition of two very different
kinds of discursive norms. As Braun and Gillespie (2011) suggest, media organizations
increasingly saddle themselves with the task of hosting an unruly user community that
does not wish to – and generally is not obligated to – play by the norms of journalism.
News provision, they suggest, is increasingly intertwined with community management,
leaving many journalists frustrated, unprepared and demoralized. In addition, a decidedly
subversive undercurrent (known as “trolling”) infests many online commenting spaces.
As one journalist from salon.com recently opined:
the trolls really do hold tremendous power of persuasion. Why try to craft a wellreasoned argument, using facts and grammar, when the real way to influence how
a person feels is a well-aimed “Kill it before it lays eggs,” or the classic “Your
stupid”? Even if the effect is divisive, at least it’s substantial — to the point that it
can strongly affect how one feels about the original piece itself (Williams, 2013).
It is precisely this diversity of opinion with respect to the broader value of online
comments that makes a deeper and more objective investigation of their discursive
quality so essential. Even the most overtly civic-minded spaces can be littered with foul
language, personal attacks, racial epithets or hate speech. At least during the period of
study, users' access to such spaces was typically quite unfettered; moderation, if it existed
at all, was strikingly passive or woefully inadequate; and broader commitments to
maintaining user anonymity were very much the norm. Though prevailing standards may
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have changed considerably since that time (see Chapter 4), this investigation occurred
during what might have been the proverbial perfect storm for revealing the miserable
underbelly of public discussion occurring within online spaces. The words, sentiments
and messages carried on these waves of toxicity can easily overpower a casual observer
and drown out a more accurate understanding of what is actually transpiring at any given
moment. Absent an objective process for measuring a forum's deliberative health, it
would be impossible to sort through the noise with any degree of consistency (or perhaps
at all), let alone to consider some of the broader opportunities and challenges for thriving
in such spaces.

Measuring Discursive Quality: An Indicator of Civic Health
Formal study of online spaces has hardly kept pace with either the rapid evolution
of existing spaces or the mushrooming of new ones. Such a conclusion is hardly
surprising even against the backdrop of widespread and growing interest: If the
investigation of an emerging construct did not prove challenging enough, one must also
consider that the metaphysics of that construct are in a near continuous state of flux even
as huge communities of users are seemingly able to adapt with relative ease. As such,
when building a mechanism for measuring the overall civic health of a deliberative space,
it is important not to become too preoccupied with the changing technological contours
of that space. Rather than try to keep up with structure, a concerted effort to gauge
generalized levels of civic-mindedness within such spaces must focus on discourse, the
principal artifact of the activities taking place within those spaces. By employing such an
approach, it is understood that any derived measures of discursive quality are not so
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much valuable in their own right but for the extent to which they can sufficiently reflect
different dimensions of civic health with a given online space. A thin but promising
literature offers important insights into how to conceptualize the notion of discursive
quality; a broad understanding of some of the central tenets of deliberative democratic
theory help to close the remaining gaps. As described in the remainder of this section,
four basic measures of discursive quality emerge: civility, politeness, justification and
complexity). Procedures for operationalizing these concepts into a measurable set of
variables follow in Chapter 3.
As noted previously, extensive scholarship exploring the ways in which public
deliberation may catalyze or reinforce democratic activities point to a fairly limited
number of conditions (Delli Carpini, Lomax Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). The measure this
study labels as "civility" is a reflection of the condition Barber (1984) describes as
empathetic, Gutman and Thompson (1996) consider to be egalitarian, and Jamieson
(1997) structures as a norm of reciprocity. It is, in essence, the prerequisite that all
members of a given community have a right to participate in public deliberation and that
their legitimacy for doing will not be challenged even if their respective expressions and
ideas may very well be. Papacharissi (2004) utilized the inverse of this measure of
civility in her content analysis of 287 political discussion groups over a period of several
months. "Incivility," as she categorized it, should be "operationalized as the set of
behaviors that threaten democracy, deny people their personal freedoms, and stereotype
social groups" (p. 267). In building her index of incivility, Papacharissi further assessed
whether stereotypes were mild or offensive; antagonistic (i.e. clearly intended to offend)
or neutral (i.e. not clearly intended to offend); and interpersonal (i.e. directed at another
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commenter) or other-directed (i.e. directed at someone not present in the discussion, such
as a politician, celebrity or journalist).
Too often, the measure this study refers to as "politeness" is the only one the
casual observer can readily recognize. Here, politeness refers principally to the absence
of name-calling, ad hominem attacks and vulgar language. It is essential to note that not
only can the presence of impoliteness potentially overshadow or diminish the likelihood
of other considerations, but using it as stand-alone indicator of a public space's civic
health can be misleading. The literature on deliberative democracy contains an extensive
set of arguments which privilege polite discourse and consider it a necessary ingredient to
achieve democratic outcomes (see, for example, Habermas, 1989, 1991). An equally
large and thoughtful array of scholarship advocates for just the opposite consideration,
arguing, for example, that democratic emancipation needs to take advantage of
unrestrained language (Lyotard, 1984) or that the conditions of politeness naturally
privilege the powerful (Fraser, 1992). The concept is employed in this study not so much
to locate it along this continuum but to clearly differentiate it from civility. In her work,
Papacharissi (2004) was similarly careful to distinguish between the two dimensions and
instead used validated measures of politeness based on Jamieson's (1997) and Jamieson
& Falk's (1998) review of floor debate in the United States Congress; she ultimately
concluded that while many discussions were impolite, few were uncivil.
A third measure employed by this study, "justification," recognizes that the
subject matter conveyed through public discourse is not insignificant and shifts attention
away from participants and onto the substance of their contributions (Wessler, 2008).
Nearly all theorists of deliberative democracy emphasize the underlying value of
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justification for engendering a shared sense of meaning or understanding within
deliberative space (see, for example, Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Entman,
2004; Wessler & Schultz, 2007). For deliberation to be efficacious, they argue,
discussants must give justification for their own claims, demand justification for others'
claims, and be willing to rebut and refine their arguments based upon the strength of
those claims. The research of Himelboim, Gleave, and Smith (2009) further
demonstrates a correlation between heightened levels of justification and more prolific
discussions. Their six-month analysis of approximately 40,000 authors across 20
political discussion groups identified authors who received an atypically large number of
replies. More than 95% of comments made by these discussion catalysts contained
content imported from elsewhere in cyberspace, and approximately two-thirds of their
comments included links to stories available from traditional news organizations. In
addition to those which rely upon external sources, the present study's concept of
justifications also borrows from the social capital literature (see, for example, Putnam,
2000) suggesting that the tendency for individuals to choose to belong to active social
networks may be tremendously beneficial in supporting a shared sense of civic
responsibility. Within such networks, trust is established by sharing more personal
information describing details of a particular lived experience. In a matter of speaking,
such expressions of trust may be thought of as something of an internally validated
justification.
The fourth and final measure – "complexity" – emerges from the recognition that
public deliberation is a dynamic and ongoing process. While Habermas (1984), for
example, suggests that participants must subscribe to an "orientation for reaching
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understanding" (p. 285), Schudson (1997) insists that the commitment to try to reach
consensus is the line separating deliberation from simple conversation. Irrespective of
whether consensus is a necessary or even desirable motivation, what matters is that the
generation of meaning is a highly contingent (and often non-linear) activity. Within
deliberative space, discussants need the opportunity to sort through conflicting ideas, ask
questions to approach higher levels of understanding, and even express their own
uncertainty about a given topic. Stromer-Galley (2007) formalized elements of a content
coding scheme with many of these very considerations in mind. Using data from the
Virtual Agora Project (Muhlberger, 2005), in which residents of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
deliberated school policy online, Stromer-Galley constructed variables for, and then
recorded instances of: agreement, a signal of support with something a prior speaker said;
and question, a genuine inquiry directed to another speaker trying to seek information.
Believing prior measures were overly complicated to administer (see, for example,
Graham and Witschge, 2003), Stromer-Galley included elements in her coding scheme
intended to "balance the need to capture the complexities of group interaction while being
simple enough to achieve acceptable levels of intercoder agreement" (p. 21).

Conclusion
This brief review of the existing literature sets the stage for the development of an
effective methodology to measure the quality of deliberation taking place in online
discussion spaces affiliated with a limited number of news outlets. Though diverse, the
collection of prior research examined herein serves as the theoretical foundation for
systematically seeking the presence of four distinct (but not entirely unrelated) telltales of
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a site’s overall civic-mindedness. Once this exploration is conducted, it becomes far
more feasible to consider why there might be both profound differences and revealing
consistencies across the spaces examined. In doing so, it is important to note that this
study examines only a very small – if still representative – sliver of online space. While a
wide variety of electronic forums both exist and are arguably home to active,
commenting publics (such as those found on Twitter, Reddit, etc.), this study is solely
concerned with deliberative spaces operated and managed by the purveyors of news.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
	
  
Overview: The Vicarious Nature of Content Analysis
	
  

As a forum, online discussion boards simply aggregate the various contributions

users make to an ongoing, asynchronous conversation on a particular topic. For those
forums affiliated with news outlets, a journalist’s article (in the print universe) or
multimedia segment (in the audiovisual realm) initially frame some of the dimensions of
a topic and then precipitate a user-driven discussion. Furthermore, it is important to note
that this study is concerned exclusively with discussion forums operating solely through
the medium of written forms of communication. While a number of vehicles, such as
CNN’s iReport and YouTube’s video response platform, allow for full video
contributions, such forms are still relatively new and not widely used (or at least not
when compared to written communication channels). As such, the utility of content
analysis as a “method that uses a set of procedures to make valid references from text”
(Weber, 1990, p. 9) is highly viable. While some computer-based forms of content
analysis attempt to measure variables by gauging the simple frequency of terms relative
to a pre-determined dictionary or corpus of words within a given sample (see, for
example, Hart, 1989; Hart, 2002; and Hart, Jarvis, Jennings & Smith-Howell, 2004), the
casual nature with which participants prepare and submit posts to an online discussion
board (to say nothing of their propensity to use slang, abbreviations and emoticons) make
this an ineffective strategy. A deeper and more thorough investigation – one that
empowers and requires human coders to make judgments about the meaning of the words
contained within user submissions – requires both a more robust definition of the
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research technique and one that better establishes its descriptive power. While
Krippendorf (1980) offers a similarly basic definition of content analysis – “a research
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context” (p. 21) –
his description of the texts themselves (i.e. the artifacts to be code) is particularly
instructive for purposes of this study. He notes:
The most distinctive feature of messages is that they inform someone vicariously,
providing the receiver with knowledge about events that take place at a distant
location, about objects that may have existed in the past, or about ideas in other
people’s minds. Messages and symbolic communications generally are about
phenomena other than those directly observed. The vicarious nature of symbolic
communications is what forces a receiver to make specific inferences from
sensory data to portions of his empirical environment. This empirical
environment is what we refer to as the context of the data (p. 22; italics added).
This added clarity concerning the overall power of the technique is undergirded
by several important distinctions germane to the method itself: content analysis is an
unobtrusive technique; it readily accepts untrusted data; it is context-sensitive and
thereby able to process symbolic forms; and it is both easily scalable and capable of
coping with large volumes of data (Krippendorf, 1980). Taken together, these four
distinctions (or propositions, as Krippendorf calls them) point to a methodology offering
the requisite data collection and analytical tools needed, most specifically, to construct
imputed measures of deliberative quality, and, more generally, to gauge the efficacy of
these spaces as forums for public discussion.

Data Collection
With the appropriateness and applicability of the content analysis methodology
established, this section will describe key considerations to be explored as part of the
broader data-collection process. Important dimensions include: defining clearly the unit
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of analysis; determining key information delimiters for purposes of data categorization
and grouping; addressing the essential mechanical procedures of, and underscoring
rationale for, the sampling procedure associated with the current longitudinal study;
establishing an algorithm for partitioning data; and identifying requisite safeguards to
secure and archive electronic data.
Unit of Analysis
	
  

Discrete postings by individual users constitute the unit of analysis for this study.

Such postings are entirely contained (i.e. they have a clear beginning and end) and there
are no limits to either the number of users who may participate in a discussion or the
number of times an individual user may post within that discussion. To be explicit, the
current study makes no attempt to measure the relative volume of contributions by unique
users; all postings are treated consistently and without any regard to the identification of
the poster. For those users who contribute multiple postings to a discussion board, each
posting is simply counted and assessed as its own unit. Though some prior studies have
elected not to employ a user-blind data collection scheme (see, for example, Lewinski,
2010; Himelboim, Gleave, & Smith, 2009), there is insufficient information available to
the current researcher to ensure the validity of uniqueness among users. Such a
methodological decision may ultimately weaken the explanatory power and overall
generalizability of the findings vis-à-vis other studies. An important point of distinction,
however, is that said studies have typically examined postings made by users through a
validated entry portal. In such cases, users possess login credentials affiliated with a
credit card account number or other type of verifiable identifier.
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Key Information Delimiters
Though individual postings may constitute the unit of analysis, each record of
data is further associated with a select number of key information delimiters to track its
concordance with different kinds of news articles and segments. Thus, while all postings
are considered discrete units, they are all appended to a variety of journalist-created
content. This study is concerned with several dimensions of that content, and each
information delimiter corresponds to one of the five overarching research questions.
These include: the name of the publication or broadcast source (RQ1); whether the
journalist-created content is print-based or multimedia (RQ2); whether the publication or
broadcast entity employing the journalist exists solely on the Web or has an antecedent in
traditional media (i.e. newspapers, news periodicals, television) (RQ3); whether the
journalist-created content is principally covering domestic politics or international
politics (RQ4); and whether the journalist-created content is principally covering acts of
governing and policymaking or campaigning (RQ5). The process for encoding these
information delimiters is outlined in the next section.
Purposive Sampling of Targeted Online Discussion Forums
The discussion platforms of four online news sites – The Daily Kos, The Los
Angeles Times, The Young Turks YouTube Channel, and The Associated Press YouTube
Channel – were selected as a meaningful set of forums from which a purposive sampling
of user contributions could be conducted. Derived directly from the data collection needs
articulated by the study’s research questions, two important dimensions needed to be
accommodated by the choice of platforms: channel constitution and channel medium. As
depicted in Figure 1 and for purposes of this study, channel constitution may be either
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traditional (i.e. there is an antecedent news channel existing in the traditional print and
broadcast media) or Internet-native (i.e. there is no antecedent news channel). Channel
medium refers to whether the given format of news precipitating online discussion is
print-based or multimedia. By utilizing four distinct data sources, both dimensional
considerations (and combinations thereof) may be adequately considered.

Print

Daily Kos

Los Angeles Times

Multimedia

Channel Medium

Channel Constitution
Internet-Native
Traditional

Young Turks

Associated Press

Figure 1: Two Dimensions of News Channel Sample Selection
Within each of the four dimensional quadrants, the respective news channel was
selected based on a combination of inherent credibility, measurable popularity and the
ease with which the required data could be extracted. According to Alexa.com (2010a),
the online edition of The Los Angeles Times (latimes.com) was the fifth most visited
U.S.-based newspaper in the world at the time of data collection and bested only by The
New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and USA Today. Among
the top five sites, only The Los Angeles Times presented its discussions in such a manner
as to allow for straightforward archival in an electronic format. Similarly, Daily Kos
(dailykos.com) was the fifth most visited U.S.-based web original at the time (Alexa.com,
2011b) and the only such site belonging to the category allowing users to post without a
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verifiable account. In consideration of the audiovisual domain, the prominence of
YouTube as the third most trafficked website in the world (topped only by Google’s
search engine (google.com) and Facebook’s social media platform (facebook.com))
(Alexa.com., 2010c) made the platform an obvious choice. Within the YouTube universe
of content, the Associated Press was the most popular news and politics channel based
upon video views and The Young Turks placed third (first if rated by either the number
of electronic subscribers or channel views) (VidStatsX, 2010).
It is important to note that the period of study corresponded to a time in which all
four of the targeted news organizations, irrespective of their age of modality, found
themselves in the midst of epochal change and engaged in a mode of significant (or in
some cases, desperate) experimentation to take advantage of new technologies. The older
outlets (the Associated Press and Los Angeles Times), which had successfully endured
multiple paradigm shifts precipitated by successive technological advancements, were
beginning to understand that this was to be no ordinary time. The Associated Press, for
example, began as a non-profit print news collaborative among major New York papers
in the mid-1800s and then, over the next century and a half, expanded its offerings to
include photos (1935), radio stories (1941) and video segments (1994). Throughout this
evolution, the AP never needed to think about changing the fundamental ways in which
in operated: content was transmitted to member news affiliates through what was
essentially a proprietary infrastructure. The fact that AP made the decision in 2006 to
begin posting much of its content to YouTube (an entirely free and open channel owned
by another entity) both reflected the staggering ways in which the media landscape was
changing and revealed the radical steps news outlets would need to take if they wanted to
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remain viable. Seemingly overnight, what had been a closed network between AP and its
affiliates had been upended and affixed to, at least in comparison, a chaotic and at times
unruly commenting community.
For The Los Angeles Times, in existence as a major daily newspaper since 1881,
the story of its history prior to this period of rapid change was dominated not so much by
technological shifts but by factors of political-economy. The paper's oscillation between
boom and bust corresponded with dynamics of ownership and, more recently, its
consolidation under the Tribune conglomerate in 2000. Through each period, however,
the newspaper – at least in its role as a public entity and purveyor of news – operated in
much the same way as it always had. As was the case with AP, by the mid-2000s The
Los Angeles Times was forced to take steps that would previously have been anathema to
its powerful editorial license. In June 2005, the editors of the paper took the
unprecedented step of inviting the readership to use the emerging technological tool of a
wiki to collaboratively rewrite a prominent editorial pertaining to the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars. Though the experiment was compromised by hackers before its
effectiveness could be gauged, the paper had clearly signaled just how far it could – and
would – deviate from its norms to remain relevant with its audience.
For the newer outlets (Daily Kos and Young Turks, both launched in 2002), the
rapidly changing technological and sociological conditions present at the time of their
emergence meant that not only was a mode of experimentation welcome but it was also
the only one they really new. Unconstrained by the inertia of a long history or the
overhead of a significant infrastructure, both outlets were able to enter the arena as
nimble and more expansive-thinking participants. Daily Kos, for example, did not have
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to make the decision as to whether it was a news organization, a community of opinionmaking or a hub for activism; it very easily became all three at once. And, particularly in
comparison to most traditional outlets, it was able to quickly embrace new technological
tools in far more prolific, meaningful and accepted ways (its longstanding use of wikis,
for example, stands in stark contrast to that of The Los Angeles Times). Given the
orientation of Young Turks and the ease with which it could operate in this different
world, its decision to launch a YouTube channel in 2005 was as naturally evolutionary as
it was blatantly revolutionary for the Associated Press. Young Turks, after all, had
previously been a cable television access show and then a radio program on Sirius. After
emerging as the world's first daily streaming online talk show, it later went on to build its
own network across multiple platforms and produced original programming for 24-hour
cable giants Al Jazeera and CNBC. To be able to make so many major shifts during such
a short period of time would have simply been unthinkable in the decade prior.
Timeframe for Data Collection and Rationale
	
  

Data were collected from the four discussion platforms each day in the early

evening (approximately 8-9pm EST) from February 1, 2011 to March 31, 2011. Though
the study investigated a longer period of time than was arguably needed, the strategic
decision was made to employ a larger sample size to allow for greater statistical scrutiny
of data subsets and to provide the opportunity to perform supplementary analyses as
needed. The timing of February-March presented a number of key seasonal advantages:
the completion of the major American holidays and the subsequent conclusion of the
consumer-driven, holiday news cycle; historical trends suggesting a period of significant
activity for the major institutions of the United States government; and the lack of any

	
  

	
  54

	
  
major, immediately imminent elections. The timeframe of early 2011 was selected
because it was not expected to be a period of intensive campaign reporting (the mid-term
Congressional campaigns had just concluded and the U.S. Presidential election was still
more than 20 months away). Knowing that the run-up to a major election may fan certain
partisan flames, the choice of timing constitutes a basic mechanism to control for what
would otherwise be the overabundance of campaign related news and the potential
skewing of ensuing discussions.
Random Selection of Affiliated News Articles and Segments
While the targeting of selected news sites was purposive, a sample of political
news was selected each day using a consistent randomization scheme. From each of the
four sites, a single story or segment was selected each day and it, along with all of its
affiliated online comments, was recorded. Throughout the study period, the possibility
existed for no new political news to be posted on a given day. During these rare times,
no sample was collected and the process began anew on the following day. Some
tailoring of the randomization process was necessary given the different ways in which
the sites categorize and post political news. For two of the sites, The Daily Kos and the
Young Turks YouTube Channel, all of the content was known to be focused exclusively
on political topics. As such, any stories or segments posted that day (all of the sites have
a time stamp indicating when content was originally uploaded) could simply be
numbered sequentially and then sampled using a random number generator. In contrast
to these sites, content on the online edition of The Los Angeles Times was divided into
popular newspaper categories (e.g. Business, Sports, Health, etc.). Using the same
randomization technique, samples were selected from all stories posted daily within the
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site’s Politics section (the configuration of the categories has since changed). Unlike The
Los Angeles Times online site, the Associated Press YouTube Channel simply posted all
its segments in a single repository irrespective of categorization. While the same
randomization strategy could be employed, a secondary step was needed to check
whether or not the given sample was political in nature. The researcher investigated each
initial sample and, if it was not, in his best judgment, obviously political in nature, it was
discarded for a secondary (or in some cases, tertiary) selection. A catalog of the articles
and segments selected appears in Appendix A.
Differentiation Between Robust and Non-Robust Discussion Threads
	
  

As this study focuses on the quality of discourse occurring within deliberative

spaces associated with political news reports, there was a need to account for the fact that
different kinds of topics simply generate different volumes of response. Effectively
controlling for the quantity of discussion demanded the development of a mechanism by
which each sample (up to four per day throughout the period of the study) could be
normalized. Building upon the research of Himelboim, Gleave, and Smith (2009), the
unit components of every discussion were further organized as a collection of threads in
that each unit could be categorized as either being a catalyst or a response. Catalysts
were defined as those contributions that began a new thread of conversation within the
broader discussion; responses were defined as, quite simply, non-catalysts. Thus, a single
thread was defined as a catalyst plus any subsequent responses. The manner in which
contributions are typically displayed in online discussion boards (and certainly for the
four sites examined in this study), in that catalysts are aligned with the left margin of the
frame and responses are indented, allowed for easy differentiation and categorization.
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Once this categorization was completed, the mean length of all threads within
each discussion thread was calculated. Threads with a length below the mean were
discarded and the remainder were defined as being sufficiently robust for purposes of this
study (see Appendices B, C, D and E for a summary of the sequestration). In effect, this
process operationalized Fishkin’s (1992) concept of the continuum between “less
deliberative” and “more deliberative” discourse and, in doing so, is clearly focusing the
study’s exploratory powers on the more deliberative elements of the sampled online
discussions. As a healthy side effect, it is important to note that this process entirely
weeds out, irrespective of the varying lengths of threads, any threads that have only a
catalyst and no responses. Such postings are, in effect, simple one-offs within the
postings and neither trigger nor (in many cases) warrant a response. Based upon how this
study defines deliberation, there is very little that could be described as “deliberative”
about these postings.
Data Integrity and Preservation
Building an archival platform to catalog a large number of discussion units, printbased stories and multimedia segments required the utilization of several digital tools. As
all discussion contributions appeared as printed text, time-stamped screen shots of each
sample were saved in Portable Document Format (PDF). Affiliated, print-based news
stories were similarly archived. For associated, audiovisual segments appearing on one
of the two YouTube channels, the Xilisoft YouTube Video converter was used to save a
permanent, Quicktime movie file of each. Data were exported incrementally to a readily
accessible, cloud-based file system (GoogleDrive) with sufficient backup protection. As
an additional step, verbatim copies of all files were concurrently stored on a local,
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external hard drive and also subjected to a regimented program of daily backups. The
syntax used in naming the files was intuitive and included consistent reference to the
news source and date. At the end of the data collection phase, the researcher amassed –
and continues to possess – a complete digital archive of all relevant data, and that archive
is stored in multiple locations.
	
  
Coding Scheme and Process
Two months of data collection in February and March of 2011 resulted in the
harvesting of 16,859 comments affiliated with more than 200 news stories and segments
(see Appendix A). Following the application of the established procedure to differentiate
between robust and non-robust discussion threads and focus exclusively on those threads
determined to have higher-than-normal rates of participation, the total sample population
of the study declined to 5,881 (a comprehensive description of the data is offered in
Chapter 4). Subsequent months were used to develop an initial a priori content analysis
coding scheme, to train a small team of coders, and to further calibrate the coding
scheme. As noted by Weber (1990), Stemler (2001), and Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (2005),
such an analysis mandates that coding categories, definitions and procedures be
established in advance and based on existing theoretical foundations and methodologies.
Revisions to the process may be made as necessary, particularly as coders are trained,
inter-coder reliability tested, and coding instructions refined. Full encoding of the data
was accomplished during the late Spring and Summer of 2012.
This section outlines critical elements necessary to establish and administer the a
priori coding scheme. Attention is paid to: the usage of trained coders and refinement of
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their work; the operationalization of key concepts into essential variables; the
introduction of a formalized coding sheet; and necessary tests for reliability and validity.	
  
Training and Management of Coders
Given the large amount of data and heeding Krippendorf’s warning – “Probably
the worst practice in content analysis is when the investigator develops his recording
instructions and applies them all by himself…” (p. 74) – the careful training of a coding
team became an absolute prerequisite for a reliable analysis. Two university students,
both of whom were known to the researcher but not to one another, were recruited for the
project and compensated for their efforts. One student was a master’s level graduate
student in communication at a large, public university; the second was an advanced
undergraduate studying communication at a small, private college. The researcher held
an initial, introductory session with both members of the team present. The research
program was described in general terms and initial coding instructions were distributed.
In keeping with the highest standards of reliability (see, for example, Krippendorf, 1980;
Weber, 1990), modifications and refinements to the coding scheme, based upon the
researcher’s ongoing assessment of its effectiveness when utilized by the coders, were
incorporated by the researcher in isolation from the coders; revised coding instructions
were then given to the coders uniformly and independently. Following their initial group
meeting with the researcher, the coders were not in contact with one another until all data
had been fully coded.
Operationalization of Grouping Variables
Given the relevant concepts encapsulated by the overarching research questions, a
handful of grouping variables needed to be introduced into the broader constructs of the
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coding scheme. All of the grouping variables are nominal and two of them – channel
constitution and channel medium (as shown in Figure 1) – could be coded effortlessly as
they merely reflect the news source. Coding for two other grouping variables –
geographic focus of political news, and topical focus of political news (illustrated in
Figure 2) – required the participation of the coders. As part of their initial slate of
instructions, coders were given access to the complete digital archive of news stories and
segments and asked to code all of the news samples for each of the two grouping

Attributes

Grouping Variables
Geographic Focus
Topical Focus
Domestic:
Focus on the United
States

Governing:
Focus on Lawmaking,
Policymaking and Public
Policy Issues

International:
Focus on Nations Other
Than the United States

Campaigning:
Focus on Elections, Balance
of Power Discussions and
Political Strategy

	
  
Figure 2: Key Grouping Variables
variables (the final coding scheme appears in Appendix F and a quick sheet is provided in
Appendix G). The technique proved effective and the coders agreed on the relevant
attribute 97% of the time with respect to the geographic focus variable and 92% of the
time with respect to the topical focus variable. On the very few occasions when the
coders did not agree, the researcher made the final determination.
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Operationalizing the Concept of Discursive Quality
Chapter 2 described the logic behind gauging discursive quality with respect to
four distinct dimensions: civility, politeness, justification and complexity. Considered
individually or in the aggregate, these measures may help to reveal a given discussion
board's overall level of broader civic-mindedness, in that discourse can be considered the
artifact of the deliberative activities taking place therein. This section, as well as two of
the accompanying appendices, detail how each of these four concepts are operationalized
into working variables to be employed within the content analysis methodology.
Operationalization of the concept of civility draws heavily from the work of
Papacharissi (2004) and, to a lesser extent, that of Ruiz, Domingo, Mico, Diaz-Noci,
Meso, and Masip (2011). Using Papacharissi’s definition, civility is understood to be
profoundly different – and thus requiring clear differentiation in any coding scheme –
than the notion of politeness. Moreover, civility is a default mode of behavior that is
violated (i.e. a mode of civility becomes a mode of incivility) when a discussant employs
one or more of the following argumentative techniques: (1) she verbalizes a generalized
or specific threat to democracy, democratic institutions or democratic values. In this
case, democracy in considered to be an amalgam of the broader concepts of liberty,
equality and the rule of law; (2) she verbalizes a threat to individual rights and freedoms.
These threats may take the form of statements intending or promising to do physical,
psychological or emotional harm with the goal of retarding the freedom to enjoy such
rights and freedoms. In addition, these threats may be directed specifically at another
discussant or more generally at a citizen or group of citizens; or (3) she employs one or
more antagonistic stereotypes – that is, the discussant distinguishes, labels and makes a
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judgment about a group of individuals – intended to antagonize, discredit or harm. These
antagonistic stereotypes may be directed specifically at another discussant or more
generally at a citizen or group of citizens. Though their work is focused on a very
different research trajectory, the use of a “cooperative search for truth” variable by Ruiz
et al. (2011) in defining a necessary feature of deliberative quality helps to corroborate
the general framework advanced by Papacharissi (2004). In addition, analyses completed
by Zhou, Chan, & Peng (2008) in examining the emergence of online public spheres in
China effectively validated Papacharissi’s original definition of civility.
With respect to politeness, the work of Jamieson (1997) and Jamieson and Falk
(1998) proved highly instructive for purposes of the current study. Though Jamieson
labels her framework a measure of civility and it has been employed and validated by
numerous scholars since (see, for example, Kessler, 2008), its methodology is executed in
concordance with gauging levels of politeness as defined by Papacharissi (2004). In
contrast to civility, politeness is measured by the absence of such techniques as namecalling, pejorative utterances, vulgarity (Jamieson & Falk, 1998), hot-button words and
inflammatory speech (Kessler, 2008). Similar to politeness, this study’s coding scheme
considers politeness to be the default mode of behavior unless a discussant marshals one
or more of the following: (1) name-calling that is clearly intended to offend. These
name-callings may be directed specifically at another discussant(s) or more generally at a
citizen or group of citizens; (2) ad hominem attacks – that is, an attack on another’s
characteristics or authority without addressing the substance of the argument itself. Here,
too, attacks may be directed specifically at another discussant or more generally at the
public; or (3) vulgar language, either expressed explicitly or clearly implied in the use of
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abbreviations, grawlixes or other obvious symbols. At the time of coding, all members of
the coding team were given a static printout of the collectively constructed list of vulgar
terms appearing in the online dictionary at noswearing.com. This dictionary served as
both a resource and an objective arbiter of what constitutes vulgarity and what does not.
Justification is arguably the most straightforward measure of the quality of
deliberation and was a key feature of nearly every methodology examined (Jamieson &
Falk, 1998; Graham & Witschge, 2003; Papacharissi, 2004; Stromer-Galley, 2007;
Kessler, 2008; Zhou, Chan, & Peng, 2008; Himelboim, Gleave & Smith, 2009). In this
measure, justification is simply the expression of some form of evidence to support an
argument or claim. The incorporation of evidence is indicative of the normative
benchmark of logic and coherence (Habermas, 1984; see also Ruiz et al., 2011) and may
take the form of supporting information ranging from the incorporation of third-party
facts to the sharing of personal narratives. Within the current coding scheme,
justification is considered to not be present unless one or more of the following criteria
are met: (1) the discussant justifies an argument or perspective by providing supporting
evidence in the form of cited facts, embedded documents, web links, or
quoted/paraphrased comments from experts; (2) the discussant justifies an argument by
providing supporting evidence in the form of a description of personal experience or a
first-hand account.
Finally, the variable of complexity is an amalgam of several factors coalescing
around the basic belief that the highest quality of deliberation is typically found in
communities of debate characterized by a wide diversity of perspectives and the pursuit
of deeper understanding (Ruiz et al., 2011). Stromer-Galley’s (2007) variable of
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“question” (a genuine inquiry into directed to another speaker trying to seek information),
Zhou, Chan, and Peng’s (2008) “complexity” (the presence of an idea that incorporates
conflicting value claims into its own claim), and Kessler’s (2008) “conflict” (the copresence of separate, conflicting ideas or policy positions in the same utterance)
constitute different facts of the same variable. For purposes of this study, complexity is
not considered to be present in a comment unless the commenter has endeavored to do
one or more of the following: (1) incorporate opposing viewpoints into a given post,
irrespective of whether she agrees with those viewpoints; (2) express the same viewpoint
in multiple ways; (3) articulates her lack of certainty on a topic; or (4) clearly asks an
honest question (versus a strictly rhetorical one) in an attempt to better understand a topic
or viewpoint.
The coding scheme for the variables of civility, politeness, justification and
complexity is clearly described in Appendix F and further accounted for in Appendix G
(the coding quick sheet employed by the coders). For each of the four variables, it is
important to note that the study does not factor in any sense of gradation in the strength
of the variable. Corresponding attributes are strictly binary in constitution and a key
characteristic should be thought of as simply being present or not present. Additional
instructions were given to the coding team to note comments that had been removed by
the discussion moderator, flagged by users as spam (and thus blocked from viewing),
were indecipherable (including appearing in a language other than English), or for which
the coder could simply not otherwise make a clear determination.
Beginning with each of the four measures, a basic compound measure of
deliberative quality was computed for each entry based upon a simple count of the
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occurrences of civility, politeness, justification and complexity. Those entries with zero
or one instance were categorized as “low” (coded as 1); those with two instances (the
mid-point of the range) were categorized as “medium” (coded as 2); and those with three
or four instances were categorized as “high” (coded as 3).
Though the study is chiefly concerned with the quality of deliberation occurring
within robust discussion threads, an abbreviated secondary analysis examined indicators
of quality within a representative sample of non-robust threads. Of the 16,859 comments,
10,978 were deemed to be non-robust. A sample size of 371 was needed to measure the
population with a standard confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of +/- 5%.
Initial Pilot Study, Calibration of Coding Scheme and Test for Intercoder Reliability
Both Lacy and Riffe (1996) and Neuendorf (2002) suggest a sample size of 30 as
a rule of thumb for conducting an initial pilot study. Following this guidance, the
researcher independently gave each coder an identical set of thirty units selected
randomly from the net collection of 5,881 user comments; a random number generator
aided in the randomization effort. Initial levels of intercoder agreement with respect to
the four nominal variables of deliberative quality fell within a relatively narrow band of
64% to 73%. After discussing and carefully reviewing the coding decision-making with
each coder individually, the researcher improved the precision of the coding instructions
and conducted a second pilot study using the same process; again, a random sample of 30
non-duplicates was selected from the net data collection. Following the second iteration,
intercoder agreement improved to a range of 72% to 83% across the four variables.
Based upon subsequent discussions (similarly conducted by the researcher independently
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with each coder), additional clarifications to the coding scheme were made and a formal
test of intercoder reliability was undertaken.
Lacy and Riffe (1996) derive a formula for determining the requisite sample size
needed to establish sufficient intercoder reliability levels for nominal content categories:
𝑛=

𝑁 − 1 𝑆𝐸 ! + 𝑃𝑄𝑁
𝑁 − 1 𝑆𝐸 ! + 𝑃𝑄

Within this formula, N is the total population; SE is the standard error corresponding to a
given confidence interval; P is the presumed population level of agreement; and Q=(1-P).
For the current study: N=5,881; P=0.8 (a conservative estimate based upon the insights
of the pilot); Q=0.2; and PQ=0.16. Presuming a confidence interval of 5% and a desired
level of probability of 95%, we can utilize the basic formula:
Confidence  interval = 𝑍(𝑆𝐸)
Z is the one-tailed Z-score associated with the given confidence level. Using the normal
distribution, the Z-score for 0.05 (a 5% confidence interval) is 1.64. Solving for SE:
𝑆𝐸 =

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝑍

SE is computed as 0.0305 and the required n can now be calculated:
𝑛=

5,881 − 1 0.0305 ! + 0.8 (0.2)(5,881)
	
  
5,881 − 1 (0.0305)! + 0.8 (0.2)

Thus, a random sample of 174 test units are needed for the intercoder reliability test. As
adapted from Riffe, Lacey, and Fico (2005), if an 80% agreement in coding a variable on
those 174 test units is achieved, chances are 95 out of 100 that at least an 80% or better
agreement would exist if the entire content population was coded by all coders and
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reliability measured. The formal test for intercoder reliability revealed a very high level
of concordance existing between the coders, as summarized in the following table:
Table 1: Summary of Intercoder Reliability Test
	
  
Variable
Civility
Politeness
Justification
Complexity

#
Cases
174
174
174
174

#
#
Agreements Disagreements
166
8
169
5
165
9
166
8

%
Agreement
95.4%
97.1%
94.8%
95.4%

Krippendorff’s
Alpha
0.813
0.943
0.903
0.912

	
  
	
  
Examination of Research Questions
	
  

Basic contingency tables were developed for each of the five research questions

and chi-square analyses were performed to test the respective null hypotheses:
(RQ1) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility,
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and political news
source;
(RQ2) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility,
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and political news
channel medium;
(RQ3) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility,
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and political news
channel constitution;
The remaining two research questions employed both the chi-square test and the more
powerful Mantel-Haenszel analysis, which tested the following null hypothesis while also
controlling for the news source
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(RQ4) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility,
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and the geographic
focus of the corresponding article/segment;
(RQ5) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility,
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and the topical focus of
the corresponding article/segment.

Conclusion and the Need for Supplementary Analysis
The method of content analysis carries with it numerous, significant advantages
that make it an excellent choice for purposes of this study: it is a non-obtrusive, nonreactive measurement technique; it recognizes that, because content often has a life
beyond its production and consumption, longitudinal studies are possible using archived
materials; and the quantification or measurement by coding teams permits reduction to
large quantities of information that would be logistically impossible for close qualitative
analysis (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005, p. 38-39). While all of these pluses bode well for the
current study, it is important to be mindful of and, to the extent possible, mitigate against,
what are typically thought to be the overarching criticisms of the method. Holsti (1969),
for one, recommends blending quantitative content analysis with supplementary
qualitative analysis to offset any claims that the quantification of content may lead to its
trivialization. Similarly, a supplementary qualitative analysis would be useful in
identifying any key distinctions between manifest and latent content that the coding
scheme is otherwise incapable of detecting.
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Though it would be impractical to engage in a deep reading of the nearly 6,000
coded entries, the supplementary analysis identifies the most robust discussion threads for
each of the four news sources. As a matter of differentiation, these discussion threads are
those having the highest total measures of deliberative quality as computed by the given
methodology. Put another way, these leading threads will have the most numerous,
aggregate occurrences of civility, politeness, justification and complexity within a given
thread.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Overview and Descriptive Statistics
The given procedures for harvesting a significant data set of user comments
posted on media-hosted discussion boards proved highly effective. Over the course of
the two-month data collection phase, nearly 17,000 comments affiliated with 201 unique
political news articles and audiovisual segments across four popular sources were
systematically recorded. A comprehensive inventory of selected news content (along
with a corresponding comment count for each) appears in Appendix A. A more detailed
breakdown of comment characteristics, including further differentiation among nonthreads, catalysts and responses, appears in Appendices B,C,D and E. As shown in Table
2, 5,742 comments were analyzed over the course of the study; a very small number
(139) of the 5,881 comments deemed to be in robust discussion threads were eliminated
per the coding methodology. The Young Turks YouTube Channel accounted the largest
number of comments (both recorded and analyzed), while Daily Kos generated threads of
the greatest average length.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Purposive Sample of Comments
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks
TOTAL

#
Mean Thread
Comments
Length
Recorded
2,825
2.45
3,982
3.90
1,155
2.03
8,897
3.22
16,859
3.20
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# Comments
Analyzed

% of Total

711
1,929
379
2,723
5,742

25.2%
48.4%
32.8%
30.6%
34.1%

	
  
In focusing the exploratory power of the study, the partitioning scheme limited the
number of comments analyzed from a range of 25.2% (Associated Press) to 48.4% (Daily
Kos). The website of The Los Angeles Times was the least prolific generator of
comments, measured either by total count or mean length of each thread.
Given some of the skepticism for online discussion platforms outlined in the
previous chapter, it was somewhat surprising that overall measures of deliberative
across the whole of the robust stream proved to be noticeably high. As shown in Table 3,
approximately 81% of all comments drawn from the robust sample were of medium or
high deliberative quality. In contrast, only 29% of the small sample drawn from the nonrobust discussion stream were similarly classified; 71% of comments were found to be of
low deliberative quality. These findings suggest that the underlying assumptions
employed in developing the methodology to differentiate between robust and non-robust
discussions were valid.
Table 3: Deliberative Quality (Robust Versus Non-Robust Threads)
	
  
Thread Type
Robust (All)
Non-Robust (Sample)

Low
(Quality = 1)
1,073 (19%)
263 (71%)

Medium
(Quality=2)
2,254 (39%)
82 (22%)

High
(Quality=3)
2,415 (42%)
26 (7%)

# Comments
Analyzed
5,742
371

Findings: Research Questions
RQ1
The first research question examines whether or not there are significant
differences in levels of deliberative quality of users’ comments based solely upon the
affiliated source of political news (i.e. Associated Press, Daily Kos, The Los Angeles
Times and Young Turks). In addition to considering the aggregate measure of
	
  

	
  71

	
  
deliberative quality, differences within the individual components (i.e. civility, politeness,
justification and complexity) were also investigated across the four news components.
Table 4 depicts the chi-square contingency table of political news source and deliberative
quality. All differences are found to be statistically significant and the null hypothesis –
that there is no association between the deliberative quality of discussion and source of
political news – is rejected. Particularly noteworthy in the given set of findings is the
consistency with which comments are found to be of medium deliberative quality across
the four news sources. From a low of 35% (The Los Angeles Times) to a high of 40%
(Young Turks), the range of the medium band is strikingly narrow, particularly when
considered in contrast to the low and high bands. Daily Kos is clearly skewed far more
heavily towards a higher quality of deliberation, as is, to a lesser extent, Young Turks. In
comparison, Associated Press and Los Angeles Times tilt noticeably towards the negative
end of the deliberative quality spectrum. Though considered in greater detail
Table 4: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative
Quality)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks

Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
234 (33%)
275 (39%)
178 (9%)
751 (39%)
116 (31%)
131 (35%)
545 (20%)
1,097 (40%)
χ2 (6, N = 5,742) = 287.400, p < 0.001

High
(Quality=3)
202 (28%)
1,000 (52%)
132 (35%)
1,081 (40%)

under the auspices of RQ3, it is interesting to note that positively-oriented comment
streams are those affiliated with news sources that began in cyberspace (they have no
precursor in traditional print or broadcast domains). Similarly, negatively-oriented
comment streams are those occurring within the discussion platforms of news sources
that have their origins in channels that long predate the Internet.
	
  

	
  72

	
  
Tables 5 through 8 depict the chi-square contingency tables for each of the four
components of deliberative quality (civility, politeness, justification and complexity,
respectively) across the four news sources. Though the differences in each of the four are
Table 5: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility)
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Associated Press
128 (18%)
583 (82%)
Daily Kos
122 (6%)
1,807 (94%)
Los Angeles Times
75 (20%)
304 (80%)
Young Turks
253 (9%)
2,470 (91%)
2
χ (3, N = 5,742) = 120.685, p < 0.001
Source

	
  

Table 6: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness)
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Associated Press
382 (54%)
329 (46%)
Daily Kos
492 (26%)
1,437 (74%)
Los Angeles Times
208 (55%)
171 (45%)
Young Turks
1,008 (37%)
1,715 (63%)
χ2 (3, N = 5,742) = 247.477, p < 0.001
Source

	
  

Table 7: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification)
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Associated Press
390 (55%)
321 (45%)
Daily Kos
882 (46%)
1,047 (54%)
Los Angeles Times
195 (52%)
184 (48%)
Young Turks
1,437 (53%)
1,286 (47%)
χ2 (3, N = 5,742) = 28.748, p < 0.001
Source

Table 8: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity)
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Associated Press
546 (77%)
165 (23%)
Daily Kos
1,163 (60%)
766 (40%)
Los Angeles Times
253 (67%)
126 (33%)
Young Turks
1,893 (70%)
830 (30%)
2
χ (3, N = 5,742) = 78.060, p < 0.001
Source
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highly statistically significant, an examination of the individual components reveals that
the variances of those differences are, in some cases, highly consistent, and, in others,
quite divergent. Civility, for example, was dependably high across all four news sources
(from a high of 94% for Daily Kos to a low of 80% for The Los Angeles Times). In
contrast, measures of politeness varied widely across the four, with two clear clusters
emerging: Daily Kos and Young Turks occupied a higher band of politeness (with a range
of 63% to 74%), while The Los Angeles Times and Associated Press occupied a much
lower band (with a range of 45% to 46%). In the case of both the civility and politeness
measures, however, news sources native to the Internet faired consistently higher than
those with origins in traditional media.
	
  

With respect to the justification measure, and as shown in Table 7, there was little

difference across the four news sources and all were tightly clustered around the 50%
mark. Though there is a much wider variability with respect to the complexity measure
(from a high of 40% with Daily Kos to a low of 23% with Associated Press), all suffer
from low levels of complexity within their respective comment streams. Complexity is
the only variable for which fewer than one-half – and for three of the sources, fewer than
one-third – of the comments linked to all news sources contain the requisite indicator
affiliated with quality deliberation. If complexity is a key ingredient of healthy online
deliberation, it is found far less often than not across the whole of the data examined.
RQ2
The second research question examines differences in deliberative quality of user
comments based upon channel medium, the first of two dimensions differentiating the
precipitating news sources. As described in the preceding chapters and depicted in
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Figure 1, channel medium may be either multimedia/audiovisual (as in the case of the
Associated Press and Young Turks YouTube channels) or print (a la Daily Kos or The
Los Angeles Times). As revealed in Table 9, print-based news stories precipitated, with
Table 9: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Deliberative
Quality)
	
  
Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
Multimedia / Audiovisual
779 (23%)
1,372 (40%)
Print
294 (13%)
882 (38%)
2
χ (2, N = 5,742) = 118.952, p < 0.001
News Medium

High
(Quality=3)
1,283 (37%)
1,132 (49%)

statistical significance, higher quality comments but not by an overwhelmingly large
margin. Both multimedia and print-based news sources yielded comments that tended to
be of higher quality than not (the aggregate of medium- and high quality comments were
77% and 87%, respectively).
Subsequent chi-square contingency tables for each of the four components of
deliberative quality are shown in Tables 10 through 13. With moderate to high
Table 10: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Civility)
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Multimedia / Audiovisual
381 (11%)
3,053 (89%)
Print
197 (9%)
2,111 (91%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 9.988, p < 0.01
News Medium

	
  

Table 11: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Politeness)
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Multimedia / Audiovisual
1,390 (40%)
2,044 (60%)
Print
700 (30%)
1,608 (70%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 61.406, p < 0.001
News Medium
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Table 12: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Justification)
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
News Medium
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Multimedia / Audiovisual
1,827 (53%)
1,607 (47%)
Print
1,077 (47%)
1,231 (53%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 26.614, p < 0.001
	
  
Table 13: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Complexity)
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Multimedia / Audiovisual
2,439 (71%)
995 (29%)
Print
1,416 (61%)
892 (39%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 58.539, p < 0.001
News Medium

	
  
statistical significance with respect to each of the four comparisons, we can say

conclusively that news conveyed through the print medium spawned comments that were
of higher deliberative quality relative to each of the four measures. These differences
were larger for the variables of politeness and complexity (print-based news sources
yielded comments that were, in each case, 10% more polite and complex than those
precipitated by multimedia/audiovisual-based sources) and nearly nil for the variable of
civility (91% versus 89%).
RQ3
The third research question examines differences in deliberative quality of user
comments based upon the second of two dimensions differentiating the precipitating
news sources: news channel constitution. As shown in Figure 1, the grouping variable of
news channel constitution can take on one of two attributes: web original (i.e. native to
the Internet) or traditional (i.e. non-native to the Internet). On the surface, the findings
affiliated with RQ3 are very similar to those of RQ2. Comments of high or medium
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deliberative quality are, with a high degree of statistical significance, more frequent in
platforms hosted by web-original news sources than traditional ones (85% versus 68%,
respectively; see Table 14). The same is true with respect to each of the individual
components of deliberative quality: civility (92% versus 81%; see Table 15), politeness
(68% versus 46%; see Table 16) and complexity (34% versus 27%; see Table 18) are
noticeably higher for web-original news sources than traditional ones. As is the case
elsewhere, differences between the two dimensions with respect to the component of
justification are less obvious and have more modest statistical significance (see Table
17).
Table 14: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and
Deliberative Quality)
	
  
News Constitution
Internet-Native
Traditional
	
  

Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
723 (15%)
1,848 (40%)
350 (32%)
406 (37%)
2
χ (2, N = 5,742) = 172.798, p < 0.001

High
(Quality=3)
2,081 (45%)
334 (31%)

	
  
Table 15: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and Civility)

	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Internet-Native
375 (8%)
4,277 (92%)
Traditional
203 (19%)
8887 (81%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 108.836, p < 0.001

News Constitution

	
  
	
  

Table 16: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and
Politeness)
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Internet-Native
1,500 (32%)
3,152 (68%)
Traditional
590 (54%)
500 (46%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 182.690, p < 0.001

News Constitution
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Table 17: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and
Justification)
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Internet-Native
2,319 (50%)
2,333 (50%)
Traditional
585 (54%)
505 (46%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 5.156, p < 0.05

News Constitution

	
  

Table 18: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and
Complexity)
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Internet-Native
3,056 (66%)
1,596 (34%)
Traditional
799 (73%)
291 (27%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 23.183, p < 0.001

News Constitution

	
  
	
  

RQ4
The fourth and fifth research questions focus on differences in the deliberative
quality of comments relative to generalizable differences in the content of the news
stories and segments themselves (see Figure 2). Specifically, RQ4 examines whether or
not there are statistically significant variations in user comments based upon the
geographic focus of the political news stories (understood to be predominantly focused
on either domestic affairs or international issues). In contrast to prior results and as
shown in Table 19, there appears to be no statistically significant difference in the
Table 19: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Deliberative
Quality)
	
  
Geographic Focus
Domestic
International

	
  

Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
884 (19%)
1,879 (40%)
189 (19%)
375 (37%)
2
χ (2, N = 5,742) = 2.941, p = 0.230
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High
(Quality=3)
1,967 (41%)
448 (44%)

	
  
deliberative quality of comments based upon the geographic focus of the affiliated
political news content. As revealed in Tables 20 through 23, the same can be said for
differences in all four of the components of deliberative quality.
	
  
Table 20: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Civility)
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Domestic
469 (10%)
4,261 (90%)
International
109 (11%)
903 (89%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 0.674, p = 0.412

Geographic Focus

	
  
	
  

Table 21: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Politeness)
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Domestic
1,729 (37%)
3,001 (63%)
International
361 (36%)
651 (64%)
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 0.280, p = 0.597

Geographic Focus

	
  
	
  

Table 22: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Justification)
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Domestic
2,414 (51%)
2,316 (49%)
International
490 (48%)
522 (52%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 2.284, p=0.131
	
  

Geographic Focus

Table 23: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Complexity)
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Domestic
3,171 (67%)
1,559 (33%)
International
684 (68%)
328 (32%)
2
χ (3, N = 5,742) = 0.114, p = 0.736

Geographic Focus
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Because the grouping variable of geographic focus cuts across the content of all
four news sources, it is possible to run the more powerful Mantel-Haenszel analysis and
examine the subsequent chi-square contingency tables for each of the components of
deliberative quality while controlling for political news source (see Tables 24 through
27). Though a large sample of comments was harvested to allow for this additional level
of granularity of analysis, it becomes immediately evident that the number of comments
	
  
Table 24: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Civility
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks
	
  

Uncivil
(Civility = 0)
Domestic
94 (20%)
International
34 (24%)
Domestic
114 (6%)
International
8 (6%)
Domestic
70 (19%)
International
5 (45%)
Domestic
191 (10%)
International
62 (9%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 0.351, p = 0.514
Geographic Focus

Civil
(Civility = 1)
476 (80%)
107 (76%)
1,682 (94%)
125 (94%)
298 (81%)
6 (55%)
1,805 (90%)
665 (91%)

Table 25: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Politeness
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks
	
  

	
  

Impolite
(Politeness = 0)
Domestic
309 (54%)
International
73 (51%)
Domestic
460 (26%)
International
32 (24%)
Domestic
203 (55%)
International
5 (45%)
Domestic
757 (37%)
International
251 (35%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 3.049, p = 0.081
Geographic Focus
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Polite
(Politeness = 1)
261 (46%)
68 (49%)
1,336 (74%)
101 (76%)
165 (45%)
6 (55%)
1,239 (63%)
476 (65%)

	
  
affiliated with internationally-focused news stories from The Los Angeles Times (n=11) is
insufficient to extract any reasonably conclusive findings. Prefaced with this important
limitation, however, it is clear that neither civility nor politeness vary in a statistically
significant way with respect to geographic focus while controlling for the remaining three
political news sources. At the same time, there is insufficient statistical significance to
suggest that similar variations within the complexity indicator, though seemingly
apparent, are not by chance alone. It is only in the variable of justification that we see
	
  
Table 26: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Justification
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks
	
  

Unjustified
(Justification = 0)
Domestic
300 (53%)
International
90 (64%)
Domestic
818 (46%)
International
64 (48%)
Domestic
186 (51%)
International
9 (82%)
Domestic
1,110 (56%)
International
327 (45%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 7.034, p < 0.01
Geographic Focus

Justified
(Justification = 1)
270 (47%)
51 (34%)
978 (54%)
69 (52%)
182 (49%)
2 (18%)
886 (44%)
400 (55%)

Table 27: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Complexity
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks

	
  

Non-Complex
(Complexity = 0)
Domestic
426 (75%)
International
120 (85%)
Domestic
1078 (60%)
International
85 (64%)
Domestic
247 (67%)
International
6 (55%)
Domestic
1,420 (71%)
International
473 (65%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 1.690, p = 0.194
Geographic Focus
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Complex
(Complexity = 1)
144 (25%)
21 (15%)
718 (40%)
48 (36%)
121 (33%)
5 (45%)
576 (29%)
254 (35%)

	
  
any substantive differences based upon geographic focus of news content while
controlling for news source. Of particular note, the Young Turks YouTube Channel
generated comments that were significantly more justified for international-focused
segments than domestic ones. Interestingly, the AP YouTube Channel saw the opposite
result as its comments were significantly more justified for domestically-focused
segments than domestic. That there can be this kind of acute variability within a single
commenting platform (YouTube) is worthy of additional consideration and scrutiny. 	
  
	
  
RQ5
Similar to the fourth research question, the fifth examines variability in the
deliberative quality of comments relative to the topical focus of the precipitating news
content. In this case, topical focus may be either campaigning-specific or governingspecific (a more thorough description of the differentiation can be found in Chapter 3 and
is summarized in Table 2). As shown in Table 28, differences in deliberative quality
based upon topical focus are slight though of statistical significance. In addition, per
Table 29, there is almost no variance in the component characteristic of civility between
campaigning-focused and governing-focused stories and segments (these tiny differences
are statistically significant). In contrast, Tables 30 through 32 reveal modest but
	
  
Table 28: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Deliberative Quality)
	
  
Topical Focus
Campaigning
Governing
	
  

	
  

Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
236 (22%)
420 (40%)
837 (18%)
1,834 (39%)
χ2 (2, N = 5,742) = 12.826, p < 0.01
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High
(Quality=3)
408 (38%)
2007 (43%)

	
  
statistically-significant differences with respect to politeness (60% of comments are
polite for campaigning-focused content versus 65% for governing-focused content),
justification (45% versus 50%, respectively) and justification (45% versus 50%,
respectively). In each case, those comments generated by governing-focused stories and
segments possess more of the characteristics of higher deliberative quality.
Table 29: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Civility)
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Campaigning
85 (8%)
979 (92%)
Governing
493 (10%)
4,185 (90%)
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 6.226, p < 0.05

Topical Focus

	
  
	
  

Table 30: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Politeness)
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Campaigning
429 (40%)
635 (60%)
Governing
1,661 (35%)
3,017 (65%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 8.674, p < 0.01

Topical Focus

	
  
	
  

Table 31: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Justification)
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Campaigning
581 (55%)
483 (45%)
Governing
2,323 (50%)
2,355 (50%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 8.488, p < 0.01
	
  

Topical Focus

Table 32: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Complexity)
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Campaigning
766 (72%)
298 (28%)
Governing
3,089 (66%)
1,589 (34%)
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 13.956, p < 0.001

Topical Focus
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As was possible for RQ4, utilization of the Mantel-Haenszel analysis offers
deeper insights into differences in the deliberative quality of comments based upon the
topical focus of news content while controlling for news source. For the Associated
Press and The Los Angeles Times (both traditional in terms of the grouping variable of
news constitution), measures of civility were noticeably and statistically significantly
higher for comments affiliated with stories focused on campaigning than governing (see
Table 33). In contrast, differences of politeness were starkest within the Daily Kos; 75%
Table 33: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Civility
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks
	
  

Uncivil
(Civility = 0)
Campaigning
0 (0%)
Governing
128 (19%)
Campaigning
17 (8%)
Governing
105 (6%)
Campaigning
22 (16%)
Governing
53 (22%)
Campaigning
46 (7%)
Governing
207 (10%)
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 8.089, p < 0.01
Topical Focus

Civil
(Civility = 1)
32 (100%)
551 (81%)
184 (92%)
1,623 (94%)
112 (84%)
192 (78%)
651 (93%)
1,819 (90%)

Table 34: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Politeness
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks
	
  

	
  

Impolite
(Politeness = 0)
Campaigning
16 (50%)
Governing
366 (54%)
Campaigning
68 (34%)
Governing
424 (25%)
Campaigning
71 (53%)
Governing
137 (56%)
Campaigning
274 (39%)
Governing
734 (36%)
2
χ (1, N = 5,742) = 4.403, p < 0.05
Topical Focus
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Polite
(Politeness = 1)
16 (50%)
313 (46%)
133 (66%)
1,304 (75%)
63 (47%)
108 (44%)
423 (61%)
1,292 (64%)

	
  
of comments were found to be polite for governing-focused stories versus 66% for
campaigning-focused stories (see Table 34). Measures of justification were significantly
higher in the Associated Press, Daily Kos and The Los Angeles Times for governingfocused stories and segments versus those that were campaign-focused; there was no
perceivable difference for Young Turks (see Table 35). In addition, higher levels of
complexity were significantly skewed towards governing-focused content across all of
the news sources (see Table 36).	
  
Table 35: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Justification
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks
	
  

Unjustified
(Justification = 0)
Campaigning
21 (66%)
Governing
369 (54%)
Campaigning
111 (55%)
Governing
771 (45%)
Campaigning
80 (60%)
Governing
115 (47%)
Campaigning
368 (53%)
Governing
1,068 (53%)
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 5.779, p < 0.05
Topical Focus

Justified
(Justification = 1)
11 (34%)
310 (46%)
90 (45%)
957 (55%)
54 (40%)
130 (53%)
328 (47%)
958 (47%)

Table 36: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Complexity
Controlling for Political News Source)
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
Young Turks

	
  

Non-Complex
(Complexity = 0)
Campaigning
31 (97%)
Governing
515 (76%)
Campaigning
137 (68%)
Governing
1,026 (59%)
Campaigning
91 (68%)
Governing
162 (66%)
Campaigning
507 (73%)
Governing
1,386 (68%)
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 11.770, p < 0.001
Topical Focus
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Complex
(Complexity = 1)
1 (3%)
164 (24%)
64 (32%)
702 (41%)
43 (32%)
83 (34%)
190 (27%)
640 (32%)

	
  
Supplementary Analysis
Identifying the Most Robust Discussion Threads By News Source
Utilization of the given procedure to identify the thread of highest aggregate
deliberative quality for each of the four precipitating news sources yielded the selection
described in Table 37. Given previous findings, it is not surprising to learn that the
leading threads on Daily Kos and Young Turks were noticeably longer than those on The
Los Angeles Times or Associate Press. Similarly expected was the fact that the leading
Table 37: Leading Discussion Threads For Each News Source
	
  

Multimedia

Channel Medium

Print

Channel Constitution
Web Original
Traditional

	
  

Daily Kos

Los Angeles Times

Leading Thread:
# of Comments: 121
Aggregate Quality: 355
Average Quality: 2.93

Leading Thread:
# of Comments: 6
Aggregate Quality: 17
Average Quality: 2.83

Precipitating Article:
“So-called ‘Right to
Work’ and the assault on
the middle class”

Precipitating Article:
“State Department
spokesman P.J. Crowley
resigns”

Young Turks

Associated Press

Leading Thread:
# of Comments: 48
Aggregate Quality: 121
Average Quality: 2.52

Leading Thread:
# of Comments: 33
Aggregate Quality: 69
Average Quality: 2.09

Precipitating Segment:
“Def. Secretary Gates:
Crazy Wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan”

Precipitating Segment:
“Raw Video: House
Abortion Debate Gets
Personal”
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threads precipitated by news in the medium of print had comments of higher average
deliberative quality than those contained within threads affiliated with multimedia-based
news.
The supplementary analysis requires a deep reading of each of the four leading
threads and the active scanning for readily apparent patterns that may not otherwise be
discernable from the results of employing the broader content analysis coding
methodology alone. Though this secondary analysis admittedly is limited as it
investigates but a single thread for each news source, what emerges across the four is
highly significant both in terms of clarity and consistency: Each thread reflects a
definitive (and remarkably contained) style of deliberation that is relatively easy to
describe, and the overarching tone of each of these styles appears to be highly associated
with that of the precipitating stories and segments themselves. While potential reasons
for these styles and correlations will be discussed in Chapter 5, it is first necessary to
review the general patterns.
Daily Kos: Bounded and Cerebral
The Daily Kos article – “So-called ‘Right to Work’ and the assault on the middle
class” – could hardly be described as, nor would there any expectation of it being, an
objective piece based solely upon a resuscitation of facts; even the headline of the piece
suggests its overt subjectivity. In fact, large portions of the article take the form of a
syllogism intended to build a cogent argument. Consider the following passage,
annotated with components of the logical construct:
(Major Premise) In fact, RtW laws actually represent the government interfering
in what employers can do, by preventing employers and unions from agreeing to
“union security” clauses. A union security clause says that if the union represents
you, you have to pay your share of the costs they incur. (Minor Premise) So what
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banning that type of agreements means is that if someone gets a job in a unionized
workplace, the union has to represent them, but they have no responsibility to the
union. They get the wages and benefits negotiated, however improved those may
be (union members earn, on average, 28% more than non-members), and don’t
contribute to the costs of negotiating. If they’re fired illegally, the union
represents them for free, no matter how much staff time and resources go into
defending them. And if they feel like the union didn’t do well enough
representing them for free, they can sue. (Conclusion) You can see where this
goes. People enter as freeloaders, happy to have improved wages and benefits
and help when they have a problem with the boss, and happy to let someone else
pay for it. But that freeloading weakens the union, and in the end, working
conditions and pay are driven down for everyone: RtW states have an average
wage of $5,500 lower than other states (Clawson, 2011; italics added).
By their very nature, syllogisms are a construct of deductive reasoning that employ the
steady application of reduction until truth becomes apparent. Employing this kind of
argumentative tool lessens the likelihood for alternative conclusions, and it is intriguing
that both the form and the function of the deliberative exchange that follows are both
overtly rational and also especially narrow – and narrowing – in focus. Note the
following sequence of comments (online usernames follow in italics):

	
  

-

Public unions and private unions are entirely different things. Private unions
negotiate with a private company; the rest of us are not involved. If they
succeed, the company and union prosper. If not, they fail. Public unions
negotiate with the public in general. Public employees being paid more mean
private employees being paid less due to paying higher taxes. (Sparhawk)

-

Public unions negotiate with the employer, just as private unions do. Public
employees being paid more can mean a wide variety of things. In some cases,
it means actually having better employees who do a better job with a stronger
commitment to it. Just because a union negotiates in support of public
employees does not mean it operates against the public’s best interests. (Julie
Waters)

-

Thank you, Julie. As usual, it’s always assumed public employees make a lot
more than private employees. It’s not always the case. (daphnepf)

-

It’s not the case at all. It depends on the job and the situation. Some do quite
well, but it’s easy to make things look worse than they are buy quoting toplevel salaries (Julie Waters)
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-

It’s frequently not the case as several studies have shown. There are big
differences depending on educational level. Those with the least education
tend to do somewhat better as public employees than as private employees.
Those with more education tend to do worse. (Meteor Blades)

-

I agree, public sector workers’ pay and benefits are based upon the averaging
of wages earned in the private sector; public sector unions (police, firefighters,
teachers, et al.) have become the new enemies in American politics. It is
strange to find individuals willing to blame Veterans Affairs nurses bringing
in $36K/year that they need a pay cut because their meager take home pay is
destroying the livelihood of all other Americans… (Epsilon)

-

The only time where it is the case is in areas where the local government is
hiring the most skilled workers, as in rural areas. Then, the most educated and
skilled workers are doing government IT, teaching, policing, lawyering, etc.
They may have a higher wage but it still is lower usually than they would
make in a more urban area. (elfling)

-

The problem is hiking taxes on poor/middle class to pay for service union
wage hikes. Why can’t the service unions collectively call on a wealth tax to
fulfill obligations made to them? The Dems are in trouble to the extent that
they ask the private sector working and middle-class, which has seen stagnant
wages for the last decade, to “suck it up” by shouldering a higher tax burden.
And regrettably, some Dem governors are doing just that. (PatriciaVa)

-

True and though not really the issue it’s an effective way to rile the middle
class who is paying the lion’s share of the taxes. The Democrats need to do
two things – link tax hikes for the highest earners with collective bargaining
agreements and be specific about expectations for labor, public and private.
We need to define expectations for wages, unemployment, health care and
pensions and strive for national standard. Even if the super rich start to pay
their fair share, what is it and what’s it for? Getting these answers will diffuse
the ageless issues used by the parties that impede getting closure. (kck)

	
  
As civil and polite as it is cerebral and abstract, this thread (the longest and of highest
aggregate quality in the whole of the study) rarely drifts beyond the boundaries of the
logical form contained within the precipitating article. Equally noteworthy, the selfselected members of the community police themselves (for better or worse) and rarely
allow for a wider field of perspectives. When the divergence of viewpoints become too
great, an offsetting, converging force will often try to intervene and reign in the
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discussion back to a more reasonably norm for the community. Consider the following
exchange:
-

I look around my apartment and see a flat panel tv, glasses, chairs, a stereo,
etc. All of that stuff was created by the private sector. The police just help
make sure that stuff isn’t stolen or broken. In exchange for that service, I give
up a stereo I might have otherwise had. The more expensive the police are,
the less stuff I have for my own consumption. Education is a little different
because it is an investment (pay now, gain later). But police and fire services
are a total dead loss – necessary, I agree, but they don’t make anything useful
and draw off the stuff that is made (Sparhawk)

-

Production isn’t possible without public services. Without public services,
there will be no investment and no production. Take a look around at the
world at places where the government is unable to enforce property rights,
where there are no universally enforced laws, where education and security
are private goods to be paid for by those than can afford them. They draw
little investment, produce little, and everyone is worse off as a result.
(WellstoneDem)

-

Both of you are making valid points. The two real and complicated questions
are: 1. When does the number of dollars paid to the public employee in total
compensation exceed the value of the service provided? At that point, if not
before, one should certainly be in favor of reducing the compensation of the
public employee. 2. Could one find an equally qualified individual for less
money? At that point, one can legitimately argue that the compensation
should be reduced. (Justanothernyer)

Beyond those who help keep the core arguments of the discussion intact, other members
of the online community take it upon themselves to expose others who do not fall within
the narrow band of the prevailing political persuasion (in this case, liberal progressivism),
either to ensure that near-outliers are widely known or to suggest to far-outliers that their
views are not welcomed. Examples include:

	
  

-

She’s a centrist. Her signature is sort of a broad hint in this area. And minus
the apparent rationalizations, all centrism is about using the power of the
government to facilitate upward transfer of wealth. (alizard)

-

But outside Wall Street, the Richistani, and the political class they fund and
the media they own, sightings of real centrists in the wild are rare. For the
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obvious reason, all that’s in it for the rest of us in centrism is lots and lots of
trouble. (sturunner)
-

Your anti-worker right wing bullshit gets old. Well paid workers contribute
more to the economy no matter the source of their income. Libertarians are
clueless, I swear. The concepts of society and the common good completely
escape you, don’t they? (happy camper)

-

Shhhh… or this Ayn Rand reading guy who is calculating everyone’s net
worth to society is going to suggest that our children go out and get jobs. I
can hear it already: Child Labor Laws – bah humbug. (Puddytat)
Los Angeles Times: Competing Attributions

In stark contrast to blog-style articles originating from Daily Kos, stories posted
on the website of The Los Angeles Times typically adhere to the same journalistic
standards as political news that are physically printed in nearly any mainstream,
American newspaper. If any news analysis is performed, it is merely to aid the reader in
connecting the often scattered dots of a more complex news reality and not to offer
political judgment. Nowhere in the selected precipitating news story from The Los
Angeles Times is an opinion offered. Instead, the article takes the form of a well ordered,
just-the-facts recounting (in this particular case, of why a prominent State Department
spokesperson abruptly resigned), complete with the requisite nut graph and string of
attributed details. Consider the first four paragraphs (style annotations appear in italics):
(Nut Graph) The State Department’s top spokesperson resigned Sunday, three
days after criticizing the Pentagon for its treatment of a soldier imprisoned on
charges of leaking U.S. government documents posted on the WikiLeaks website.
(Attributed Detail) P.J. Crowley, the assistant secretary of State for public affairs,
told a group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on Thrusdayt that the
Pentagon’s treatment of Pfc. Bradley Manning was “ridiculous and
counterproductive.” His comments were made public by a blogger who attended
the session. (Attributed Detail) Manning was forced to sleep naked for several
days under military rules intended to keep maximum-security prisoners who may
be suicidal from injuring themselves. Manning’s lawyers say he also has been
made to stand at attention naked, and there was no justification for his treatment
in custody. (Attributed Detail) President Obama defended the Pentagon at a news
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conference Friday, when ABC reporter Jake Tapper pressed him about Crowley’s
comments. Obama said he had been assured that Manning’s treatment was
“appropriate and was meeting our standards.” (Richter, 2011)
Though comments posted on the website of The Los Angeles Times are not nearly as
voluminous as they are elsewhere, the leading thread reveals a deliberative style that is,
once again, noticeably consistent and perhaps taking its queue from the form of the
precipitating news story. In this case, the whole of the deliberative exchange exudes an
overarching sense of certainty based upon two very distinct kinds of attributions:
righteousness, or the direct appeal to higher-level (if abstract) virtues of morality and
humanity; or the seeming concreteness of lived experienced. In the rather basic
conservative-versus-liberal argument that ensues, one camp exclusively utilizes one
beacon of certainty while the other is steadfast in tapping into the other. Though the
comments generally possess civility, politeness, and in several cases justification (thus
yielding higher measures of deliberative quality), it is difficult to imagine that any
common ground or co-created political meaning could emerge from the deliberations.
Nowhere in the exchange is there even a whiff of doubt as to the certainty of each user’s
respective argument, not unlike the style of the news story itself:

	
  

-

They made him stand at attention? Poor dear. My drill instructors at Parris
Island would have been devastated for the unhappy little guy. Manning is, or
was supposed to be, a soldier. We have an all-volunteer military. Nobody
asked him to enlist. Soldiers occasionally stand at attention. And as for
requiring him to sleep without his footie jammies, well… He’s confined to a
military brig, not at Club Fed. Here’s a hint for Bradley: “Actions have
consequences.” (Kinnison)

-

Actions have consequences? Here’s one… the belief that information on
ongoing wars that cost human lives everyday needed to be freely available.
Here is Mr. Crowley who lost a 3 decade long career for saying what he
believed in the land of the free. And both could have simply kept quiet. If
they were Wall Street CEOs throwing away money and lives, that would have
been ok, if there were warmongering politicians sending young soldiers to
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fake wars, that would have been ok. Here a hint for Bradley and others –
“Free thought has consequences.” (neilm101)	
  
	
  
-

From a retired member of the Armed Forces: It may be the land of the free…
but you give up certain rights when you join the military, the police, the
intelligence services, or the Department of State. This is the issue: You can’t
simply go blabbing your mouth because you feel like it. Manning or Crowley.
(Salmon)	
  

-

“I was just following orders” – soldier of the 3rd Reich (mr. gittes)	
  

-

These comments show the mentality of the conservative mind. Evil and
perverse. It’s part of their DNA. (senior)	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

Young Turks: Reverence for the Cult of Personality
Unlike the other three sources of political news, the Young Turks YouTube is the
only one with reporting emanating from a single individual – in this case, the channel’s
creator and longtime host, Cenk Uygur. As is the style of so many broadcasted talk show
hosts, bloggers, and so-called political “commentators” (i.e. pundits), Uygur typically
establishes a provocative but also strong and clear position early on in his segment
(indeed, the leading thread is affiliated with a segment that indirectly identifies Uygur’s
position in its very title – “Def. Secretary Gates: Crazy Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan”) and
then incessantly reinforces his point with a rapid-fire succession of facts (volleyed in a
staccato style), leading questions, unchallenged assumptions and quick conclusions. The
style indicators (shown in italics) are clearly evident in the following section of his
report:
(Clear and Provocative Position) In terms of Afghanistan, we’re still there and
not withdrawing. (Leading Question) So, if our Defense Secretary thinks this is
such a terrible idea, why do we continue to stay there? (Clear and Provocative
Position – Continued) It’s a very fair question. (Fact #1) And, by the way, the
DNC just passed a resolution saying that Obama needs to do a speedy withdrawal
from Afghanistan; so the Democrats agree. (Fact #2) And, oh by the way, ABC
News did a poll two months ago saying 60% of Americans think it was the wrong
idea to go into Afghanistan. (Unchallenged Assumption) My guess is that if you
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did a poll – and I’ve seen others polls – that if you asked should we leave as soon
as possible the percentage would be even higher and past 70%. (Quick
Conclusion) So, if we all agree, let’s go… let’s get out of there. (Uygur, 2011a).
Not surprisingly, the comment that then spawns the leading thread is also both
provocative and clear in establishing its position:
-

Iraq sure, it was a big mistake… But don’t tell me for a second that we
shouldn’t have gone into Afghanistan. That’s bullshit. We had to go over
there and fuck those bitches up. (MrHav1k)

The comment immediately following the catalyzing post is, in turn, very much a leading
question that triggers its own bombardment of facts:

	
  

-

All wars are bullshit. Name one war that was done, solely chosen by the
people, for the people. Instead all ward are started by special interest groups.
Normal people just want to have some land and house, a family, a little
respect and getting old peacefully. (georgemargaris)

-

What about World War 2? (theRekcabofD)

-

Napoleonic Wars? (sulmagnificent)

-

Ummm… the American Revolution? (darkraider47)

-

Just for the sake of being a douche, I’m pretty sure the old Spartans eventually
went to war because they all wanted to show everyone how awesome they
were at killing. (AsifIcarebear3)

-

World War I, many Americans at the time, wanted to remain isolated from the
Great War in Europe. (EvilFingers)

-

WW2. If we hadn’t fought that this entire world would be controlled by a
racist totalitarian state with only “Aryans” as the last ones living.

-

The Libyan revolt? (bersaba)

-

French revolution, American revolution, etc… the list just goes on and on.
(redryan2000)

-

Defensive wars… can’t blame the US for WWII. Can’t blame the French for
WWI. Wars of aggression, more accurately, are bullshit, which is why they
are technically outlawed under international law. (Redfingers)
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-

Name one war? Okay. First one that comes to mind is the Yellow Turban
Rebellion from 184-205 against Emperor Ling. (falconfira)

-

Defeating Hitler was in the best interest of every human on the planet.
(soundslave)

	
  
Though many contribute to this thread in a manner that suggests a relatively high level of
deliberative quality (based upon the given methodology), there is very little being
accomplished in the way of arriving at a more vibrant sense of understanding or cocreated meaning. The thread barely takes the form of a discussion at all and is merely an
accumulation of rather disjointed pseudo-facts; lost is any specific attention paid to
debating the efficacy of recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the amassing of
unrelated facts continues to snowball, no members of the community step in to attempt to
reign in the conversation and refocus it with a renewed sense of purpose, let alone
endeavor to synthesize the discussion into any kind of cogent conclusion. While they
may behave with civility and politeness, employ justification, and express modest levels
of complexity in their expression, members of the community very rarely attempt to
moderate or conclude. Given that Uygur’s popularity with his viewers arguably borders
on that of a cult of personality (not unlike other single-voice purveyors of political news
content), members of the community may not see it as their place to do so; those
functions are reserved for the community’s leader (Uygur), who, noticeably, never
directly engages with posters.
Associated Press: Accidental Crusader
The final segment, drawn from the YouTube Channel of the Associated Press, not
only covers a highly politically charged topic (abortion) but also does so without the
presence of any journalist, commentator or moderator at all. The three minutes of so-
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called raw video (the segment is entitled, “Raw Video: House Abortion Debate Gets
Personal”) is of a single – if graphic – exchange between two members of Congress: one
is male, likely pro-life, and identified as being a Republican from New Jersey; the other
is a female, seemingly pro-choice, and introduced as a being a Democrat from California.
The exchange, though brief, has nothing in the way of lead-up or post hoc assessment; it
is merely the audiovisual record of one small block of a lengthier floor debate: 	
  
(Male, Republican, New Jersey) I am talking about the scandal of these unborn
children and calling it choice. There is nothing, whatsoever, benign or caring or
generous or just or compassionate or nurturing about abortion. Earlier one of our
colleagues called abortion “healthy” for the child. Abortion dismembers children,
piece to piece… in late-term abortions, the doctors goes in with a pair of forceps
and literally hacks that baby to death… it is not healthy for children and it is not
healthy for women either. (Female, Democrat, California) I had planned to speak
about something else but the gentleman from New Jersey has just put my stomach
in knots. I am one of those women he spoke about just now. I had a procedure at
17 weeks pregnant with a child. That procedure you just talked about was a
procedure I endured. I lost a baby, but for you to stand on this floor and to
suggest as you have that somehow this is a procedure that is either welcomed or
done cavalierly or done without any thought is preposterous. To think that we are
here tonight, debating this issue, when the American people are scratching their
heads and wondering, what does this have to do with me getting a job?
(Associated Press, 2011)
If the leading thread extracted from the Young Turks discussion board lacked a definitive
contributor who was attempting to coalesce or steer the conversation, it is safe to say that
the same cannot be said for the Associated Press’ top thread. As shown in the following
exchange, and then repeated again and again throughout the thread (not shown), the user
Viracocha711 takes it upon herself/himself to counter nearly every pro-life-leaning entry
made on the board:

	
  

-

Abortion should be up to the carrying woman. No one else. (Gahagafaga)

-

Not at all you murdering son of a bitch. (wefanworld)

-

Seriously, grow up! (Viracocha711)
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-

I just can’t come up with a good reason to allow anyone (even the mother) to
kill a baby or fetus. I don’t claim to be right. I just can’t think of one good
reason. (fermos11111)

-

Are you truly that ignorant? What about a 13yr old girl who has been
repeatedly raped by her stepfather? Or a mother who will die if she continues
on with a pregnancy? Or a 30yr old woman was brutally raped. YOUR
COMMENT SICKENS ME! (Viracocha711)

-

She obviously had an abortion and is trying to make herself feel better by
justifying killing babies… did I hit the nail on the head or what?
(fermos11111)

-

Who had an abortion and is trying to make themselves feel better? Abortion
is a woman’s right! It is her body! END OF STORY. If we force women to
do things then that sets the stage to force anyone to do whatever the
governments says when it comes to one’s body. We are a SECULAR nation
and everyone has the right to govern their own bodies. Folks just need to
mind their own business! It’s that simple! (Viracocha711)

Though almost none of her/his adversaries offer counterstatements to the given retorts
(even though the majority do continue to contribute in other threads affiliated with the
same segment), Viracocha711 should not be considered a so-called “Internet troll,” the
popular term given to a person who attempts to wreak havoc within online discussion
boards by posting inflammatory and often topically unrelated messages so as to upset the
ordinary flow of communication. Instead, the user’s online persona is more depicted as
that of an accidental crusader, a person who clearly operates with a heavy sense of
righteousness and who somehow must fulfill the duty of speaking out but would
otherwise like to see the very argument itself subside. In this manner, and as illustrated
on the final comment shown above, Viracocha711’s responses often blend a
supercharged, emotional expression with a conclusion of utter simplicity – “… folks just
need to mind their own business.” In this way, his/her style is not unlike that of the
Democratic House Member, who, after revealing something highly personal, reduces the
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magnitude of the issue by saying, “To think that we are here tonight… when the
American people… are wondering, what does this have to do with me getting a job?”
Interestingly, a brief (and admittedly non-scientific) scan of Viracocha711
throughout cyberspace reveals an approach to commentary that is hardly accidental. A
Google search of this unusual term yields approximately 6,400 unique results, and it is
relatively easy to determine that the user is actually an American male in his mid-40s
who works as a computer engineer and lives in suburban Atlanta, Georgia. Clearly
spending copious amounts of time in dozens (if not hundreds) of online communities,
Viracocha711’s modus operandi is to capitalize upon politically charged moments
(always originating with the words or actions of a prominent political figure(s)) by
employing them as an invitation to defend – or perhaps more accurately, to assert – his
political views within a broader community. Not surprisingly, there can be no swaying
the opinions of such an unlikely crusader: a moment of (distant and detached) political
controversy provides him the requisite agency to defend, just as his innate righteousness
anchor his beliefs to a bedrock of certainty.
	
  
Conclusion and Summary of Findings
In their most basic form, these findings support a simple but profound conclusion:
there are powerful, overarching differences in the kinds of Internet-based conversations
happening across all of the news platforms investigated. Essential to a deeper
understanding of the potential and threat they possess vis-à-vis democratic discourse – let
alone the proliferation of reforms to strengthen what works well and mitigate against
what does not – is the understanding that such spaces should not be considered
myopically. Even when taking care to recognize the heterogeneity of users, critics of
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online discussions too often leap to blaming what they see as a singular platform of
communication that precipitates a uniform result. As but one recent (and, at the time,
landmark) high-profile example, the editors of Popular Science in 2013 made the
decision to eliminate online comments entirely claiming that “trolls and spambots” had
diminished their ability to make good on the magazine’s “141-year commitment of
fostering lively, intellectual debate and spreading the word of science far and wide”
(LaBarre, 2013). In an online explanation to readers, the site’s content director argued:
Comments can be bad for science. That's why… we're shutting them off…
That is not to suggest that we are the only website in the world that attracts vexing
commenters. Far from it. Nor is it to suggest that all, or even close to all, of our
commenters are shrill, boorish specimens of the lower Internet phyla. We have
many delightful, thought-provoking commenters. But even a fractious minority
wields enough power to skew a reader's perception of a story, recent research
suggests… If you carry out those results to their logical end – commenters shape
public opinion; public opinion shapes public policy; public policy shapes how and
whether and what research gets funded – you start to see why we feel compelled
to hit the "off" switch (LaBarre, 2013).
Indeed, commenters may very well shape public opinion in the manner described, but it
must not be forgotten that while commenters, even if they are interfacing with one
another using tools that did not exist a decade ago, are fundamentally the same human
beings with the same tendencies. In an essay featured in The New Yorker entitled “The
Psychology of Online Comments,” Konnikova (2013) urges caution against Popular
Science’s choice of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater, suggesting:
Whether online, on the phone, by telegraph, or in person, we are governed by the
same basic principles. The medium may change, but people do not. The question
instead is whether the outliers, the trolls and the flamers, will hold outsized
influence—and the answer seems to be that, even protected by the shade of
anonymity, a dog will often make himself known with a stray, accidental bark.
Then, hopefully, he will be treated accordingly (Konnikova, 2013)
In advancing her point, Konnikova draws heavily upon the work of Yzer & Southwell
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(2008) whose social and psychological research attempts to place this straw man fallacy
in proper context:
The recent emergence of new media, or better, new communication technologies,
has afforded substantial commentary regarding societal effects, the latest chapter
in a decades-old trend that rises and falls with each new communication
technology. [We] do not deny that the current generation of communication
technologies differs from predecessors… [we] argue against the need for
wholesale changes in theory to understand the effects of these technologies. New
communication technologies do not fundamentally alter the theoretical bounds of
human interaction; such interaction continues to be governed by basic human
tendencies. What is perhaps most interesting about these new technologies is
their ability to provide new or previously rare contexts for information expression
and engagement (Yzer and Southwell, 2008, p.8).
It is against the backdrop of these emerging possibilities for different forms of
interaction and exchange that the findings of this chapter are summarized and also
depicted in the form of a single table included as Appendix H:
•

In total: The sample of threads deemed to be robust generated a vastly higher
level of deliberative quality than the sample of non-robust threads. When
postings catalyze more lengthy conversations, these conversations are
approximately six times more likely to be of high deliberative quality than those
that do not generate lengthy conversations. To put it another way, the quantity of
comments in a thread appears to be positively correlated with its discursive
quality. Though they can be anything from racist to vulgar, negative comments
do not appear to hold the same ability as positive ones to sustain a conversation.
Intrinsically, this may be avery positive sign for the underlying health of public
discourse.

•

In response to RQ1: There are large and statistically significant differences in
overall measures of discursive quality across the four platforms, thus lending
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further credence to the need of considering their idiosyncrasies. Interestingly, and
as shown in Figure 3, all four platforms had a nearly identical share of comments
demonstrating a middle level of quality. This consistent band, accounted for, in
each, about one-third of the total with a range of just five basis points (35 to 40).
In contrast, low-quality comments had a range of 24 (9 to 34 basis points) and
high quality comments had a range of 26 (28 to 52). With respect to individual
measures, civility was dependably high across all four platforms; politeness
varied considerably; justification was reasonably consistent across the four and
clustered around 50%; and complexity was uniformly low across the four.

Figure 3: Measures of Discursive Quality Across Four Platforms (% of Total)

•

	
  

In response to RQ2: Print-based news generated higher quality comments than
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audiovisual news; the same was true for the four individual indicators of quality.
•

In response to RQ3: News coming from Internet-native sources generated higher
quality comments than news from traditional sources; the same held true for the
component indicators.

•

In response to RQ4: News covering international issues was no different than
news covering domestic issues vis-à-vis the quality of comments; this was also
the case for each of the individual indicators. The Mantel-Haenszel analysis
(controlling for news source) revealed two intriguing outliers: the Young Turks
generated comments that were significantly more justified for internationalfocused segments; the AP generated comments that were significantly more
justified for domestic-focused segments.

•

In response to RQ5: News stories focused on a mode of governing were very
slightly – though statistically significant – different than news stories covering
issues of campaigning. Those stories focused on governing generated higher
quality comments; the same was true for each of the four component measures.
The Mantel-Haenszel analysis (again, controlling for news source) revealed that,
for the AP and The Los Angeles Times, civility was noticeably higher for
campaign-focused stories than governing-focused stories. For Daily Kos,
politeness was noticeably higher for articles covering governing than those
examining campaign-related issues.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
	
  
Preface
One does not have to have the vision and perspective of Buckminster Fuller,
Gordon Moore or Ray Kurzweil to appreciate the extent to which new technologies – and
new attitudes surrounding those technologies – have accelerated the rate of change
throughout modern society. To put it more simply: Things move pretty fast in the Digital
Age. Thus, before commencing a discussion of the implications of the findings contained
within this study, it is first necessary to review some of the key shifts – some of them
rather extraordinary – in both the prevailing wisdom and the quality of tools available to
catalyze (or in some cases, squelch) the power and prevalence of online comments.
When this investigation first began several years ago, there were already telltale
signs that the pressures faced by news organizations to adequately monitor and moderate
these relatively open discursive spaces were mounting. For some, their concerns centered
around a bevy of new ethical and legal dimensions – questions of corporate liability,
concerns for slander or libel, etc. – arising from the blurred line of responsibility existing
at the intersection of professionally-edited, journalist-produced news content and the socalled "Wild West" of comment boards (see, for example, Rosen, 2011). Others were
concerned about the potential tarnishing of their own reputations resulting from their
willingness to host a platform containing sentiments that were toxic, racist, xenophobic or
homophobic (see, for example, Sloane, 2013). As one example, The Attleboro Sun
Chronicle, a modest daily newspaper based in Southeastern Massachusetts, garnered
national and international attention (see, for example, Kirchner, 2010) when it made the
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landmark decision to begin charging users 99 cents for a dedicated login before they
could post comments. The newspaper's editor, Mike Kirby, shared the following in an
interview with the author:
The decision was taken out of basic need. We're a small paper that wants to be
engaged with the community and our readers, but our news staff was simply not
big enough to keep up with the volume of comments that needed to be monitored.
On top of that, there was a situation in which a string of comments defaming the
character of a local city official put us in a real bind. We didn't author what was
written but the words were sitting on our server and readily viewable from our
webpage. Commenters don't have the burden of proof upon them that journalists
do. The 99-cent fee was actually the brainchild of our [information technology]
guy. He thought that if we required people to charge a tiny fee – 99 cents – to
their credit card, we would have a clear record of who they were. This was first
and foremost about protecting the integrity of the paper. It really didn't matter to
us if people remained anonymous within the user community and pseudonyms
were still allowed. But if something got really sticky we had a way to more
clearly show what was our content and what wasn't. And, if it gave people a little
more skin in the game and made them think a bit more before they posted, that
was certainly okay, too (M. Kirby, personal communication, February 5, 2012).
Since data for this investigation were first collected, major news-providing
organizations everywhere have wrestled mightily with these overarching questions and
many have used anonymity controls as a primary level. In one recent tally, of the largest
137 newspapers in the United States – those with daily circulations in excess of 50,000 –
49% have banned anonymous commenting while an addition 9% never allowed
commenting (of any form) in the first place (Santana, 2014). Some, such as The Chicago
Sun-Times, heralded the spirit of the forums but felt compelled to hit the pause button in
in April 2014 until such time as either technology or attitudes (or both) could mature:
The world of Internet commenting offers a marvelous opportunity for discussion
and the exchange of ideas. But as anyone who has ever ventured into a comment
thread can attest, these forums too often turn into a morass of negativity, racism,
hate speech and general trollish behaviors that detract from the content. In fact,
the general tone and demeanor is one of the chief criticisms we hear in regard to
the usability and quality of our websites and articles. Not only have we heard
your criticisms, but we often find ourselves as frustrated as our readers are with
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the tone and quality of comments on our pages... Again, we are not doing away
with comments. But we do want to take some time and work on the qualitative
aspect of how they are handled and how we can foster a productive session rather
than an embarrassing mismatch of fringe ranting and ill-informed, shrill bombthrowing (Newman, 2014).
Others news outlets, such as the periodical National Journal, have made the reluctant
choice but expressed no intention of ever going back:
We believe that public service is a noble calling; that ideas matter; and that
trustworthy information about politics and policy will lead to wiser decisions in
the national interest. Those principles are reflected in everything we do – from
the stories we write, to the events we produce, to the research and insights we
offer our members. But there's one place where those principles don't seem to
hold: in the comments that appear at the end of our Web stories. For every
argument, there's a round of ad hominem attacks – not just fierce partisan feuding,
but the worst kind of abusive, racist, and sexist name-calling imaginable. The
debate isn't joined. It's cheapened, it's debased... and research suggests that the
experience leaves readers feeling more polarized and less willing to listen to
opposing viewpoints (Grieve, 2014).
As an alternative to eliminating anonymity altogether, and sensitive to its potentially
beneficial disinhibiting effects, other news providers have ramped up their monitoring
and moderating functions considerably. The Huffington Post, for example, made the
decision to employ a large team of specialists trained to ensure that comments met a
certain standard of civility and soon thereafter required user identities to be validated
through Facebook (Toth, 2014). This latest decision upset many longtime commenters
who benefited from the platform's (once) leading-edge system of progressive credibility
badges and other online tools used to differentiate users based upon the overall quality of
their comments over a period of time. One prolific commenter signed off rather
poignantly:
4 Plus years... 7900 fans... 2600 friends... 63000 comments... after a Networker
Badge, a Superuser Badge, a Moderator Badge, a Third World America Badge, a
Predictor Badge, a Beta Tester Badge AND most significantly, a Political Pundit
Badge. Each represents something very real to me: commitment, connection,
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trust, concern, foresight, judgment and wisdom recognized by HP. I THOUGHT
THAT HP WAS GOING TO HAVE A LONG TERM PLACE IN MY LIFE...
Day in and day out, it was HP that was my intellectual oasis, my debate club. It
was a point of connection with folks who really wanted to consider complex
issues and speak in nuances tones. I took part in some really wonderful
conversations. One of them involved 23 interchanges with a nurse who altered my
understanding of the nature of the choices that women make in matters of
reproductive health. In others I fought long and hard with those representing the
other side of the political and social spectrum and, in the end, agreed that we
could disagree without being disagreeable. I have been moved by many similar
testimonials here in the last several days. HP has been a friend, a companion to
many of us. I understand that HP has changed. Arianna Huffington envisioned a
place where a virtual community of serious conversationalists could gather but
that vision has given way to one of service as a global platform for the
dissemination of information. The move to all Facebook comments is part of that
(Nieman Journalism Lab, 2014).
As another example, National Public Radio utilized an off-site, contracted service to
perform essentially the same type of initial monitoring function and then announced it
was taking an additional step:
[The service] has improved the situation significantly, but it hasn't yet gotten the
community to that goal of the civil discussion that you value. Balancing the
desire to encourage free and open discussion and the need to prevent spam and
harmful comments, we believe we've come up with a compromise that will be
satisfactory to most of our members. Starting today, all new users to the site will
go through a period in which all of their comments are reviewed by a community
manager prior to the comments appearing on the site. We expect this review to
take fewer than 15 minutes for each comment. Once a user has established a
reputation for following the commenting guidelines all of his comments will
appear immediately after posting. Community managers will only review
comments in response to a specific report from other community members
(Myers, Stencel, & Carvin, 2011).
Closer to the center of the current investigation, though all four of the news outlets
included in this study had anonymous commenting interfaces in place at the time of data
collection in 2011, all required third-party credentialed user accounts (i.e. connected to a
credit card, social media site, or some other identity verifier) by the close of 2013. It is
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important to review the evolution of the three platforms (both the Associated Press and
Young Turks operate on YouTube) in some detail.
YouTube: Better Tools But Commerce Trumps Discourse
YouTube (and its parent company Google) had long been regarded by many as
the proverbial "cesspool" of Internet discussion platforms (see, for example, Tate, 2014).
As one popular blogger noted, "YouTube is a comment disaster on an unprecedented
scale. All of the worst things that could be said have been said here: YouTube IS the
room with the million monkeys and the million typewriters, but they haven’t even gotten
half-way though Hamlet yet because they’re too busy pitching feces at one another"
(Hermann, 2012). In an attempt to improve its reputation, YouTube in late 2013 took the
controversial step of requiring all would-be commenters to have a validated Google+
account before they could post. The move was met with fierce criticism from a variety of
different audiences and was interpreted by some, including one of YouTube's original cofounders, to be a thinly-veiled ploy to boost market share for its struggling social media
platform (Johnson, 2012). An international petition (currently in possession of more than
269,000 signatures) logged on change.org argued, "Google is forcing us to make google+
accounts and invading our social life to comment on a youtube video and trying to take
away our anonymous profile. They are also trying to censor us unless we share the same
worldview as they do" (Change.org, 2014). Even writers for The New York Times (long
an organization with strict commenting policies and safeguards) questioned the
announcement in noting:
These steps should encourage more civilized discourse. But I’ll miss the old
regime. As news sites and e-commerce sites moved to tidy up their comments
sections... there was (some modicum of) value in YouTube remaining a portal to
chaos. The comments, for now, are human, even if all too human. They
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counterbalance the shiny, happy videos of screaming goats and laughing babies.
Sure, they’ll make your stomach turn, but isn’t it beneficial to feel that way from
time to time? There’s something useful in reminding oneself that under the
cleanest streets of the fanciest neighborhoods, there’s a sewer. Soon YouTube
comments will be less obscene, more decorous and quite possibly more
substantive. They’ll also be less revealing (Lapidos, 2013).
Less than one month following the decision, commenting traffic on YouTube plummeted
by an estimated 40% (Sloane, 2013) and business analysts were quick to point out that
the company’s overall sanitation strategy had worked:
[The response to the YouTube decision] confirms that people are much less
courageous about making racist, sexist, homophobic, and altogether vile
comments in public when there's a chance those comments could get linked back
to their offline person. It also makes YouTube more attractive to major brands
who might want to advertise on the site, an initiative the company has taken quite
seriously lately in light of recent deals with big-time media buyers and its hiring
of an executive from consumer goods giant Procter & Gamble. In the past, brands
have had to worry about having their content placed beside hateful anonymous
comments, as happened when Cheerios posted a ground-breaking ad earlier this
year featuring a mixed-race family. The new comment policy gives them greater
confidence that investing in YouTube ads and sponsored content will not get
wasted amidst a sea of ignorance, making them that much more likely to give
YouTube more of their money (Taube, 2013).
Perhaps somewhat lost in the debate surrounding YouTube's decision to disallow
anonymity (and, by extension, to mandate linkage with its in-hose social media platform)
was the company's release of a much more robust set of commenting and reviewing tools
intended to transform the way commenters engage in a community setting and catalyze
comments into conversations. Key changes included: comments from the video creator
being ranked very highly and surfacing more regularly in the comment stream; elevating
comments from popular personalities on YouTube and users in one's Google+ network
higher up the comment chain; and greater standing given to more highly engaged
commenters who have historically received positive (i.e. "thumbs up") feedback from
their previous posts. At the same time, video owners were given new abilities to calibrate
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their preferences between automatic posting of submitted comments and manual
approval; and to create a blacklist with words that automatically push comments into the
review queue or block users (Lardinois, 2013).
Important to note, neither the Associated Press nor the Young Turks, whose
audiovisual segments and affiliated comment streams are hosted on YouTube, offer any
additional guidance or rules above and beyond what is required by YouTube.
Los Angeles Times: A Well-Lawyered Corporate Response
In contrast to YouTube, The Los Angeles Times appears to have embraced a
decidedly legalistic response in response to the challenge of allowing its online
commenting platform to evolve given the torrent of negativity surrounding the poor
quality of postings. Owned by the multinational media giant Tribune, The Los Angeles
Times requires each of its (now) registered users to certify that they understand its terms
of service, memorialized in a dense, 12-page document. No attempt is made to inspire
the spirit of healthy discourse or engender democratic debate; instead, the rules merely
address the boundaries of possible entries. Users are warned not to engage in
communication that, among a wider array of possible qualities:
… contains vulgar, profane, abusive, racist or hateful language or expressions,
epithets or slurs, text, photographs or illustrations in poor taste, inflammatory
attacks of a personal, racial or religious nature... is defamatory, threatening,
disparaging, grossly inflammatory, false, misleading, fraudulent, inaccurate,
unfair, contains gross exaggeration or unsubstantiated claims, violates the privacy
rights of any third party, is unreasonably harmful or offensive to any individual or
community... or discriminates on the grounds of race, religion, national origin,
gender, age, marital status, sexual orientation or disability, or refers to such
matters in any manner prohibited by law (Los Angeles Times, 2013).
Such a policy clearly exists to protect the corporation (as opposed to any members of the
discursive community) and its overarching utility is derived more from its very existence
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(and users' recorded compliance with it) than any of the actual content it contains.
Moreover, the legal nature of the document reflects both binary thinking and a detached
orientation that is reactive only when necessary. Nowhere, for example, are any
exemplars offered to illustrate proper and improper online behavior. Language and word
choice are considered to be either compliant or non-compliant; any consideration or
judgment of nuance is weighed down by repeated pronouncements of rights reserved by
the corporation. Even in the briefer and more colloquial user FAQ (frequently asked
questions), the same arm's-length-style guidance endures:
Readers are reminded to post comments that are germane to the article and write
in a common language that steers clear of personal attacks and/or vulgarities. We
reserve the right to remove any user or user's comments that are identified as
inappropriate. Examples of these types of infractions are comments that include:
abusive, off-topic or foul language... racist, sexist, homophobic or other offensive
terminology... attacks that celebrate the death, injury or illness of any person,
public figure or otherwise... Comments are filtered for language (Los Angeles
Times, 2014).
Though members of the online community are given the ability to report abuse (i.e. lack
of compliance with the terms of use) on a particular comment, flagged comments remain
posted until such time that they can be investigated by a Los Angeles Times staffer. No
mention is made of who these staffers are, what a reasonable response time is for their
adjudication, or how a decision to filter a comment may be appealed. The entire process
is nameless and mechanistic; it occurs absent any engagement either between
commenters or between commenters and the moderators.
One small improvement to the platform (though still occurring at the requisite
arm's length) is the denotation of certain comments as so-called "Editor's Picks." An
increasingly common designation granted by large, American newspaper sites (and
originating with The New York Times), an Editor's Pick at The Los Angeles Times is a
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comment "than an editor has identified as insightful and thought-provoking that help[s]
further the dialogue" (Los Angeles Times, 2014). While such an engagement is arguably
beneficial to the democratic health of the discursive community, it falls short in several
critical ways: the name of the editor (a typical large newspaper has many) is never
revealed; his/her thinking behind choosing a given article for the denotation is never
explained; and nowhere is the broader "dialogue" given proper context.
Daily Kos: Straight Talk and Empowering Users to Be Activists
In stark contrast to The Los Angeles Times, Daily Kos not only utilizes straight –
and at times, borderline crude – talk to convey its discussion standards but also to clearly
give the benefit of the doubt to commentators when it comes to interpretations of their
postings. With respect to the former, founder Markos Moulitsas (a.k.a. “Kos”) could not
be more unabashed in his articulation of the community’s norms: “The core of the Daily
Kos behavior guide is simple: don't be a dick. While we go into some depth below about
sanctionable behavior, it's not an all-encompassing list. There are always types of
behavior that while not listed below, rise to the level of "dickishness", and as such are
actionable” (Moulitsas, 2013).
From a technical perspective, the managers of Daily Kos (the blog operates as a
limited liability corporation (LLC) under the name Kos Media with Moulitsas having
controlling interest) have placed the responsibility to monitor and police discussions
directly into the hands of the community. Users have two powerful tools at their disposal
– the ability to “uprate” (or publicly support) a given comment thus giving it greater
emphasis in the discussion; and the capacity to immediately “hide” entries they deem to
have risen to the aforementioned level of “dickishness” (along with more carefully
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identified types of behavior). Culturally, however, and unlike other commenting
platforms, there are significant consequences for employing either in haste; users must do
so very judiciously and with great care:
Our new reporting tools make it easier to track hidden comments and who [hid]
them. If we determine that a comment should not have been hidden, those [who
did so] will lose their ratings ability for a period of time, progressively longer for
each infraction until that ability is removed forever. Uprating personal insults is
as bad if not worse than making the insult itself because this rewards the insulters
and encourages them to continue the same behavior. Doing so will likewise cost
users their ratings privileges for a period, with long penalties for repeat infractions
(Moulitsas, 2013).
At the same time, users are clearly reminded of the fact that “In baseball, a tie goes to the
runner. At Daily Kos, any gray area will be decided in favor of the commenter. So if
you're not sure that something should be [hidden], then don't [hide it]. Because if the
situation is that iffy, chances are that it'll be you who gets burned. [The ability to hide
comments] is for clear and obvious violations (Moulitsas, 2013).
Though it uses very different terms than the variables named in this study, Daily
Kos essentially tackles the current study’s fundamental distinction between civility and
politeness head-on and prescribes different norms. Threats of violence, bigotry and
personal insults (all of which are germane to the variable of civility) are dealt with
specifically, as is the broader topic of language usage. Moulitsas, whose spent some of
the 1980s living in his mother’s native country of (then) war-torn El Salvador insists:
I grew up in a country where people were killed for their political beliefs. It's not
fun. Violence has no place in our political discourse. It's not kosher to wish
violence against each other, and it's not cool to wish it against our enemies. This
does not mean that all forms of cartoon violence, literary references, metaphors
and the like are barred. It does mean that threatening to beat up or kill someone,
or suggesting that people should kill themselves, or saying that poison should be
put in somebody's crème brûlée, or making similar remarks, even as a joke, is
prohibited and can lead to banning” (Moulitsas, 2013).
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With respect to bigotry, Moulitsas set the following guidelines concluding with a nod
towards the community’s activist style: “Any language designed to denigrate someone on
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality, physical appearance, etc. is
prohibited. Leave that shit to the Republicans” (Moulitsas, 2013). And on the subject of
personal insults he further maintains:
It is impossible to have a real debate when you call the other party, say, "batshit
insane." At that point, you're not engaging in debate, you're just engaging in a
pissing match. And while that may be fun for you, it isn't fun for anyone else. So
maintain a sense of decorum. There are plenty of people on the site who avoid
[having their comments hidden] despite engaging in the most contentious topics.
It can be done. Just be courteous and stick to the facts (Moulitsas, 2013).
When it comes to the choice of foul or vulgar language, however, Daily Kos is
very clear in not only distinguishing it from other kinds of controversial behaviors but
also maintaining its presence goes part and parcel with spirited exchange. Moulitas was
unapologetic in writing, “I don't care about language. We're adults. If potty words make
your ears bleed, I recommend Disney.com. Of course, there's a difference between
"that's fucking awesome!" or "that's fucked up!" and "fuck you" or "you're a fucking
asshole." If you know the difference, you're an adult” (Moulitsas, 2013).
Though Daily Kos clearly appeals to a liberal/progressive audience, its organizers
contend that all political arguments need to be pulled apart and that dissent is the
lifeblood of healthy discussion. Unlike other commenting sites, Daily Kos has a clear
policy against the declaration of so-called “debate free zones,” spaces where a user posts
his/her contribution and then ostensibly asks for it to simply be memorialized. The
board’s standards on the matter are made blatantly clear, connected to the community’s
core identity, and reflect the broader commitment of preparing users for more activist
forms of politics:
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Some users have asked about the ability to declare their diary off-limits to their
detractors, so that they can discuss a topic without having opponents intrude. This
would apply to internally contentious issues like Israel-Palestine, Snowden-NSA,
and guns. Or primaries where the community is divided among the contenders.
While I find some validity in the request, and considered it deeply, fact is it
conflicts with the debate-centric focus of the site. We're not an echo chamber, nor
do I want it to become one. So if you want to be spared dissent, Daily Kos just
won't be the place for you. If you can't handle dissent, then maybe political
activism is not the thing for you (Moulitsas, 2013).
	
  
	
  
Implications
Sorting Through the Noise: Recognizing the Multiplicity of Online Publics
The fact that news platforms everywhere – and certainly including those
scrutinized by this study – have responded so very differently to the emerging questions
of anonymous commenting should serve as yet another powerful reminder that there is no
singular conceptualization, consistent useful definition, nor matrix of commonly agreed
upon norms that present a unified understanding of what constitutes an online public – be
it from the perspective of news providers, audiences or both. The desire to seek one is
not only a sure path to disappointment but also serves to reinforce unhealthy stereotypes;
such stereotypes may ultimately cloud the more progressive realization that there is
significant potential for a great multiplicity of publics (each with different norms and
expectations) to emerge and operate in ways that fundamentally support an underlying
sense of civic responsibility, catalyze the shaping of public opinion and formation of
political meaning, and are generally understood to be advancing democratic virtues.
As one recent (and, admittedly, downright hilarious) example of this stereotyping,
comedian John Oliver of HBO's Last Week Tonight made a direct appeal to Internet
commenters on the subject of so-called "net neutrality." Oliver enlisted their help in
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registering negative feedback on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
website during its period of open comment:
Good evening, monsters. This may be the moment you've spent your whole lives
training for... For once in your life, we need you to channel that anger, that badly
spelled bile that you normally reserve for unforgivable attacks on actresses you
seem to think have put on weight or politicians you disagree with or photos of the
ex-girlfriend getting on with her life or non-white actors being cast as fictional
characters... We need you to get out there and for once in your lives focus your
indiscriminate rage in a useful direction. Seize your moment, my lovely trolls,
turn on caps lock and fly, my pretties! Fly! Fly! Fly! (Oliver, 2014).
Though the strategy proved highly effective for purposes of fanning the flames of dissent
(the FCC website actually crashed the very next day from the influx of traffic), the
combination of its nearsightedness and satirical forcefulness crowded out the possibility
of Oliver catalyzing a more thought-provoking response from the considerable majority
of commenters who, based at least upon the findings of this study, could have registered
their opposition with comments of higher deliberative quality. In choosing to activate the
stereotypical Internet trolls, and speaking to them as if they were one in the same with the
whole of the online public (however defined), the plan mobilized a disruptive force as
opposed to one that could be more expansive, serious and contributory.
To be clear, no one understanding of online public could or should be privileged
over another. What matters most for purposes of the implications of this study is the
crying need to consider cyber-communities, spaces, platforms and fora not as a unitary
construct but as multiplicity of ideas and dynamics. Even the underlying methodology
employed in this study (using an a priori coding scheme to analyze the content of
individual comments based upon four reasonable measures), though relatively easy to
demonstrate the high level of face validity the scheme enjoys, is deliberately grounded in
but one particular understanding of how deliberative quality operating within an online
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public may be assessed. Be that as it may, it is the utilization of a common set of
measures – applied scientifically and effective in neutralizing any normative judgments
or personal biases along the path of exploration – that allows one to understand these
conversations at a deeper level. To build upon a metaphor used in Chapter 1, while the
"loudest drunk in the bar" may be extraordinarily distracting, the ability to block him or
her out presents the opportunity of examining the pluses and minuses of the whole
"tavern" far more effectively and holistically.
As was revealed throughout the findings of this study, statistically significant
differences in overall levels of deliberative quality were detected across the four
platforms. It was further discovered that Internet-native and print-based news platforms
were home to comments of a higher quality than, respectively, traditional and
multimedia-based news sites. The overarching content of the precipitating story or
segment, irrespective of the platform upon which it was hosted, was either not a
statistically significant factor (as in the case of the international-domestic dichotomy) or a
minuscule one (as in the case of the governing-campaigning dichotomy). These findings
give rise to the need to further investigate what differences are present between similar
kinds of platforms; the results of subsequent analyses are documented below.
	
  
Table 38: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative
Quality) – Internet-Native Sources Only
	
  
Source
Daily Kos
Young Turks
	
  
	
  

	
  

Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
178 (9%)
751 (39%)
545 (20%)
1,097 (40%)
χ2 (2, N = 4,652) = 122.269, p < 0.001
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High
(Quality=3)
1,000 (52%)
1,081 (40%)

	
  
Table 39: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) –
Internet-Native Sources Only
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Daily Kos
122 (6%)
1,807 (97%)
Young Turks
253 (9%)
2,470 (91%)
2
χ (1, N = 4,652) = 13.409, p < 0.001
Source

	
  
	
  

Table 40: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) –
Internet-Native Sources Only
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Daily Kos
492 (26%)
1,437 (74%)
Young Turks
1,008 (37%)
1,715 (63%)
2
χ (1, N = 4,652) = 68.499, p < 0.001
Source

	
  
	
  
Table 41: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) –
Internet-Native Sources Only
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
Source
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Daily Kos
882 (46%)
1,047 (54%)
Young Turks
1,437 (53%)
1,286 (47%)
2
χ (1, N = 4,652) = 22.445, p < 0.001
	
  
	
  
Table 42: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) –
Internet-Native Sources Only
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
Source
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Daily Kos
1,163 (60%)
766 (40%)
Young Turks
1,893 (70%)
830 (30%)
χ2 (1, N = 4,652) = 42.668, p < 0.001
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Table 43: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative
Quality) – Traditional Sources Only
	
  
Source
Associated Press
Los Angeles Times
	
  
	
  

Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
234 (33%)
275 (39%)
116 (31%)
131 (35%)
2
χ (2, N = 1,090) = 4.855, p = 0.088

High
(Quality=3)
202 (28%)
132 (34%)

Table 44: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) –
Traditional Sources Only
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Associated Press
128 (18%)
583 (82%)
Los Angeles Times
75 (20%)
304 (80%)
2
χ (1, N = 1,090) = 0.471, p = 0.471
Source

	
  
	
  

Table 45: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) –
Traditional Sources Only
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Associated Press
382 (54%)
329 (46%)
Los Angeles Times
208 (55%)
171 (45%)
2
χ (1, N = 1,090) = 0.133, p = 0.716
Source

	
  
	
  
Table 46: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) –
Traditional Sources Only
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
Source
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Associated Press
390 (55%)
321 (45%)
Los Angeles Times
195 (52%)
184 (48%)
χ2 (1, N = 1,090) = 22.445, p < 0.001
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Table 47: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) –
Traditional Sources Only
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Associated Press
1,163 (60%)
766 (40%)
Los Angeles Times
1,893 (70%)
830 (30%)
2
χ (1, N = 1,090) = 1.150, p = 0.284
Source

	
  
	
  

Table 48: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative
Quality) – Print Sources Only
	
  
Source
Daily Kos
Los Angeles Times
	
  
	
  

Low
Medium
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
178 (9%)
751 (39%)
116 (31%)
131 (35%)
2
χ (2, N = 2,308) = 133.933, p <0.001

High
(Quality=3)
1,000 (52%)
132 (34%)

Table 49: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) –
Print Sources Only
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Daily Kos
122 (6%)
1,807 (94%)
Los Angeles Times
75 (20%)
304 (80%)
2
χ (1, N = 2,308) = 73.557, p < 0.001
Source

	
  
	
  

Table 50: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) –
Print Sources Only
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Daily Kos
492 (26%)
1,437 (74%)
Los Angeles Times
208 (55%)
171 (45%)
χ2 (1, N = 2,308) = 129.361, p < 0.001
Source
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Table 51: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) –
Print Sources Only
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
Source
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Daily Kos
882 (46%)
1,047 (54%)
Los Angeles Times
195 (52%)
184 (48%)
2
χ (1, N = 2,308) = 4.176, p < 0.05
	
  
	
  
Table 52: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) –
Print Sources Only
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
Source
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Daily Kos
1,163 (60%)
766 (40%)
Los Angeles Times
1,893 (70%)
830 (30%)
2
χ (1, N = 2,308) = 5.582, p < 0.05
	
  
	
  
Table 53: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative
Quality) – Audiovisual Sources Only
	
  
Low
Medium
High
Source
(Quality = 1)
(Quality=2)
(Quality=3)
Associated Press
234 (33%)
275 (39%)
202 (28%)
Young Turks
545 (20%)
1,097 (40%)
1,081 (40%)
2
χ (2, N = 3,434) = 60.930, p < 0.001
	
  
	
  
Table 54: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) –
Audiovisual Sources Only
	
  
Uncivil
Civil
Source
(Civility = 0)
(Civility = 1)
Associated Press
128 (18%)
583 (82%)
Young Turks
253 (9%)
2,470 (91%)
χ2 (1, N = 3,434) = 73.557, p < 0.001
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Table 55: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) –
Audiovisual Sources Only
	
  
Impolite
Polite
(Politeness = 0)
(Politeness = 1)
Associated Press
382 (54%)
329 (46%)
Young Turks
1,008 (37%)
1,715 (63%)
χ2 (1, N = 3,434) = 65.33, p < 0.001
Source

	
  
	
  
Table 56: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) –
Audiovisual Sources Only
	
  
Unjustified
Justified
Source
(Justification = 0) (Justification = 1)
Associated Press
390 (55%)
321 (45%)
Young Turks
1,437 (53%)
1,286 (47%)
χ2 (1, N = 3,434) = 0.979, p = 0.322
	
  
	
  
Table 57: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) –
Audiovisual Sources Only
	
  
Non-Complex
Complex
Source
(Complexity = 0)
(Complexity = 1)
Associated Press
546 (77%)
165 (23%)
Young Turks
1,893 (70%)
830 (30%)
2
χ (1, N = 3,434) = 14.497, p < 0.001
As shown in Table 38, there were statistically significant differences in the level
of deliberative quality of online comments attached to the two Internet-native news
sources (Daily Kos and Young Turks). Tables 48 and 53 reveal the same can be said for,
respectively, comments affiliated print-based news sources (Daily Kos and The Los
Angeles Times) and audiovisual news sources (Associated Press and Young Turks). This
second case is particularly notable in that it reveals a statistically significant difference in
the quality of comments operating within a single platform (YouTube). Similar analyses
of these three pairings were conducted for each of the component measures of quality; the
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results are shown in Tables 49-52 and 54-57. With the exception of a single comparison
– the justification variance within the audiovisual news sources (Table 56) – statistically
significant differences were detected across the board.
In contrast, and as shown in Table 43, there were no statistically significant
differences between the quality of comments generated within the Associated Press and
The Los Angeles Times (i.e. the two traditional news sources). Moreover, none of the
component measures registered any statistically significant differences (see Tables 44-47)
for this pairing.
Taken as a whole, these findings begin to paint the broad brush strokes of a
conceptual picture in which not only is one platform very different than another, but also
one in which a more intrinsic hierarchy of platforms might be present. The innovation of
the Internet (even with all of its warts, garbage and noise) may be at least partly
responsible for creating the technological, cultural and behavioral superstructure that
allows a multiplicity of publics – and, perhaps even more important, types of publics – to
emerge. To better understand the potential implications for this suggestion, however, it is
first necessary to return to a more fundamental discussion of the meaning of public, and
to consider how this overarching sense of multiplicity may allow one to think with
greater specificity and granularity about the opportunities, needs and challenges of online
communities as they attempt to better embrace the democratic.
A Multiplicity of Online Publics: Differentiating Community Needs for
Information Engagement/Processing and Discursive Norms
	
  
As summarized in Chapter 2, an extensive and growing body of scholarship has
attempted to articulate a wide array of cogent definitions – and, by extension, conditions
and expectations – for what is meant by "public" (a term that has a tendency to be used
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rather colloquially). While this study remains deliberately neutral and makes no
consideration of which definition may be superior – be it more plausible and practical;
possessing greater efficacy in catalyzing democratic spirit; or more open and accessible
to a diversity of viewpoints – it does seek to explore some of the profound ways in which
they are different. While no subset could conceivably be wholly representative of the
gamut of meanings, four were chosen and dissected in an attempt to illustrate some of the
contours of the broader range and to further reinforce the need to consider a multiplicity
of constructs. Three of these have been described previously: the rational-critical "public
sphere" relying upon the utilization of the idea speech type (Habermas, 1989); "agonistic
confrontations," which privilege adversarial conditions in debate over the need for
compromise and consensus (Mouffe, 2000); and "rhetorical democracies" assigning high
intrinsic value to rhetorical contributions that contribute to a broader public activity and
promote civic dialogue (Hauser & Grim, 2004). The fourth involves Schudson's (2011)
concept of a so-called "monitorial citizen."
Perhaps highly relevant within the contemporary period of 24-hour news cycles,
instantaneous information and a plethora of vehicles and channels, a monitorial citizen is
oriented with a "defensive rather than proactive" (Schudson, 2011, p. 311) posture.
Though not detached from political activity, monitorial citizens are highly politically
cognitive and readily scan their respective information environments – or, as Schudson
puts, continuously "keep an eye on the scene" (p. 311) – for news germane to their needs
and interests. They can become highly politically active when needed but otherwise
choose to stay out of the conventional political fray. Schudson's research, too, clearly has
at least some lineage in the political psychology literature (see, for example, Popkin,
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1994; Graber, 2001) as monitorial citizens must recognize particular schema in switching
back and forth between modes of inaction and action, all while exhibiting a default mode
of low-information rationality (Popkin, 2004).
To systematically disentangle some of the overlapping features of these different
definitions of public, they are assessed against a troika of possible community needs. It
is important to note that those selected were hardly intended to be exhaustive. Rather,
they are intended to be both commonsensical and reflect the range of existing
considerations and dynamics covered in the Chapter 2.
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Figure 4: A Multiplicity of Online Publics and Needs

As depicted in Figure 4, these three clusters – representing the community needs
of information engagement, information processing and discursive norms – constitute the
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horizontal axis within an array depicting a hierarchy of definitions of public. The four
given typologies of public (i.e. public spheres, agonistic confrontations, rhetorical
democracies and monitorial citizenship) constitute the vertical axis. Within each
corresponding cell, a relative assessment of importance is proffered in an attempt to
suggest which needs are most vital to which typology; needs are expressed as having
above average, average, or below average importance to a given typology. Ultimately,
these typologies are ordered on the chart in descending order from highest levels of
aggregate need (public spheres) to lowest levels of aggregate need (monitorial
citizenship).
The first cluster, the need of information engagement, contains three subheadings:
political literacy, political cognition and collective action. While all of these terms have
been defined previously, it is important to note that they have been arranged along the
axis in the form of a continuum between engagement in the form of thinking and
engagement in the form of acting. When examined in this way, clearer differences
between the typologies begin to emerge. Public spheres, for example, require a high
degree of political literacy but very little in the way of collective action. For agonistic
confrontations, the inherent adversarial conditions demand that participants be very quick
to think on their respective feet as the debate evolves, thus demanding a higher than
average level of political cognition. Within rhetorical democracies, collective action
gives the typology its very form in that they need to be eventful so that individual
rhetorical contributions, however inchoate, can congeal into a broader collective
expression. Lastly, monitorial citizens need not possess much in the way of political
literacy but the sense of both knowing when to act (through the cues of political
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cognition) and then having the will to act (by embracing collective actions) are of
paramount importance.
The second cluster places the community's need for information processing at its
conceptual center and builds upon the seminal debate of the 1920s between Walter
Lippman and John Dewey describing the role and power of journalism in industrial
society. Here, too, the subheadings are arranged on a continuum – this time operating
between top-down and bottom-up information processing – and appear in three forms:
Lippman's (1922) intelligence bureaus (most top-down); Dewey's (1927) citizen
journalists (most bottom-up); and Sunstein's (2001) general interest intermediaries.
In Public Opinion, Lippman (1922) noted that citizens were increasingly
incapable of knowing the world directly and could arrive at political judgments based
upun the "pictures in our heads" (p. 4), or
the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. To that
pseudo-environment his behaviour is a response. But because it is behaviour, the
consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where the
behaviour is stimulated, but in the real environment where action operates." (p.
10).
To mitigate against possible perceptual distortions to said pictures (arising from
dynamics as disparate as government censorship to groundbreaking innovations in
information transmission), Lippman advocated for the creation of elite-driven intelligence
bureaus that would be the guardians of knowledge and the stewards of reason. Such
elites would be tenured in their positions for life and be disconnected from actual
decision-making; Lippman argued that "the only institutional safeguard is to separate as
absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which
investigates" (Lippman, 1922, p. 201). The steadfast commitment of such bureaus to
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privilege fact rather than propagating and promulgating symbols would serve, Lippman
believed, as a powerful remedy to the emerging ills of modern society:
I argue that representative government, either in what is ordinarily called politics,
or industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the basis of election,
unless there is an independent, expert, organization for making the unseen facts
intelligible to those who have to make the decisions. I attempt, therefore, to argue
that the serious acceptance of the principle that personal representation must be
supplemented by representation of the unseen facts would alone permit a
satisfactory decentralization and allow us to escape from the intolerable and
unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all
public affairs… This organization I conceive to be in the first instance, the task of
a political science that has won its proper place as formulator, in advance of real
decision, instead of apologist, critic, or reporter after the decision has been made
(Lippmann, 1922, p. 31-32).
Dewey's (1927) response, as memorialized in The Public and Its Problems, echoed
Lippman's diagnosis of the public's poor health but offered a fundamentally different
remedy. Rather than look beyond the masses and elevate the role of elites, Dewey
aspired to align the creation and dissemination of knowledge more with the realm of lived
experience. Doing so would require a radical shift in the prevailing expectation of each
person's civic – or in Dewey's parlance, community – responsibilities:
The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of methods and conditions
of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public. We have
asserted that this improvement depends essentially upon freeing and perfecting
the processes of inquiry and of dissemination of their conclusions. Inquiry,
indeed, is a work which devolves upon experts. But their expertness is not shown
in framing and executing policies, but in discovering and making known the facts
upon which the former depend. They are technical experts in the sense that
scientific investigators and artists manifest expertise. It is not necessary that the
many should have the knowledge and skill to carry on the needed investigations;
what is required is that they have the ability to judge of the bearing of the
knowledge supplied by others upon common concerns (p. 209).
Though Dewey's seminal political text is notoriously light on hard details, his concluding
thoughts give rise to the citizen journalist (though he does not here use the actual term)

	
  

127
	
  

	
  
and his/her invaluable role in formulating, disseminating and digesting a community's
intelligence:
Vision is a spectator; hearing is a participator. Publication is partial and the
public which results is partially informed and formed until the meanings it
purveys pass from mouth to mouth. There is no limit to the liberal expansion and
confirmation of limited personal intellectual endowment which may proceed from
the flow of social intelligence when that circulates by word of mouth from one to
another in the communications of the local community. That and that only gives
reality to public opinion. We lie, as Emerson said, in the lap of immense
intelligence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken,
inarticulate and faint until it possesses the local community as its medium (p.
219).
Much later, and in what could be seen as something of a conceptual fulcrum
between the two sides of the Dewey-Lippman debate, Sunstein (2001) highlights the
importance of general interest intermediaries (such as daily newspapers, news
periodicals, and nightly news broadcasts) that provide elements of a shared cultural
narrative and a common frame of reference. The number and reach of such
intermediaries, he contends are very much on the decline as a result of both a rising
consumerist orientation by the general public and the introduction of new technological
tools to filter content. The erosion of the intermediary function retards the exposure of
people to opinions, ideas and perspectives that they may not otherwise seek out on their
own. Sunstein sees this development as antithetical to a well-functioning system of free
expression:
First, people should be exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in
advance. Unplanned, unanticipated encounters are central to democracy itself.
Such encounters often involve topics and points of view that people have not
sought out and perhaps find quite irritating. They are important partly to ensure
against fragmentation and extremism, which are predictable outcomes of any
situation in which likeminded people speak only with themselves. I do not
suggest that government should force people to see things that they wish to avoid.
But I do contend that in a democracy deserving the name, people often come
across views and topics that they have not specifically selected. Second, many or
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most citizens should have a range of common experiences. Without shared
experiences, a heterogeneous society will have a much more difficult time in
addressing social problems. People may even find it hard to understand one
another. Common experiences, emphatically including the common experiences
made possible by the media, provide a form of social glue. A system of
communications that radically diminishes the number of such experiences will
create a number of problems, not least because of the increase in social
fragmentation (Sunstein, 2001, p. 9-10).
Taken together, these three subheadings – citizen journalist, general interest
intermediaries and intelligence bureaus – present a range of options to aid in the
description of how different types of publics respond to the need of information
processing in very different ways. Public spheres, for example, are places of timely,
highly-rationale news digestion and discussion. Such discussants rely heavily upon
objective sources for analysis of complex issues (the output of intelligence bureaus),
embrace the ordering and prioritization of those issues (the work of general interest
intermediaries), and then actively contribute to robust discussions in which such inputs
are rationally equated to the perspective of lived experience (the duty of a citizen
journalist). In stark contrast, a well-functioning public consisting of monitorial
citizenship discounts the need for either citizen journalism or intelligence bureaus.
Participants, who are perpetually scanning the landscape of information for topics
impacting their unique affairs, instead rely heavily upon general interest intermediaries to
help them monitor the news stream most efficiently. Rhetorical democracies similarly
rely upon such intermediaries to engender, and then sustain, the critical mass of the
rhetorical event, while agonistic confrontations are typified by debating gladiators
wielding their respective contributions to citizen journalism as primary weapons.
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Lastly, the third cluster considers a range of possible (though certainly not
exhaustive) discursive norms that overlap with the measures of deliberative quality
employed by this study. Not surprisingly, public spheres, in employing an ideal speech
type, place above average importance on meeting all four of the discursive norms. For
very different reasons, three of the four norms are also highly important for the success of
agonistic confrontations. Requiring the presence of an adversary, for example, is a
profound expression of civility (at least as it is defined in this study), just as a deliberate
preference for adversarial conditions undoubtedly conveys an appreciation for the
complexity associated with any argumentative position. Rhetorical democracies, as
Hauser (1999) and others have shown, are often too quickly dismissed by casual
observers as being too raucous (i.e. very impolite), even though they may very well
constitute vibrant publics. Finally, monitorial citizens, with their keen ability to scan the
landscape and heavy utilization of general interest intermediaries to help them find
relevancy, are far less susceptible to be distracted or intrigued by any particular
discursive patterns.
Exemplars of Vibrant Online Publics: Best Practices and New Tools
	
  
Now that some of the key features of different typologies have been disentangled
using a common rubric of community needs, it becomes possible to search for different
(existing) exemplars of each and to further investigate some of the more novel
approaches and tools such spaces utilize to catalyze democratic exchange. The previous
section detailed a conceptual framework within which such a multiplicity of public
spaces could both theoretically exist and – if closely aligned with a given set of
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community needs – thrive. It follows, then, that the current section will describe actual
flourishing domains that ably demonstrate the presence of this multiplicity.
Of all the news platforms examined by this study, Daily Kos clearly distinguished
itself as hosting comments that were of a very high level of deliberative quality. As
shown in Table 4, 91% of all comments examined were of middle or high levels of
quality. Daily Kos was also the only news outlet in which a majority of the comments
examined (51%) were deemed to be of high quality. In addition, the channel accounted
for comments containing the highest measures of civility, politeness, justification and
complexity – in some cases by a very wide margin – thus affording it some of the critical
qualities defining a public sphere.
With respect to its community's needs for creating, managing and digesting
information, it similarly places great importance on providing for both bottom-up and
top-down forms of engagement, as well as for types that are somewhere in between.
Among the sites investigated by this study, Daily Kos was home to far-and-away the
most prolific commenters and, based upon even a cursory reading of its comments, it is
plain to see that even some of its most infrequent and casual participants make substantial
contributions. Citizen journalism is alive and well on the site and, on fairly regular
occasion, particularly provocative, illuminating or poignant comments rise to the level of
receiving treatment within the hypertextual frame that is akin to a bona fide article
written by a member of the staff. Many of these same commenters, too, appear on the
site's real-time leaderboard of authors which is readily searchable based on several
rankings derived from overall community response (e.g. most recommended, most
prolific, most followed, highest mojo (a compound measure computing overall impact)).
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The broader technical design of the site, which affords users an opportunity to focus in on
popular content, and provides managers with the opportunity to showcase a range of
stimulating discussions, functions as an able general interest intermediary. Though
content is voluminous, participants and organizers alike have considerable tools at their
disposal to sort through information and find what is most relevant. Lastly, Daily Kos
maintains something of its own intelligence bureau in the form of dKosopedia.com, an
in-house attempt to actively build and strengthen a political encyclopedia. Currently
consisting of over 14,000 topical entries (ranging from subjects as varied as "Hurricane
Katrina" to the "Evolution of the Credit Default Swap"), the encyclopedia is frequently
cited as a source of evidence by commenters on the site. During its launch, Moulitsas
(2004) likened dKosopedia to a virtual, open-source, community-driven think tank.
Equating even further with the given typology of a public sphere, Daily Kos and
its participants rely upon a steady resuscitation of political facts to build their arguments
and engage in debate. The best arguments are generally not those made by commenters
demonstrating the highest levels of political cognition (though such skills are not
unimportant) but by those who have the best researched and cited claims. Interestingly,
the site's tagline – "News. Community. Action." – likely overstates the willingness of
participants to truly engage in collective action. Daily Kos, not unlike other public
spheres, is a highly discursive space where conversation and rational thinking have
preference over bona fide deeds.
None of the other news platforms considered by this study (Los Angeles Times,
Young Turks, Associated Press) come anywhere close – at least in their current forms –
to meeting the community needs of any of the given typologies. Much can be learned,
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however, from looking beyond this simple set and identifying other spaces in which these
typologies are clearly thriving. The Room for Debate webpage of The New York Times,
for example, bears a great resemblance to the given typological definition of an agonistic
confrontation. Similarly, Ta-Nehisi Coates' blog – a component of The Atlantic
magazine – is a rich and powerful example of a living and evolving rhetorical democracy
(or perhaps, more granularly, an ongoing series of rhetorical democracies). Lastly, the
Collaborative Discovery Engine (also known as "Opinion Space"), an innovation of the
College of Engineering and School of Information at the University of California at
Berkeley, when applied to such public affairs projects as the State of California Report
Card, demonstrate how a monitorial citizenry can be highly active and viable. Each of
these three are assessed in brief.
Though it understandably emanates from one of the largest, most influential and
best-resourced mainstream newspapers in the world, The New York Times' Room for
Debate platform may very well constitute the most progressive and ambitious attempt to
modernize the role of traditional media while not supplanting its historic core. Here,
elites (i.e. New York Times reporters and editors) still generate and disseminate news
content in much the same way that they have for more than 160 years. What comes next,
however, is another matter entirely. In a very clear and deliberate way, Room for Debate
creates the conditions for an agonistic confrontation, and even the title of the forum itself
suggests consensus should not be an overarching goal. To begin a dialogue, Times
editors author a very brief synopsis of a given issue, embed one or more links from recent
articles that appeared in the paper, and then ask several guiding questions to aid in
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framing the debate. In one recent example, involving the water crisis in the western
United States, the introduction read as follows:
With water increasingly scarce in the drought-ravaged American West, many
states could face drastic rationing without rain. Even with more sustainable
practices, the future of water in the West is not secure. Population growth,
conflicting demands for resources, and the unpredictable nature of a changing
climate will all exacerbate the crisis of an already parched landscape. What are
the best ways to share the water? And how can we ensure it lasts for the
foreseeable future? (New York Times, 2014, June 9, emphasis added to indicated
embedded hyperlinks).
A handful of debaters representing at least two (but often more) sides to a given issue are
then invited by the Times to contribute an essay of not more than 500 words to energize
discussion and seed what will then be a more expansive discussion among members of
the online community. In the given example, six debaters, emerging as credible citizen
journalists, included: a professor from the University of Arizona whose research
investigates the economics of the water supply; a senior fellow at the Public Policy
Institute of California who advocates for a water rights exchange; a renowned dietician
from the Netherlands claiming that American diets and consumption habits are
responsible for water shortages; the director of a non-profit recycled water research
foundation; an urban water policy expert; and the general manager of a regional water
authority. Each of their contributed essays states a clear claim that is then supported by
considerable evidence in the form of facts, specialized research findings, or short
descriptions of relevant lived experiences. The broader community then engages in a
lengthy debate that is both civil and representative of the broader complexity of the issue.
No attempt is ever made, however, to arrive at a single answer to the questions that have
been asked; instead, members of the online community engage as adversaries (with
varying degrees of politeness), staking their claims and justifying their positions. In this
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rather intensive back and forth, contributions ranked as readers’ favorites (the platform
offers such a tool) are typically those that either best connect some of the issue's
conceptual dots or reveal a provocative, alternative dimension. To put it more simply,
political cognition is an invaluable asset to the community.
A second storied news outlet, The Atlantic, is home to another flourishing
exemplar of one of the four typologies defined previously. Ta-Nehisi Coates, a senior
editor and popular blogger for the periodical, is actively creating, supporting and
catalyzing an impressive series of rhetorical democracies (without naming them as such)
surrounding some of the most profound political issues of the day. To better understand
his approach, the researcher examined his broader involvement with the online
community following the publishing of one of his most prominent recent features – the
May 21, 2014, cover story arguing for reparations for African-Americans.
It is important to note that Coates has an established reputation within the online
arena for doing something that is, on the one hand, rather easy to describe, but, on the
other, tremendously time consuming. In an interview with NPR On the Media’s Bob
Garfield, Coates described both sides of the coin:
I always tell people it's like a dinner party, and I try to host it that way. I try to
keep the conversation interesting, in terms of what is the bane of all comments
sections, and that is, you know, rude commentary, people going over the line,
trolling, that sort of thing. I generally follow the same rules, so I always tell
people, if you were in my house and you insulted one of my guests, I would ask
you to leave. I don't understand why it would be any different in a comments
section... [the time I have to invest in keeping the conversation civil and directed]
is way, way too much, and more than I ever expected. I invest at least as much
time in curating and in hosting as I do in actual writing. It can get really, really
hectic. Blogging will burn you out, period. I think blogging plus having to curate
definitely is a load. And I’m of the mind that it's not something that somebody
should do for the rest of their life (Garfield, 2013).
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For as long as he chooses to sustain the juggling act, then, Coates will continue to be the
exceedingly rare combination of mainstream journalist, abounding blogger, and perhaps
most important of all, extraordinarily committed moderator. While Coates carries with
him the credibility of an elite journalist, his blog is clearly one in which is the sole
master, and his rules, though hardly onerous (he expresses them quite casually and even
comically) reveal that he is the lone enforcer, judge and jury of what is appropriate and
what is not:
We've been through this before, but it's a good time to go through it again. Here
are the basics of commenting here. One thing worth adding is that I need people
to understand that this is a moderated space. I know that most blogs do a
minimum of moderation. But there's quite a bit here. It's all after the fact and
transparent, but this is supposed to be a dinner party. It's not a food fight. Here
are some road rules: 1.) Try to assume the good will, and honest motives, of your
fellow commenters. Half of the unnecessary beef I see up here comes from basic
misunderstandings. I'm not saying that there aren't really differences. There most
certainly are. But the point is to spend our time on those, as opposed to what we
"think" someone was trying to imply. 2.) Try not to be unnecessarily
antagonistic. This rarely happens here, but I generally find that an extra heap of
sarcasm ("Heh. Yeah, that's real intelligent.') or the occasional tweaking ("I'll be
commenting on you momma tonight!") or even the threat for bodily harm
("What's that about Michelle Obama? I'LL CUT U!!!") tends to serve as
distractions. I mean, it's fun, but probably not good for the neighborhood. 3.) If
your comment is "held for moderation," it rarely means that you've said
something objectionable. More likely you've managed to trip the spam filter.
Send me an e-mail. I'l fish it out as soon as possible. 4.) It's worth remembering
that this is a liberal blog, written by a guy whose politics are unfailingly liberal.
So if you see me defend Huck or Palin, it's probably not because I'm "going soft"
on them, being "too polite," or "a sleeper agent for birthers the nation over." It's
most likely just on that one issue. 5.) There are no set of rules for why someone
might be deleted or banned. The only big one holds that if you came here, through
google's news portal, to tell us why Sarah Palin is our country's foremost
intellectual, you will be banned. Beyond that, don't be an ass, and we'll be fine.
6.) White people. Never, ever comment on one of my barbershop threads. We
tried this once. Someone ended telling me to go to Hair Cuttery. In Obama's
America, I thought you guys might be ready. You're not and hence banished to
the bleachers. Just kidding. Sorta. I mean damn, Hair Cuttery?? 7.) Claiming
that conversate isn't a word, is a bannable offense. Ditto for "irregardless." And
"overstand." All words are words. That is all (Coates, 2010).
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Though he may be unapologetic for his chosen level of monitoring and moderating, he
readily recognizes that subjects as controversial as reparations demand that discussants
have sufficient space and freedom to engage in this shared exploration of a very sensitive
topic. In this way, such a discussion becomes the very kind of public event Hauser
(1999) suggested in his discussion of rhetorical democracies, in which individual
contributions made by members of what would otherwise be considered to be an inchoate
group create a coalescing force that can result in collective action. As opposed to
searching for the destination of some elusive truth reached through rational-critical means
(as in public spheres) or the sustainment of adversarial conditions required to fend off the
onset of hegemony (as in agonistic confrontations), rhetorical democracies derive energy
from their evolutionary nature. Coates, an African-American whose own thinking
changed radically on the subject of reparations over a three-year span, is creating the
conditions by which others can share in the ongoing journey (though he obviously
remains at the helm). In the initial moment of discussion, Coates offers not only a very
lengthy, multi-part essay on the topic to prime the conversation but also a relatively open
space within which discussants can express more raw opinions and perspectives. He
opens the forum by suggesting:
Here is your uncurated space to talk about reparations. Later we will have a
curated space according to the usual rules on my blog. Even though this is
uncurated – it is still moderated. In other words, you still have to obey basic
Atlantic rules of commenting. No one will try to steer the conversation, but
namecalling and blatant trolling will still bring the pain of banhmmer. Think of
this as Hamsterdam. But what happens in Hamsterdam, must stay in Hamsterdam
(Coates, 2014).
This three-step process – priming the conversation, allowing for an open period of period,
and then curating a discussion – is highly effective in not only activating and propelling
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the rhetorical democracy but also in readying discussants to be actively engaged in
contributing to a shared and dynamic search for a deeper understanding.
If Ta-Nehisi Coates' blog is demonstrative of the potential that newer
technologies, when administered appropriately, hold in empowering rhetorical
democracies, it is safe to say that the groundbreaking work of the CITRIS Data and
Democracy Initiative at the University of California at Berkeley may possess equivalent
capacity to enliven monitorial citizenries. Noting that the most common interface for
Internet comments is a list, sorted either chronologically or by binary ratings, researchers
endeavored to build an interface that was both more readily scannable and did not have a
tendency to lead to cyberpolarization and the the reinforcement of extreme opinions.
Employing a combination of discursive and engineering tools (deliberative polling,
dimensionality reduction and collective filtering), the team introduced a so-called
"collaborative discovery engine" named Opinion Space (Faridani, Bitton Royokai, &
Goldber, 2010):
Opinion Space solicits opinions to a set of controversial statements as scalar
values on a continuous scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) and
applies dimensionality reduction to project the data onto a two-dimensional plane
for visualization and navigation, effectively placing all participants onto one level
playing field. Points far apart correspond to participants with very different
opinions, and participants with similar opinions are proximal. One of our goals is
to move beyond one-dimensional characterizations of opinion: the arrangement of
points is statistically optimized to convey the underlying distribution of opinions
and does not correspond to conventional left/liberal and right/conservative
polarities. Participants are also asked to contribute a textual comment in response
to a discussion topic; each comment is associated with the position of the
contributing user in the visualization space. We designed Opinion Space to be a
self-organizing system that rewards participants who consider the opinions of
those with whom they might normally disagree (p. 1175-1176).
In a controlled experiment, when Opinion Space was compared with a traditional
(i.e. chronological) list interface, participants read a similar diversity of comments but
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were significantly more engaged with the system and had noticeably higher agreement
with and respect for the comments they read (Faridani, Bitton Royokai, & Goldberg,
2010). Beyond being a potentially invaluable improvement for how monitorial citizens
can more efficiently navigate online discussion spaces, Opinion Space has been utilized
to engender such a public's participation on a much grander scale. The California Report
Card, for example, a joint project between CITRIS and California's Lieutenant Governor,
was designed to rethink the ways in which citizens and government officials interact. An
op-ed penned by the lead collaborators suggested that the state's collective intelligence
could be amplified through a better utilization of technology, noting:
The methods used to find out what citizens think and believe are limited to
elections, opinion polls, surveys and focus groups. These methods may produce
valuable information, but they are costly, infrequent and often conducted at the
convenience of government or special interests. We believe that new technology
has the potential to increase public engagement by tapping the collective
intelligence of Californians every day, not just on election day. While most
politicians already use e-mail and social media, these channels are easily
dominated by extreme views and tend to regurgitate material from mass media
outlets. We’re exploring an alternative (Newsom & Goldberg, 2014).
The alternative they describe is a mobile-friendly extension of the Opinion Space
platform designed to streamline and organize public input for the benefit of policymakers
and elected officials. Participants are initially asked to assign letter grades relative to the
State of California's performance on six timely issues: implementation of the Affordable
Care Act; quality of K-12 public education; affordability of state colleges and
universities; access to state services for undocumented immigrants; laws and regulations
regarding recreational marijuana; and marriage rights for same-sex partners (California
Report Card, 2014). Once completed, participants are invited to virtually join other
Californians in a virtual coffee house, in which six mugs are situated around a table.
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Each mug corresponds to a unique suggestion made by another participant as to which
public policy issues should be considered for inclusion in the next version of the Report
Card. Mugs that are further away from the front of the table (the frame uses a firstperson perspective) are suggestions likely to be less agreeable to the current user, just as
mugs closer to the front are likely to be more agreeable. The user is then asked to rate the
relative importance of the proposed issue for the next report card and also to assign a
letter grade for the state's current level of effectiveness with respect to that issue. Just
before submitting the completed report card, the user is asked to contribute his/her own
submission of an important issue.
In this process, an extraordinary amount of useful data is being collected to
inform civic leaders as to public opinion. Not only do elected and appointed officials
gain an overarching sense of their ability to make progress on matters of public import,
but they also gain a sense of which matters are of greatest concern. Interestingly, while
the system allows for a large amount of information to be conveyed and shared, it is
hardly a discursive space. Short of writing a one sentence suggestion at the end of the
engagement, participants do little more than interacting with on-screen sliding scales.
And yet the power of the tool – to convey citizen perspectives, to avoid special interest
barriers or filters, and to take individualized communicative action that is then
synthesized into both aggregate and granular political pulses – cannot be denied, nor can
its initial popularity (statistics posted on the site show that more than 30,000 citizens
throughout all of California's 58 counties have participated). Researchers have no
immediate plans to incorporate any kind of traditional discussion forum into the platform
and, nor would it appear is there any pressing need to do so.
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Unleashing the Democratic: Guiding Questions For Tailored Reforms
	
  
By now it should be abundantly clear that there is no such thing as a singular
definition of what constitutes an online community, let alone how it should behave, what
it needs to thrive, who it needs to encompass, or why it exists in the first place. As such,
trying to articulate even a modicum of guiding principles to best energize the public or
more optimally inspire them towards a mode of democratic participation would be
foolhardy. As this study has shown through the administration of an objective content
analysis employing several measures of reasonable face validity, there are vast
differences operating within different kinds of discussion boards; even within a singular
platform, when controlling for disparate kinds of precipitating thematic content, such
differences are highly significant. At a more conceptual level, this analysis gives rise to
the idea of a multiplicity of publics, different typologies that each require fundamentally
different starting materials and must satisfy various combinations of inherent community
needs if it is to thrive. Embracing the notion of a multiplicity further suggests that there
is no one way to exercise the democratic within online space, nor is there a
corresponding, unitary mechanism for measuring the efficacy of such spaces.
And yet, it is equally clear that any number of digital forums have begun to figure
out, at minimum, how they can get better. Colorful metaphors conjuring images of the
loudest drunk at the bar, cesspools of hate-soaked racism, or monkeys writing
Shakespeare while flinging feces begin to reek of complacency and the desire for a quick
escape. In contrast, true pioneers – from the organizers of the Daily Kos to Ta-Nehisi
Coates to information theorists at UC Berkeley to an inventive editorial page team at the
"gray lady" – have refused to surrender their underlying belief that new technologies, if
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utilized carefully, can help to unlock more of the potential arising from democratic
exchange. In profoundly different ways, each demonstrates time and time again that the
conveners of an online community – whether directly involved or detached, whether
operating by a doctrine of rules or tapping into their own intuitions, whether seeking
consensus or demanding adversarial conditions, whether creating the conditions for
deliberation or the harvesting of pubic opinion – are perhaps the most prominent
determinant of its likelihood of success. Though it can often be a fantastically
exhausting, muddy and even thankless task, the more time and thought a convener gives
to the overarching "why" and "how" of an online community the better off that
community generally is.
One highly relevant finding of this investigation (RQ3) revealed significant
evidence that news sources native to the Internet generated comments of much higher
deliberative quality than those attached to news sites predating it. One possible
explanation may be found in the fact that the Internet, as a superstructure, is radically
different than the communication technologies proceeding it. Instead of being just a
more flexible and robust channel for the transmission of information, the Internet created
the conditions for truly multi-directional transmission and reception. In setting up
platforms born in cyberspace, conveners were obliged to think more holistically about
these new dynamics and consider the array of new opportunities and challenges
associated with them. In contrast, the organizers of traditional news sites, at least
initially, largely just bolted commenting interfaces (of disparate flexibly and possessing a
wide variance of user tools) and continued to operate as they always had. This is not to
say traditional news outlets cannot catch up to their Internet-native counterparts (e.g. both
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The Atlantic and The New York Times have clearly made great strides), but it does mean
that it requires a completely different approach – and much more expansive thinking –
surrounding the role of journalists, the consideration of audiences, and the very purpose
of political news in the first place.
What follows then, is not so much a how-to guide as it is a preliminary framework
of critical guiding questions. Organizers need to understand and as clearly as possible
articulate their respective motivations for offering online comment opportunities in the
first place. Concurrently, members of the online community should have reasonably
clarity regarding not only the participative expectations placed upon them but also a fair
sense of how their needs as a coalescing public (corresponding to a variety of different
typologies) will be met. In effect, active and deliberate consideration of these many
questions functions as something of a calibration within a given public space. This effort,
as illustrated in Figure 5, accounts for the interplay that has typically operated between
the worlds of deliberation and news while also recognizing (given the introduction of
new technologies) newer opportunities to modulate discursive norms and content
attributes. Within the conceptual space of this historic back-and-forth, participants and
journalists alike may possess greater opportunity to define the relative importance they
place on the shared community needs of information engagement and processing. The
calibrating choices they make should ideally correspond to the type of public they wish to
be. While this study examined the broad contours of four such typologies (public sphere,
agonistic confrontation, rhetorical democracy, monitorial citizenship), it is important to
remember that a large but indefinable number – a multiplicity – theoretically exist.
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Figure 5: Calibration of Public Spaces
While there are, indeed, multiple ways to excite and enliven the democratic within
such spaces, they will almost certainly fail if these calibrating decisions are not
considered, even if only modestly. An emerging truism of online spaces vis-à-vis their
democratic potential may very well be that choosing NOT to offer the opportunity for
participation at all may be preferable than doing so either cavalierly or carelessly.
Democracy is no easy proposition, and while a few key experimental advancements can
generate great reason for optimism, a handful of failures certainly can erode confidence
quickly.
As online platforms come into existence or as they seek to evolve, conveners
(and, if possible, audiences alike) should begin by posing to themselves a basic but allimportant question: Can we identify and clearly articulate the overarching mission,
objective(s) and basic motivation(s) that allowed the idea of this discursive space to arise
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in the first place? Grappling with this question is an extraordinarily important precursor
to either launching a platform or making improvements. The answer can take on any
number of forms and examples include (based upon this exploratory study) but are not
limited to: to generate rationale discourse and strive for a consensus of understanding; to
ensure that as many viewpoints as possible are given the opportunity to weigh in, all the
while ensuring that no one perspective colonizes another; to allow for an ongoing, shared
discovery of issues that are continuously evolving in their own right; to engender
widespread participation and encourage people to take action beyond the discursive
space; to allow members of a given audience to readily communicate their perspectives
and opinions to elites (e.g. journalists, elected officials, etc.); to offer constructive
critique of a given news article based upon a wealth of different vantage points and
perspectives; to serve as a populist counterweight to elite-created news content; to engage
in direct or indirect communication with the author or creator of content in an attempt to
optimize the relevancy of current editorial trajectories; and to exploit a broader
community’s collective intelligence while synthesizing individual contributions into a
salient sense of collective public opinion. An answer to this fundamental question helps
both to gauge the level of a convener’s inherent readiness to seed and then manage an
online community while also revealing some of the basic contours of what typology of
public may be most optimal given the particular circumstances.
Beyond the question of a site's raison d'être, additional initial reflection is needed
to help establish and introduce a broader understanding of what participation both entails
and even means. Rather than relying upon a single holistic question, this exploration
involves a handful of important asks: are participants encouraged to cite externally
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verifiable facts when making postings; are statements drawing upon participants' political
cognition (including those arguments that begin with "I think") appreciated or generally
frowned upon?; do participants have to clearly identify themselves and validate their
authenticity?; is anonymity acceptable or not?; should participants asking questions of or
debating with one another be encouraged?; should participants asking questions of or
critiquing the author be acceptable?; what is the approximate range of viewpoints a
community would hope to have, and should participants take responsibility for ensuring
this range?; how often is one expected to participate in the community?; is a participant
expected to respond to challenges made to his/her posting?; are participants expected to
help other participants possessing vastly different viewpoints find common ground?; are
participants invited to or given incentives to submit their own content that may be
presented for more pronounced distribution?
The third set of questions address both the expectations for human monitoring and
moderating as well as the deployment of various technological tools to either aid in that
process of serve as a surrogate. As has been shown, the more high-functioning platforms
have a very clear answer to the question: who (or what) is monitoring the site and what is
their (or its) expectation for when a responding action may be necessary? Beyond this
fundamental question, however, a number of other guiding choices come into focus: do
participants have the power to identify postings that have either high or low value given
the community's mission and standards?; do participants have a mechanism for reporting
what comments may constitute a threat to the community, and if so, is the sequestration
of comments automatic or subject to review?; who is the final arbiter of this decision and
is there a reasonable appeal process?; what are the consequences of engaging in activities
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that undermine the mission of the site?; how are these consequences enforced and by
whom?; if an automatic system of filtering or moderating exists, what does the
underlying logic look like?; how is content (both precipitating news content and
subsequent comments) optimally organized given a community's needs?; are participants
empowered with the abilities to either block or showcase other participants?; does the
community have access to a repository of facts, vital information or examples that model
appropriate participation?
Finally, conveners and participants alike must consider carefully the set of
discursive norms that define the community. As has been shown, seemingly similar
kinds of online spaces can have vastly different rules governing the appropriate use of
language, and technical aids to filter out bad language (as they are unable to infer
meaning) are often woefully inadequate. Generally, communities need to decide if they
are highly prescriptive in what is acceptable and what is not (often requiring the clear
statement of a corpus of words and terms that are off limits) or, as in Coates' blog or the
Daily Kos, provide an equally clear, broader expression of where participants can and
cannot go with respect to their underlying intentions. Though this study examined in
depth four discursive norms – civility, politeness, justification and complexity – they
were never intended to be exhaustive. While each deserves careful attention as to its
relative importance, there are numerous other considerations that could be addressed to
better establish expectations: are participants expected to use proper English when
posting or are shortcuts and slang readily embraced by the community?; is there a
standard range for the length of a contribution?; are alternative, less literal contributions
to the discussion acceptable (i.e. video clips, sounds recordings, artistic expressions,

	
  

147
	
  

	
  
etc.)?; should there be a moratorium on the utilization of logical fallacies (i.e. red
herrings, straw men, etc.); how does the community feel about more excitable forms of
speech, such as the choice to use all capital letters, an overabundance of exclamation
points or particular clauses that speak to anger or passion?
Not surprisingly, all of these questions as well as their overarching categorization
began with an appreciation for the kind of multiplicity outlined throughout this chapter
and summarized in Figure 4. For the scholar, the challenge remains to continue to better
understand what is potentially an ever-expanding and ever-evolving constellation of
definitions and possibilities for democratic engagement within this multiplicity. For the
practitioner (conveners and participants alike), the pressing need is to establish what a
community hopes to be (and, just as important, what it hopes not to be), to allow form to
follow intended function, to be both deliberate and open-minded in encouraging its
evolution, and to remain circumspect when presented with silver bullets or gamechanging innovations. Technology may foster new possibilities to awaken the
democratic; just as easily, it has the potential of lulling participants into thinking it has
somehow become an easy proposition. No matter the era or the tools at one's disposal,
Churchill's comments continue to ring true: "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or
all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except
all those other forms that have been tried from time to time" (Churchill, 1974).
Limitations of the Study
	
  
Even as this study arguably sheds new light on many of the profound differences
that exist within online communities, and though it addresses some of the pathways to
better unleash the latent democratic potential of a multiplicity of online publics, it is
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essential to document its underlying limitations. While a handful of the investigation's
weaknesses arose from resource and time constraints, more often than not its
shortcomings were the result of an inherent tension: while the overarching research
trajectory intended to operate at the frontier of existing research and scholarship on the
bricolage of subject matter, the landscape of online platforms – along with the tools
associated with them, prevailing thinking surrounding them, and the response of news
organizations towards them – continued to evolve at an accelerating rate. Thus, some of
the critical decisions made with respect to the overarching research design may, at times,
appear to a reviewer to be too arbitrary or narrow-minded. If there is an air of artificiality
about the study, it is the result of having to be decisive in choosing to peel back the first
several layers of the proverbial onion, all the while knowing there are both many layers to
the onion and, possibly, many other vegetables to consider. What follows, then, is a
summary of the investigation's 10 most significant weaknesses.
First and foremost, it is important to note the data set analyzed could be regarded
as at least somewhat dated. Three years of age would not typically be considered old by
content analysis standards, but the rapid pace of digital evolution makes what happens in
online spaces to be something of an outlier in this regard. Case in point, all four of the
news sources considered by this study (along with countless others) saw significant
changes to their approaches to managing online comments between the time data were
first collected and when they were analyzed. It is known that, at least in the case of
YouTube, some of these changes had a profound impact on the overall number of
comments posted. At the same time, the introduction of new tools – such as those
allowing users to hide, filter or prioritize the comments they see – arrived on the scene
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after data had been collected but before findings could be assessed. For example, the
chronological ordering of comments (the only choice when data were harvested) is now
just one of several sequencing options available to users (and hardly the most popular one
at that). Quite literally, the whole interface through which users engage with an online
community has shifted significantly during the period of study. As a result, the
generalizability of the findings into current and future periods becomes somewhat
problematic.
Equally a concern for the overall strength of the study's generalizability was the
decision to scrutinize comments coming from just four news sources; as shown in Figure
1, each of these four organizations represented a respective quadrant in the 2x2 array
between channel modality and channel constitution. While care was taken to choose the
occupants of these quadrants with respect to overall popularity and (at least then) concern
for relative consistency in the commenting interfaces across the four, it is too much of a
conceptual leap to suggest that any one platform could ably or wholly represent one of
these groups. Not only did the study's findings clearly demonstrate that significant
differences in deliberative quality existed across the discussion boards of the four news
sites, the significance of those differences was also readily apparent in forums that shared
the same commenting platform (i.e. Young Turks and Associated Press, both of which
operate on the YouTube platform). Moreover, while the original grouping technique (as
shown in Figure 1) proved invaluable in systematizing the preliminary exploration of the
discursive landscape, what emerged from the analysis is the need to think of a different
organizing construct altogether, and one more in line with what is depicted in Figure 4.
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Added to this important question of representativeness is the potential for inherent
biases to be present based upon ideological predispositions within the different online
communities. Again, while the choices of news sources were made judiciously to best
meet the data needs corresponding to the study's primary research questions, a troubling
consideration is that the broader left-right spectrum (at least from an American
perspective) is not well represented. Daily Kos and Young Turks, for example, are
unabashedly leftist-progressive in advancing their activist agenda. In addition, The Los
Angeles Times is widely regarded as having a left-of-center editorial slant. Though it has
its critics on both the right and the left, the Associated Press operates as an apolitical, notfor-profit corporation feeding print articles and audiovisual content to member news
organizations around the world. The absence of a right-leaning news organization from
the mix weakens the overall generalizability of the findings. For example, while the
findings did show that commenters communicated differently (at least in terms of the
four measures of deliberative quality) across these four left-leaning and centrist
discussion boards, it is entirely possible that this finding would not hold true if rightlearning news platforms were examined. A fuller investigation would have adopted a
more holistic consideration of the ideological spectrum.
This concern raises another issue: outside of the brief inspection in the
supplementary analysis, no attempt is made to think more granularly as to who are the
actual commenters making discursive contributions. As individual comments constitute
the unit of analysis for this study, a more thorough understanding of actual participants
would certainly have been helpful (and likely further illuminating). And while the
methodology was deliberate in harvesting data from anonymous users, there could have
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been a greater accountability of, at minimum, the uniqueness of users. As it is currently
constructed, and as it was used to differentiate between robust threads and non-robust
threads, the research design is incapable of distinguishing between, for example, a
lengthy back-and-forth between two users and a sustained conversation among a larger
group of participants. The total number of unique users within a given conversation is
simply not a consideration. While anonymous platforms make it relatively easy to invent
and utilize new pseudonyms (all of which is non-verifiable by the researcher), it is fairly
easy to tell, at least when one is reading a chain of comments, when a given chain is a
dialogue between a few and when it is among many. As the content analysis scrutinized
individual postings, however, and not chains, individual pseudonyms attached to each of
the nearly 17,000 comments registered would have been required to first be collected and
then used to differentiate (using a more sophisticated procedure) between robust and nonrobust discussions.
Beyond the data set and questions of broader sampling is the need to reconsider
the measures of deliberative quality. As a strictly exploratory study, the current
investigation can make do with binary attributes to the variables of civility, politeness,
justification and complexity. To go any further, however, more complex measures will
be required. As of now, the research design cannot gauge the difference between a
comment that contains a single instance of vulgarity and one taking the form of a
profanity-laced tirade. It can merely distinguish between "polite" and "impolite." With
no gradations, there is no possibility of using the methodology to conclude, for example,
that one comment is "less polite" or "significantly less polite" than another. Equally
important, the broader measurement of overall quality (as the simple sum of the four

	
  

152
	
  

	
  
component measures) can take on only one of only five values. Though it would require
considerably more work (plus time and resources), introducing greater precision into each
of the measurements would not only reveal much more in the way of depth but also make
the methodology more portable for future investigations.
Given what has been articulated as the emerging need to consider a multiplicity of
online publics, it is reasonable to assume that the given calculation of deliberative quality
is heavily skewed towards certain typologies of publics and away from others. As
discussed previously and illustrated in Figure 4, the four components of deliberative
quality utilized in this study are important norms within the construct of public spheres;
they are less important for agonistic confrontations and rhetorical democracies, and they
have little value for monitorial citizenship. Adding their measures together makes a fair
degree of sense for public spheres and their prescribed mode of employing so-called
"ideal speech types." Here, this compound measure of deliberative quality makes
intuitive sense and would likely be highly correlated with overall levels of efficacy and
vibrancy within such a space. Against the backdrop of other typologies, however, this
definition begins to lose meaning.
Finally, there is an enduring concern as to the decision to separate (irrespective of
the given methodology) robust from non-robust threads. While doing so revealed higher
levels of deliberative quality at work in robust threads (and, correspondingly, much lower
levels within non-robust threads), there is indeed something inherently artificial about the
choice to distinguish between types of chains (or to even think in terms of chains) in the
first place. Before the advent of user-friendly management and sorting tools, participants
simply viewed a chronological list (with responses to a given post indented accordingly).
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It is simply not known, nor does this study truly take into account, the extent to which
users are able (or even seek) to wander through the bevy of comments and navigate their
way down particular threads. No less important, the metaphor of the "loudest drunk at
the bar" is an important one. Given the study's design, the researcher is able to easily
filter out the "drunk's" effect; participants, who actually exist in the space, have no such
capabilities (or certainly did not at the time when data were collected).
In choosing to focus on robust threads, too, this research clearly sets its sights on
delving into the differences between the segments of online discussion boards that are
already working, on average, rather well. Doing so is somewhat counterintuitive and, as
has been shown, the widespread negative criticism hoisted upon such forums is largely
born out of of their darker elements (and thus, more prevalent in non-robust threads). In
the hopes of ultimately proposing a slate of tailored reforms intended to better unleash the
democratic potential of such spaces, the researcher was deliberate in attempting to better
understand what was inherently healthy and then trying to find ways of further improving
that health. An alternative approach could have been to scrutinize what was most
destructive and then prescribe ways to mitigate against – or better still, neutralize – those
factors.
Opportunities for Additional Research
	
  
Most immediately, and as implied by the preface to Chapter 5, it would be highly
worthwhile to repeat the study, using much the same methodology, and examine what
impact (if any) the elimination of pseudonyms and anonymity from the four platforms
investigated have had on the underlying findings. Anonymity has both psychological and
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sociological pluses and minuses associated with it, and gauging the net effect may shed
new light on where in the multiplicity it could be of benefit. 	
  
The study would, unquestionably, benefit from both a significant expansion of its
time horizon and the utilization of a more extensive array of news sources. Given that so
many news sites have already tinkered – or in some cases, overhauled – their
commenting platforms, the possibility naturally arises for a series of pre- and post-change
content analyses to be conducted and then compared. The Digital Age is creating tools at
an astonishing pace; the need to maximize the speed of roll-out and implementation,
however, more often than not far outweighs the necessity of gauging their effectiveness.
Such investigations could perform an invaluable public service and engender an
appreciation for better assessing what already exists.
Perhaps the most ambitious new direction for this research would be to blend the
methodologies of content analysis and active experimentation. Conceivable if not easily,
different online communities could be created with each modeled upon a particular
typology of public. Different stimuli could then be applied – be it the introduction of
different community expectations, the tweaking of rules, changes to the digital
infrastructure, a modulation in the overarching approach to moderation, etc. – and the
various impacts measured. What the current study has shown is that there is a need to
consider an array of differently constituted online publics. What it cannot yet show is the
extent to which the various components (needs, norms, etc.) of these publics may possess
different power in activating the democratic. The ability to consider the possibilities at
hand with greater sophistication, all the while recognizing that there is no optimal
engineering, would be an invaluable step forward.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE OF POLITCAL NEWS ARTICLES/SEGMENTS PRECIPITATING
USER COMMENTS

	
  
	
  

Date

Source

2/1/11

Young Turks

2/1/11
2/1/11
2/2/11

AP
Daily Kos
Young Turks

2/2/11

AP

2/2/11

Daily Kos

2/3/11

Young Turks

2/3/11

AP

2/3/11

Daily Kos

2/3/11

LA Times

2/4/11

Young Turks

2/4/11

AP

2/4/11

Daily Kos

2/4/11

LA Times

2/5/11
2/5/11

Young Turks
AP

2/5/11

Daily Kos

2/5/11

LA Times

2/6/11
2/6/11
2/6/11

Young Turks
AP
Daily Kos

2/6/11

LA Times

2/7/11

Young Turks

2/7/11

AP

Title
U.S. oil drilling in response to Egypt
protests?
Obama: Egypt’s transition must begin now
GOP redistricting efforts languishing
Barbara Bush pro-gay ad
Gibbs: Obama condemns violence, calls for
change
H.R. 3 hides even bigger dangers than
redefinition of rape
Record profits during recession?
Bernanke: Economy better; budget
unsustainable
GOP unveils pro-greenhouse gas legislation;
White House vows veto
House Republicans propose $74 billion in
budget cuts
GOP budget lie exposed
Unemployment falls to 9.0%, only 36K new
jobs
Census shows a dramatic browning of
America
Obama urges Egypt to go into transition
process ‘right now’
Mark Foley loves young Republicans
US backs Egypt reform moves, seeks support
The folly of raising the Social Security
retirement age
Egypt’s talks with opposition are
‘extraordinary,’ a possible turning point,
John Kerry says
Senator’s blatant lie about big coal
Elaborate ceremony for Reagan centennial
The final verdict on the Bush Doctrine
Conservative Democrats switch to GOP
across the deep south
Rand Paul – Cut foreign aid (Is he right?)
Obama: White House, CEOs must work
together
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# Comments
353
43
35
464
66
48
157
33
83
20
105
59
130
9
150
35
88
8
106
21
105
34
525
72

	
  
2/7/11

Daily Kos

2/7/11

LA Times

2/8/11

Young Turks

2/8/11

AP

2/8/11

Daily Kos

2/8/11

LA Times

2/9/11
2/9/11

Young Turks
AP

2/9/11

Daily Kos

2/9/11

LA Times

2/10/11

Young Turks

2/10/11

AP

2/10/11

Daily Kos

2/10/11

LA Times

2/11/11

Young Turks

2/11/11

AP

2/11/11

Daily Kos

2/11/11

LA Times

2/12/11

AP

2/12/11

Daily Kos

2/12/11

LA Times

2/13/11
2/13/11

Young Turks
AP

2/13/11

Daily Kos

2/13/11

LA Times

	
  

Blue Dogs feeling ignored by Pelosi
Obama a business booster in Chamber of
Commerce speech
Tea Party R’s kill Patriot Act?
Biden touts high-speed rail investment in
Philly
Health insurers continue to drop children’s
coverage
Most Americans say Obama is handling
Egypt about right, Pew poll says
Tea Party rep. wrong about stimulus bill
Napolitano: Threat may be highest since 9/11
White House to propose cutting energy
assistance for poor
House Republicans’ spending cuts fall short
of goal
Sarah Palin vs Rick Santorum – CPAC strike
back on Fox News
Top intel officials: Terror remains top US
threat
ME-Sen: Snow removal: Tea Party Express
targets Olympia Snowe
CPAC: Donald Trump says he’s considering
a 2012 presidential run
How being gay kills – GOP Representative
Govt. to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac
WSJ: White House will leave Social Security
out of budget
CPAC: Mitt Romney says Obama is ‘weak
president’
Paul wins Conservatives’ straw poll
Obama gives preview of budget: Freezes and
investments
Ron Paul of Texas wins CPAC presidential
straw poll
Fox News Egypt panel rips democracy
Obama takes scalpel to budget, avoiding pain
So-called “Right to Work” and the assault on
the middle class
John Boehner: ‘Not my job’ to convince
skeptics on Obama birth, religion

158
	
  

89
59
62
62
94
3
60
98
260
31
140
18
96
60
222
12
56
112
83
158
28
88
106
215
110

	
  

2/14/11

Young Turks

2/14/11

AP

2/14/11

Daily Kos

2/14/11

LA Times

2/15/11
2/15/11

Young Turks
AP

2/15/11

Daily Kos

2/15/11

LA Times

2/16/11

Young Turks

2/16/11

AP

2/16/11

Daily Kos

2/16/11

LA Times

2/17/11

Young Turks

2/17/11

AP

2/17/11

Daily Kos

2/17/11

LA Times

2/18/11

Young Turks

2/18/11

AP

2/18/11

Daily Kos

2/19/11

AP

2/19/11

Daily Kos

	
  

President Obama’s budget proposal –
analysis
Clinton: GOP 2011 budget devastating for
security
Ezra Klein: The White House is calling for
Social Security Talks
Obama begins rollout of budget certain to
spark strong debate
GOP in favor of loose nukes?
GOP: No presidential leadership on budget
Poll: Overwhelming support for immigration
reform with border security, path to
citizenship
Senate passes extension of Patriot Act
provisions
Boehner OK w/ Americans losing jobs
New Obama spokesperson steps into
spotlight
Can Republicans avoid a federal shutdown
without ditching their tea partiers?
CBS News poll: Most Americans don’t want
to strip healthcare law of its funding
Obama sides with Tea Party?!
Bernanke: Fed moving ahead on financial
revamp
Boehner threatens shutdown over spending
bill
Sarah Palin making rounds among socially
conservative groups
Investigations on WMD lies that led to Iraq
war
Raw video: House abortion debate gets
personal
Pelosi blasts GOP’s ‘so be it’ attitude
towards government shutdown
House passes sweeping cuts to domestic
programs
CPAC, bowing to Santorum’s conservative
stool, bans groups that support gay equality

159
	
  

85
65
107
83
189
27
59
14
131
43
91
8
250
16
205
36
202
150
41
200
50

	
  

2/20/11

Daily Kos

2/20/11

LA Times

2/21/11

Daily Kos

2/21/11

LA Times

2/22/11

Young Turks

2/22/11

AP

2/22/11

Daily Kos

2/22/11

LA Times

2/23/11
2/23/11

Young Turks
AP

2/23/11

Daily Kos

2/23/11

LA Times

2/24/11

Young Turks

2/24/11

AP

2/24/11

Daily Kos

2/24/11

LA Times

2/25/11

Young Turks

2/25/11

AP

2/25/11

Daily Kos

2/25/11

LA Times

2/26/11
2/26/11

Young Turks
AP

2/26/11

Daily Kos

2/26/11

LA Times

2/27/11
2/27/11
	
  

Young Turks
AP

	
  

Senate panel to cut Social Security and
Medicare is based on imaginary theory of
legislation
After House passage of GOP budget cuts,
lawmakers head home to hear from voters
Deficit commission members forget they
didn’t make recommendations
Gallup: Solidly Democratic states are down
by half
Mike Huckabee a dangerous candidate for
president?
Oil prices surge as Libya protests mount
State of the Nation Poll: More Dem voters
say we’re on ‘wrong track’
Harry Reid offers plan to avert government
shutdown
O’Reilly – Obama won’t defend liberals
Obama dispatches Clinton for talks on Libya
House GOP scrambles to avoid blame for
government shutdown
Gay marriage: questions and answers about
the Obama administration’s decision
Crusades OK to radical Republican
Santorum
Mideast unrest translates to higher fares
Freshman GOPer wants funding restored for
program he cut
Mitt Romney, Tim Pawlenty show support
for Wisconsin governor
President Obama vs himself on unions
White House: U.S. to impose sanctions on
Libya
House Committee takes aim at housing
rescue programs
State’s racial past could hurt a presidential
run by Haley Barbour
Cenk proud of Wisconsin protesters
Anti-American protest in Pakistan
Simon Johnson: U.S. isn’t in fiscal crisis, but
we’re on our way
‘Tea Party’ activists rally at national policy
conference
Universities vs poor students
Obama welcomes governors to White House
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70
26
52
4
137
21
46
20
164
113
37
25
170
3
54
14
287
37
20
15
203
52
34
43
216
42

	
  

2/27/11

Daily Kos

2/27/11
2/28/11
2/28/11

LA Times
Young Turks
AP

2/28/11

Daily Kos

2/28/11

LA Times

3/1/11

Young Turks

3/1/11

AP

3/1/11

Daily Kos

3/1/11

LA Times

3/2/11

Young Turks

3/2/11

AP

3/2/11

Daily Kos

3/2/11

LA Times

3/3/11

Young Turks

3/3/11

AP

3/3/11

Daily Kos

3/3/11

LA Times

3/4/11

AP

3/4/11

Daily Kos

3/4/11

LA Times

3/5/11

Young Turks

3/5/11

AP

3/5/11

Daily Kos

	
  

Treasury’s housing finance plan misses the
mark
Boehner signals reluctance about shutdown
Corporate tax cuts screwing states
Obama offers alternative health care option
Sarah Palin’s popularity drops with
Republicans. Again.
GOP governors to launch ads backing
Wisconsin Gov. Walker
Def. Secretary Gates: Crazy wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan
Mortgages to cost more without Fannie,
Freddie
House GOP votes unanimously to protect big
oil subsidies
House vote first step in averting government
shutdown
‘Federal government dumbass program’ –
Senator Hatch gives absurd speech
Supreme Court hears argument over post9/11 arrest
NBC/WSJ: People overwhelmingly side with
the unions; say leave Medicare, Social
Security alone
With stopgap funding bill passed, budget
sparring resumes
Fox won’t suspend Huckabee, Palin – ‘fair
and balanced’ ploy
Obama tells Libya’s Gadhafi to go
The public: Yes to union givebacks, no to the
end of collective bargaining
New Gingrich a step closer to Presidential
bid
Unemployment dips to 8.9 pct., 192K jobs
added
Republicans issue a new round of
government shutdown threats
GOP tries to sell idea that less spending
means more jobs
GOP deficit plan would cost jobs – report
Michael Moore rallies Wis. pro-union
protesters
GOP Senators try to block stricter rules for
for-profit colleges
161
	
  

91
5
315
89
66
8
234
13
59
12
59
18
82
2
196
65
97
16
38
45
90
72
49
62

	
  

3/6/11

Young Turks

3/6/11

Daily Kos

3/7/11

Young Turks

3/7/11

AP

3/7/11

Daily Kos

3/7/11

LA Times

3/8/11

AP

3/8/11

Daily Kos

3/8/11

LA Times

3/9/11
3/9/11

Young Turks
AP

3/9/11

Daily Kos

3/9/11
3/10/11
3/10/11

LA Times
Young Turks
AP

3/10/11

Daily Kos

3/10/11

LA Times

3/11/11

LA Times

3/12/11

Young Turks

3/12/11

AP

3/12/11

Daily Kos

3/12/11

LA Times

3/13/11

Young Turks

3/13/11

AP

3/13/11

Daily Kos

3/13/11

LA Times

3/14/11

Young Turks

	
  

Coburn against Hingrich for President in
2012
Open thread for night owls: Get ready for the
‘womancession’
GOP college voter suppression & Michele
Bachmann’s IQ
Report: Military leadership needs more
diversity
The latest GOP attack on health reform:
middle class tax hikes
GOP Presidential content begins to warm up
Debate over Congress hrg. On Islamic
radicalism
GOP Senators push for more drilling as they
cuts in renewables research
Likely GOP presidential candidates praise
GOD, criticize Obama in Iowa
Report: Banks horrible for investors
Imams denounce House Muslic hearings
Cantor: Democrats wrong to oppose Social
Security, Medicate benefit cuts
Leaders of Obama debt commission go rogue
Down goes Senator Ensign
King: Muslim radicalization must be probed
Pelosi: Bachmann’s affordable care act
charges ‘imaginry’
House Republicans vow to uphold the
Defense of Marriage Act
After Japan quake, Obama holds firm on oil
reserves and drilling
Why Republicans cut education
Wis. Gov. says support will grow for new
law
Palin, Huckabee send aides to RNC meeting
on 2012 campaign
State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley
resigns
Why are gas prices going up? – Obama vs
GOP
Hawaiians offer hope and help for Japan
Assault on student voting: Just the latest
GOP overreach
Haley Barbour bashes Obama on economic
and energy policies
Republican defends big oil subsidies
162
	
  

60
66
334
66
51
32
45
53
9
159
54
105
33
131
74
376
51
20
500
139
73
30
193
32
78
8
168

	
  
3/14/11

AP

3/14/11

Daily Kos

3/15/11

AP

3/15/11

Daily Kos

3/16/11
3/16/11

Young Turks
AP

3/16/11

Daily Kos

3/17/11

Young Turks

3/17/11

AP

3/17/11

Daily Kos

3/17/11

LA Times

3/18/11

Young Turks

3/18/11

AP

3/18/11

Daily Kos

3/18/11
3/19/11
3/20/11

LA Times
Daily Kos
AP

3/20/11

Daily Kos

3/20/11

LA Times

3/21/11

Young Turks

3/21/11

AP

3/21/11

Daily Kos

3/21/11

LA Times

3/22/11
3/22/11

Young Turks
AP

3/22/11

Daily Kos

3/23/11

Young Turks

3/23/11

AP

	
  

Obama ‘heartbroken’ over Japan devastation
House Republicans come out swinging on
job creation
Energy chief: US will learn from Japan
disaster
The latest GOP non-jobs agenda: Repealing
Wall Street refor
Crazy gun law – Caught on tape at open mic
Japan nuclear crisis rattles financial markets
Pelosi: We’ll help Boehner pass funding bill
– if he’ll compromise
New tax rates for the rich possible
Obama Trip Aims to Reinforce Latin
American Ties
House progressives reflect on being in the
minority
Democrats move to repeal Defense of
Marriage Act
1/4 America kids in poverty & record profits,
bonuses
Obama: Coalition prepared to act in Libya
Former Attorney General Mukasey lobbies
for U.S. Chamber to gut foreign bribery law
Sarah Palin traveling to India and Israel
The continuing death of the FEC
Raw video: Obama plays soccer
Sarah Palin’s 2008 campaign game-changer:
Sarah Palin
Obama juggles Libya war, Brazil trade
John McCain – Obama waited too long on
Libya
Obama lauds Chile’s transition to democracy
What do all Scandinavians, Belgians and
Dutch have than 52 million Americans
don’t? Health care
Tim Pawlenty files paperwork for
Presidential bid
Called out – 2012 GOP Presidential hopefuls
U.S. loses jet on 4th day of Libya operation
Geithner poised to blow big loophole in Wall
Street reform
Republican BS on Obama’s handling of
Libya
GOP Presidential hopefuls off to slow start
163
	
  

86
63
38
72
162
32
51
377
22
24
5
47
62
45
26
53
63
118
9
419
15
106
11
240
41
121
308
17

	
  

3/23/11

Daily Kos

3/23/11

LA Times

3/24/11

Young Turks

3/24/11

AP

3/24/11

Daily Kos

3/24/11

LA Times

3/25/11
3/25/11

Young Turks
AP

3/25/11

Daily Kos

3/25/11

LA Times

3/26/11
3/26/11

Young Turks
AP

3/26/11

Daily Kos

3/26/11

LA Times

	
  

Donald Rumsfeld offers Obama advice on
Libya
Healthcare law’s condition is anything but
stable on its anniversary
Disastrously wrong predictions from
Republicans on health care reform
Census: One in six Americans are Hispanic
Newtered: Mass scrubbing of Newt
Gingrich’s Twitter archive
White House plans private briefing on Libya
for Congress next week
Barbour for amnesty for illegal immigrants?
Economy stronger, but oil prices a concern
Cantor denies making progress to avoid
government shutdown
No big stars in a nebulous field of
Republican hopefuls visiting Iowa
1 in 4 Americans have criminal record
GOP address: Critical of health care overhaul
Fed: Household wealth plummets 23% in
two years
House Republicans prefer bite-sized bills

164
	
  

75
11
249
138
64
3
159
30
32
5
48
55
169
7

	
  
APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: LATIMES.COM
Date
2/3/11
2/4/11
2/5/11
2/6/11
2/7/11
2/8/11
2/9/11
2/10/11
2/11/11
2/12/11
2/13/11
2/14/11
2/15/11
2/16/11
2/17/11
2/20/11
2/21/11
2/22/11
2/23/11
2/24/11
2/25/11
2/26/11
2/27/11
2/28/11
3/1/11
3/2/11
3/3/11
3/4/11
3/7/11
3/8/11
3/9/11
3/10/11
3/11/11
3/14/11
3/15/11
3/17/11
3/18/11
3/20/11
3/21/11
	
  

#
# Non#
#
Comments Threads Catalysts Responses
20
14
3
3
9
9
0
0
8
6
1
1
34
19
6
9
59
18
13
28
3
1
1
1
31
15
6
10
60
22
11
27
112
27
26
59
28
13
6
9
110
15
25
70
83
22
20
41
14
3
4
7
8
2
3
3
36
18
6
12
26
9
6
11
4
4
0
0
20
10
4
6
25
8
5
12
14
6
3
5
15
10
2
3
43
18
9
16
5
2
1
2
8
2
2
4
12
6
2
4
2
2
0
0
16
11
2
3
90
33
17
40
32
9
10
13
9
6
1
2
33
7
7
19
51
19
12
20
20
10
3
7
30
10
6
14
8
3
2
3
5
1
2
2
26
7
7
12
9
5
2
2
11
9
1
1
165
	
  

Mean
Length
1.00
N/A
1.00
1.50
2.15
1.00
1.70
2.45
2.26
1.50
2.80
2.05
1.75
1.00
2.00
1.83
N/A
1.50
2.40
1.67
1.50
1.78
2.00
2.00
2.00
N/A
1.50
2.35
1.30
1.00
2.71
1.67
2.33
2.33
1.50
1.00
1.71
1.00
1.00

# Threads
%
Examined Threads
0
30.0%
0
0.0%
0
25.0%
3
44.1%
6
52.5%
0
66.7%
3
52.6%
3
63.3%
10
75.9%
1
53.6%
14
86.3%
4
73.5%
2
78.6%
0
75.0%
2
50.0%
3
65.4%
0
0.0%
1
50.0%
2
68.0%
1
57.1%
1
33.3%
4
58.1%
0
60.0%
1
75.0%
0
50.0%
0
0.0%
1
31.3%
6
63.3%
1
71.9%
0
33.3%
3
78.8%
5
62.7%
1
50.0%
2
66.7%
1
62.5%
0
80.0%
3
73.1%
0
44.4%
0
18.2%

	
  
3/23/11
3/24/11
3/25/11
3/26/11
TOTAL
	
  

	
  

11
3
5
7
1,155

5
3
5
7
424

2
0
0
0
239

4
0
0
0
485

	
  

166
	
  

2.00
N/A
N/A
N/A
2.03

1
0
0
0
85

54.6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
62.7%

	
  
APPENDIX C
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: AP YOUTUBE CHANNEL
Date
2/1/11
2/2/11
2/3/11
2/4/11
2/6/11
2/7/11
2/8/11
2/9/11
2/10/11
2/11/11
2/12/11
2/13/11
2/14/11
2/15/11
2/16/11
2/17/11
2/18/11
2/19/11
2/20/11
2/2311
2/24/11
2/25/11
2/26/11
2/27/11
2/28/11
3/1/11
3/2/11
3/3/11
3/4/11
3/5/11
3/6/11
3/8/11
3/9/11
3/10/11
3/11/11
3/13/11
3/14/11
3/15/11
3/16/11
	
  

#
# Non#
#
Comments Threads Catalysts Responses
43
24
9
10
66
39
7
20
33
29
2
2
59
17
9
33
35
27
3
5
21
10
3
8
73
26
15
32
62
32
11
19
98
73
12
14
18
18
0
0
12
9
2
1
83
38
10
35
106
54
11
41
65
24
13
28
27
19
2
6
43
25
5
14
16
14
1
1
150
30
16
104
200
88
25
87
21
18
1
2
113
49
16
38
3
3
0
0
37
31
3
3
52
23
9
20
42
26
6
10
89
45
12
32
13
13
0
0
18
13
2
3
65
36
7
21
38
21
5
12
49
22
5
22
66
36
9
21
45
26
5
14
54
16
6
32
74
26
14
34
139
67
19
53
25
6
4
15
86
37
18
31
38
22
3
13
167
	
  

Mean
Length
1.10
2.86
1.00
3.67
1.67
2.67
2.13
1.73
1.17
N/A
1.00
3.50
3.72
2.15
3.00
2.80
1.00
6.50
3.48
2.00
2.38
N/A
1.00
2.22
1.67
2.67
N/A
1.50
3.00
2.40
4.40
2.33
2.80
5.33
2.43
2.79
3.75
1.72
4.33

# Threads
%
Examined Threads
1
44.2%
2
40.9%
0
12.1%
2
71.2%
2
22.9%
1
52.4%
4
64.4%
4
48.4%
1
26.5%
0
0.0%
0
25.0%
3
54.2%
4
49.1%
3
63.1%
1
29.6%
1
44.2%
0
12.5%
4
80.0%
6
56.0%
0
14.3%
5
47.8%
0
0.0%
0
16.2%
2
55.8%
4
38.1%
4
49.4%
0
0.0%
1
27.8%
2
43.1%
2
44.7%
1
55.1%
1
45.5%
1
42.2%
2
70.4%
3
64.9%
8
51.8%
2
76.0%
8
57.0%
2
42.1%

	
  
3/17/11
3/18/11
3/19/11
3/20/11
3/21/11
3/22/11
3/23/11
3/24/11
3/25/11
3/26/11
3/27/11
TOTAL

	
  

32
22
57
59
93
15
30
17
138
30
55
2,825

17
15
33
37
40
9
19
5
52
25
30
1,414

3
3
5
5
8
2
5
5
24
2
9
371

12
4
19
17
5
4
6
7
62
3
16
991
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4.00
1.33
3.80
3.40
5.63
2.00
1.20
1.40
2.58
1.50
1.78
2.45

1
1
1
2
3
1
1
2
7
1
4
111

46.9%
31.8%
42.1%
37.3%
14.0%
40.0%
36.7%
70.6%
62.3%
16.7%
45.5%
48.2%

	
  

APPENDIX D
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: DAILYKOS.COM
Date
2/1/11
2/2/11
2/3/11
2/4/11
2/5/11
2/6/11
2/7/11
2/8/11
2/9/11
2/10/11
2/12/11
2/13/11
2/14/11
2/15/11
2/16/11
2/17/11
2/18/11
2/20/11
2/21/11
2/22/11
2/23/11
2/24/11
2/25/11
2/26/11
2/27/11
2/28/11
3/1/11
3/2/11
3/3/11
3/4/11
3/5/11
3/6/11
3/7/11
3/8/11
3/9/11
3/10/11
3/12/11
3/13/11
	
  

#
# Non#
#
Comments Threads Catalysts Responses
35
5
8
22
48
10
10
28
83
18
15
50
115
26
23
66
84
10
16
58
105
22
16
67
77
27
14
36
94
17
15
62
254
16
26
212
85
24
10
61
140
15
21
104
215
17
20
178
107
16
18
73
59
9
8
42
79
14
12
53
181
35
30
116
41
10
10
21
58
13
9
31
49
10
9
30
46
10
11
25
37
19
8
10
54
26
9
19
20
7
5
8
34
8
5
21
85
9
17
59
66
12
16
38
59
18
8
33
82
14
15
53
97
9
14
74
45
17
8
20
60
18
7
35
64
16
10
38
51
14
8
29
51
21
12
18
74
16
14
44
36
12
8
16
73
8
13
52
77
23
15
29
169
	
  

Mean
Length
2.75
2.80
3.33
2.87
3.63
4.19
2.57
4.13
8.15
6.10
4.95
8.90
4.06
5.25
4.42
3.87
2.10
3.44
3.33
2.27
1.25
2.11
1.60
4.20
3.47
2.37
4.12
3.53
5.29
2.50
5.00
3.80
3.62
1.50
3.14
2.00
4.00
1.93

# Threads
%
Examined Threads
2
85.7%
4
79.2%
5
78.3%
6
77.4%
5
88.1%
4
79.0%
5
64.9%
4
81.9%
4
93.7%
3
83.5%
9
89.3%
3
92.1%
4
85.0%
4
84.7%
6
82.3%
8
80.7%
2
75.6%
3
69.0%
3
79.6%
4
78.3%
2
48.6%
2
51.9%
2
65.0%
3
76.5%
5
89.4%
4
81.8%
3
69.5%
7
82.9%
2
90.7%
2
62.2%
2
70.0%
4
75.0%
3
72.5%
6
58.8%
3
78.4%
3
66.7%
3
89.0%
5
57.1%

	
  
3/14/11
3/15/11
3/16/11
3/17/11
3/18/11
3/19/11
3/20/11
3/21/11
3/22/11
3/23/11
3/24/11
3/25/11
3/26/11
TOTAL
	
  

	
  

62
69
51
23
45
52
107
104
116
74
64
32
163
3,982

28
14
17
12
15
10
24
8
15
26
12
17
21
810

14
11
7
5
3
9
18
15
18
14
14
6
19
646

21
44
27
6
27
33
65
81
83
34
38
9
123
2,522
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1.42
4.00
3.86
1.20
9.00
3.67
3.61
5.40
4.61
2.43
2.71
1.50
6.47
3.90

3
3
2
1
1
3
6
3
6
5
6
3
5
196

56.5%
79.7%
66.7%
47.8%
66.7%
80.8%
77.6%
92.3%
87.1%
64.9%
81.3%
46.9%
87.1%
79.6%

	
  
APPENDIX E
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: YOUNG TURKS YOUTUBE CHANNEL
Date
2/1/11
2/2/11
2/3/11
2/4/11
2/5/11
2/6/11
2/7/11
2/9/11
2/10/11
2/11/11
2/12/11
2/14/11
2/15/11
2/16/11
2/17/11
2/18/11
2/19/11
2/23/11
2/24/11
2/25/11
2/26/11
2/27/11
2/28/11
3/1/11
3/2/11
3/3/11
3/4/11
3/6/11
3/7/11
3/8/11
3/9/11
3/10/11
3/13/11
3/14/11
3/15/11
3/17/11
3/18/11
3/19/11
3/22/11
	
  

#
# Non#
#
Comments Threads Catalysts Responses
353
102
34
217
464
262
50
152
157
62
21
69
105
36
16
53
150
85
17
48
106
30
14
62
525
268
40
217
62
47
6
9
60
42
4
14
140
86
39
15
223
123
32
78
88
44
9
35
85
32
13
40
189
70
29
90
131
67
16
38
250
90
38
122
202
137
20
45
137
57
21
59
164
68
25
74
170
83
19
68
287
101
39
147
203
66
31
106
216
112
28
76
315
83
43
189
234
89
29
116
59
29
9
21
196
98
20
79
72
32
7
33
60
34
7
19
334
192
52
90
131
60
14
57
159
74
17
68
500
188
58
254
193
76
27
90
168
113
17
41
162
68
27
27
377
163
47
167
47
20
11
16
419
198
54
167
171
	
  

Mean
Length
6.40
3.04
3.28
3.31
2.82
4.43
5.43
1.50
3.50
2.60
2.44
3.89
3.08
3.10
2.38
3.21
2.25
2.81
2.96
3.58
3.78
3.42
2.71
4.40
4.00
2.33
3.90
4.71
2.71
1.73
4.07
4.00
4.38
3.33
2.41
2.48
3.55
1.45
3.09

# Threads
%
Examined Threads
10
71.1%
10
43.5%
7
57.3%
4
65.7%
6
43.3%
3
71.7%
7
49.0%
2
24.2%
1
30.0%
7
38.6%
9
49.3%
4
50.0%
3
62.4%
9
63.0%
6
41.2%
17
64.0%
4
32.2%
10
58.4%
8
60.4%
5
51.2%
8
64.8%
7
67.5%
8
48.1%
5
73.7%
4
62.0%
3
50.8%
6
50.5%
2
55.6%
3
43.3%
19
42.5%
5
54.2%
5
53.5%
13
62.4%
6
60.6%
3
34.5%
10
33.3%
14
56.8%
5
57.4%
14
52.7%

	
  
3/23/11
3/24/11
3/25/11
3/26/11
3/27/11
TOTAL

	
  

240
308
249
159
48
8,897

107
140
120
58
18
4,030

38
47
33
18
9
1,145

95
121
96
83
21
3,684
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2.50
2.57
2.91
4.61
2.33
3.22

8
18
10
5
3
316

55.4%
54.5%
51.8%
63.5%
62.5%
54.3%

	
  
APPENDIX F
CODING INSTRUCTIONS AND SCHEME
Overview & General Instructions
This study is investigating the quality of online user comments posted to online
discussion forums hosted by one of four political news channels: The Los Angeles Times
website, the Daily Kos website, The Young Turks YouTube Channel, and the Associated
Press YouTube Channel. Data were collected over a two-month period beginning
February 1, 2011 and concluding on March 31, 2011. A gross total of 16,859 comments
were archived over the study period and, based upon a partitioning methodology
designed by the researcher, a subset of 5,881 comments require encoding.
As a member of the two-person coding team, you will be responsible for encoding
approximately one-half of this subset. The researcher is supplying you with printed
copies of all comments you have been assigned to code. You are also being given full
access to the digital archive of news content affiliated with these discussions as your
assistance is needed in categorizing the collection of articles and segments.
You will receive compensation from the researcher according to the employment contract
provided to you. In fulfillment of that agreement, you are required to:

	
  

•

Utilize the provided coding scheme to the best of your ability and with as
uniform a level of focus as possible. Though the data set is large, you are being
provided with ample time to complete the coding assignment. As such, be sure
to code only when you are well rested and can give the requisite attention to the
project.

•

Enter all coding data directly into the online GoogleDrive spreadsheet assigned to
you. News source and date information have been preloaded into the spreadsheet
and correspond to identifying information appearing on the printed sheets. You
may open and use the online spreadsheet whenever you wish and as many times
as you wish. Contact the researcher if you have any questions about the online
spreadsheet or if you encounter any problems accessing it.

•

Refrain from communicating with the other member of the coding team in any
way until such time as the researcher has received all coding data. Should you
have any questions about the coding scheme or any particular data elements,
please contact the researcher exclusively.

•

Complete all coding by September 1, 2012. Please contact the researcher
immediately if, for any reason, you anticipate you will not be able to complete
the assignment by this deadline.
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Coding Scheme: Measures of the Quality of Deliberation
Each comment is considered discreet and must be coded separately as its own row within
the online spreadsheet. Columns correspond to four measures of deliberative quality
(civility, politeness, complexity and responsiveness) and are described in detail below.
Civility Measure
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions?
a) The discussant verbalizes a generalized or specific threat to democracy,
democratic institutions or democratic values. Democracy is considered to be an
amalgamation of the broader concepts of liberty, equality, and the rule of law.
Example Yes: “The U.S. Supreme Court should be disbanded and replaced by a
committee of the NRA.”
Example Yes: “Freedom of speech should be eradicated.”
Example No: “When 2012 rolls around, we need to elect a new president.”
Example No: “I cannot believe in this day and age, with so many people below
the poverty line, you can still vote Republican.”
b) The discussant verbalizes a threat to individual rights and freedoms. These
threats may take the form of statements intending or promising to do physical,
psychological or emotional harm with the goal of retarding the utilization of such
rights and freedoms. Moreover, these threats may be directed specifically at
another discussant or more generally at a citizen or group of citizens.
Example Yes: “If you’re not gainfully employed, you should have no right to
vote.”
Example Yes: “I’m going to rip [username’s] tongue out so he can’t yap any
more!”
Example No: “Pro-gay advocates need to take to the streets in protest of the
Defense of Marriage Act.”
Example No: “If you don’t like it, get off our duff and do something about it!”
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c) The discussant employs one or more antagonistic stereotypes – that is, the
discussant distinguishes, labels and makes a judgment about a group of
individuals – that are intended to antagonize, discredit or harm. These
antagonistic stereotypes may be directed specifically at another discussant or
more generally at a citizen or group of citizens.
Example Yes: “Cutting the capital gains tax just means more fancy sports cars
and private jets for the uber-rich.”
Example Yes: “… [username] is a typical soccer mom who is convinced her kids
are little angels that do nothing wrong.”
Example No: “Senior citizens are worried about the future of Social Security –
and they should be!”
Example No: “He’s no different than many new immigrants who will work long
hours for little pay and then send most of their money back to their
home country.”
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Civility = 0.
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Civility = 1.
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell, Civility = 99.
Politeness Measure
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions?
a) The discussant engages in name-calling that is clearly intend to offend. These
name-callings may be directed specifically at another discussant or more
generally at a citizen or group of citizens.
Example Yes: “Senator King is an obnoxious prick.”
Example Yes: “[Username] is a total fraud and shouldn’t even be allowed

to post on this discussion board.”
Example No: “Politicians generally do a lousy job in terms of truly
understanding the needs of their constituents.”
Example No: “[Username] is totally wrong in her analysis. She’s looking at the
wrong kinds of data.”
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b) The discussant engages ad hominem attacks – that is, the discussant attacks
another’s characteristics or authority without addressing the substance of the
argument. These attacks may be directed specifically at another discussant or
more generally at a citizen or group of citizens.
Example Yes: “I don’t expect you to understand. After all, you’re poor.”
Example Yes: “[Username] has no business lecturing us about tax policy.”
Example No: “President Bush lied to us. He said in the campaign he wouldn’t
raise taxes… and then he did.”
Example No: “I can understand why the rich don’t want a national health care
program. It will likely lead to higher taxes and nearly all of them
have private insurance already.”
c) The discussant uses vulgar language appearing in the dictionary at
www.noswearing.com. These words may be expressed explicitly or clearly
implied in the use of abbreviations, grawlixes or other obvious symbols.
Example Yes: “How the f**k are we supposed to do that?”
Example Yes: “Holy @#$%&! You can’t be serious!”
Example No: “Our taxes are going up again?! Jesus H. Christ!”
Example No: “The House of Representatives makes we want to barf.”
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Politeness = 0.
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Politeness = 1.
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell,
Politeness = 99.
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Justification Measure
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions?
a) The discussant justifies an argument or perspective by providing supporting
evidence in the form of cited facts, embedded documents, web links,
quoted/paraphrased comments from experts, etc.
Example Yes: “Senator Johnson took in $190K of PAC money according
to the Center for Government Reporting.”
Example Yes: “How can [username] say that? Doesn’t he remember what
he posted two days ago?: www.youtube.com/acqwr122”
Example No: “Everyone knows that Republicans favor small government.”
Example No: “President Obama has a war chest of $59 million already!”
b) The discussant justifies an argument by providing supporting evidence in the
form of a description of personal experience or a first-hand account
Example Yes: “When I got laid off from my job my unemployment benefits
were only $600 per month. How can I survive on that?”
Example No: “The average person receiving unemployment benefits gets about
$600 per month. That’s not very much at all.”
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Justification = 0.
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Justification = 1.
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell,
Justification = 99.
Complexity Measure
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions?
a) The discussant incorporates opposing viewpoints into a given post (irrespective
of whether he/she agrees with those viewpoints)
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Example Yes: “Who can tell who’s right? Conservative say Obamacare will
bankrupt the country. Liberals say health care is a right we owe
our citizens.”
Example No: “I agree with liberals in saying that access to affordable health
care is a right just the same as free speech or worship.”
b) The discussant expresses a viewpoint in more than one way
Example Yes: “The build-up of the military gets a bad rap. Not only does it
stimulate large sectors of the economy but it also leads to the
development of new technologies that improve every-day
quality of life.”
Example No: “The build-up of the military gets a bad rap. It stimulates large
sectors of the economy.”
c) The discussant verbalizes his/her lack of certainty
Example Yes: “I’ve wrestled for years with the abortion question and I still
can’t decide if I’m pro-choice or pro-life. My values as a
citizen are at odds with my values as a Catholic.”
Example No: “The pro-choice position is the only position that’s consistent
with the Bill of Rights.”
d) The discussant clearly asks an honest question (and not a rhetorical one) in an
attempt to better understand an issue
Example Yes: “How many young people voted in the last election?”
Example No: “Vote Democrat and expect lower taxes? How dumb do you
think I am?
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Complexity = 0.
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Complexity = 1.
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell,
Complexity = 99.

	
  

178
	
  

	
  
Coding Scheme: Categorization of Corresponding Article/Segment
Each comment corresponds to an original printed article or broadcasted audiovisual
segment. Two additional columns are included on the online spreadsheet and coders are
asked to make appropriate categorizations of each corresponding article/segment.
Geographic Focus
Does the segment or article focus the majority of its attention on (1) political issues,
discussions or considerations within the United States; or (2) political issues, discussions
or considerations outside of the United States?
If (1), Geographic Focus = Domestic.
If (2), Geographic Focus = International.
If you cannot tell, Geographic Focus = Cannot Tell.
Example Domestic:

An article describing the Democratic Party’s
opposition to the Defense of Marriage Act.

Example International:

A segment describing widespread protests of the
G7 summit in Paris.

Topical Focus
Does the segment or article focus the majority of its attention on (1) lawmaking,
policymaking or public policy; or (2) on elections, balance of power discussions or
political strategy?
If (1), Topical Focus = Governing.
If (2), Topical Focus = Campaigning.
If you cannot tell, Topical Focus = Cannot Tell.

	
  

Example Governing:

A segment describing a United Nations debate to
dispatch humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees.

Example Campaigning:

A article detailing the current field of Republican
Presidential candidates and their odds of winning
the Iowa caucuses.
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APPENDIX G
CODING QUICK SHEET

Pre-populated by Researcher:
Date of Article:

___ / ___ / 2011

Source:

☐
☐
☐
☐

Channel Constitution:

☐ Internet-Native
☐ Traditional

Channel Medium:

☐ Print
☐ Multimedia

Discussion Thread ID:

Thread #: ___ Sequence #: ___

Associated Press YouTube Channel
Young Turks YouTube Channel
Los Angeles Times Website
Daily Kos Website

To Be Populated by Coding Team Members:
Measures of the Quality of Deliberation
Civility:

☐ 0 YES
☐ 1 NO
☐ 99 N/A

(a) threats to democracy; (b) threats to individual
rights and freedoms; (c) antagonistic stereotypes

Politeness:

☐ 0 YES
☐ 1 NO
☐ 99 N/A

(a) name-calling; (b) ad hominem attacks;
(c) vulgarity

Justification:

☐ 0 NO
☐ 1 YES
☐ 99 N/A

(a) cited facts; (b) cited personal experience

Complexity:

☐ 0 NO
☐ 1 YES
☐ 99 N/A

(a) opposing viewpoints; (b) multiple viewpoints;
(c) lack of certainty; (d) honest question
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Categorization of Corresponding Article/Segment
Geographic Focus

☐ Domestic
☐ International
☐ Unable to Determine

Topical Focus

☐ Governing/Policymaking
☐ Campaigning/Strategizing
☐ Unable to Determine
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APPENDIX H
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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